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COMPETITION AND COOPERATION 
IN THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE 
Papers from the Fourth Italy-Japan Workshop
by
M a ssim o  D i M a t t e o  * and L io n e llo  F. P un zo  *
1. Many interpretations of Japans’ Post-War development have been 
offered, in Italy and elsewhere. Some attribute it to the socio-cultural envir­
onment, others to what could be termed “flexible rigidity”, and others to the 
peculiarities of Japanese industrial relations and/or of the role of gov­
ernment in directing development, and fostering macroeconomic adjust­
ments and structural changes, if and when needed. There is no uniform 
explanation, based on one or two fundamental “causes”, for Japan’s success. 
Although the five essays published in this issue do not present a coherent 
and comprehensive interpretation of the workings of the Japanese economy, 
they offer some elements to understand the maze of analytical issues arising 
from a reasoned reconstruction of the country’s post war development. 
Perhaps they are the most interesting aspects, from the European point of 
view. Our selection provides two interesting viewpoints on the overall inter­
pretation of Japan’s fast growth dynamics: one from within Japan, by Ryu- 
taro Komiya, a well known authority in recent Japanese economic history 
and industrial policy; an alternative, partially conflicting, partially consistent 
viewpoint from outside by an Italian researcher, Gianni Fodella, who can 
claim great familiarity with Japan and the Far-East in general (due to his 
past personal history and present diplomatic position). Next, the selection 
offers three “windows” on specific aspects of Japan’s economic statics, a 
system with a “relational network” of its own. These focus respectively on 
the relations (possibly of a hierarchical nature) among firms (Banri Asanu- 
ma), between (specifically manufacturing) firms and banking and financial 
institutions (Toshihiro Horiuchi), and within firms, between workers-em-
* Department of Political Economy, University of Siena, Siena (Italy).
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ployees and the firms as training institutions (Man Sako). Although the 
emphasis is different in the various papers, on the whole they all suggest 
international comparisons.
It is appropriate to mention that the papers were originally conceived 
as contributions to the Fourth Italy-Japan Workshop, the last in a sequel of 
Forum-like meetings held in Siena starting in the Spring of 1987, and 
organized by a joint research group between the Department of Political 
Economy and STICERD at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science. Besides its regular research activity, the group promoted the inter­
change of views and experiences between professional and academic econo­
mists of the two countries by organizing regular workshops. Most of the 
papers read at the earlier meetings have already appeared elsewhere \
In this short introduction, we shall only try to point out some key 
elements common to the papers; however, comments on some of the issues 
go beyond our limited scope.
As a unifying theme one can call attention to an empirical observation: 
Western-style competition, though certainly important, is not the only force 
which can drive an economy on a successful development path. The Jap­
anese post-War experience reveals the complex blending of the forces of 
competition with those of cooperation, both internally and in relation with 
the external world, in a fashion that is considered unusual in standard 
doctrine. It is much easier to see and appreciate the power of such intricate 
connections after forty years of development than it was at its outset, in the 
early 50s. The root of Japanese success, it seems now, lies in perceiving 
from the outset that a mixture of competition and cooperation could prove a 
successful political and economic recipe, as well as guessing the right propor­
tions of these two ingredients.
In Italy the widespread interest for Japan springs from an “impres­
sion” of great similarity in the positions of the two countries at the end of 
WWII. Hence the economic strategy (broadly defined) implemented so 
successfully in Japan may have been an option for Italy too, but unfortunate­
ly it was not taken up. Although great care is obviously needed in drawing 
comparisons when there are important “structural” and cultural differences 
as in this case, it can easily be remarked that the two countries had similar 
political experiences before the War and were substantially hit by them;
1 The working group, coordinated by Michio Morishima and Lionello F. Punzo, was 
established in the framework of a research project involving the Department of Political 
Economy of the University of Siena and the Suntory-Toyota Foundation (STICERD). On the 
Italian side, financial support was granted by the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, under 
contracts no. 86.01273.10; 87.01158.10; 88.03104.10.
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neither could they count on domestic production of raw materials or on 
energy sources. Finally, they both had high labour/land ratios. Why did 
they take altogether different directions as far as economic strategy is 
concerned? Was the Japanese choice, the result of “natural attitudes”, e.g. 
of the Japanese conception of social organization as a hierarchy, or the 
result of political engineering, or both? This is the issue when we come 
down to it. In the sequel some notes are offered in the vein of comparing 
Italy and Japan. (Perhaps one should be bold enough to tackle other 
comparisons, e.g. with the present situation in the Eastern European 
countries, as by now suggested from various parts).
2. For the interplay of the policy principles of competition and coopera­
tion in post-war Japanese economic history, one should read the essays by 
Fodella and Komiya, which can conveniently be read together. Here, we 
would like to take up the case of the industrial policies from Komiya. To 
evaluate past policy choices one could use a counterfactual methodology, 
and ask what could have been the result of faithful adhesion, by Japan, to a 
version of the laissez-faire doctrine (the doctrine of unrestricted or complete­
ly free competition). First of all, it would probably have entailed the liberal­
ization of trade and capital movements and thence a domestic industrial 
structure which would have been entirely shaped by its international 
comparative advantage. No doubt, the realization of the former has been 
among Japan’s policy priorities since the early 50s, a point stressed by 
Komiya. At the same time however, and perhaps even higher in the policy 
ranking, other guidelines were defined and strictly adhered to. Policy-makers 
were concerned first of all with providing Japan with a substantially 
complete industrial matrix. It is in this perspective that active support for 
the development and/or modernization of sectors classified as key sectors, 
such as energy, steel, and shipbuilding, was decided and vigorously carried 
out. In this light one can rationalize government support of those branches 
of the chemical industry which were instrumental in improving productivity 
in agriculture and reducing the dependence on wool and cotton of the large­
ly home-based clothing industry. To use Ricardian (and neo-Ricardian) 
terminology, all these measures show the marked prominence accorded in 
policy decisions to securing the production of wage and basic goods. 
Komiya refers to Marx’s reproduction schemes as an inspiration of this 
“industrial structure” policy; we feel the reference needs some qualification: 
there is a big difference between Japan and the USSR of the late 20s where 
Marx’s reproduction schemes were indeed used for planning purposes.
At the basis of the Japanese historical experience there appears to be a
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definite sense of means-and-ends hierarchy among the various industries. 
Putting them on the same footing is typical of the liberistic doctrine (speciali­
zation is always good whatever the industry involved) which then is totally 
unable to cope with the complex problems arising in the industrial structure 
of an economy undergoing qualitative change and development. For a varie­
ty of reasons, but significantly for lack of technological know-how, human 
skills, specific capital goods and production plants, and the like, the devel­
opment of certain branches of heavy industry might prove impossible, or 
simply too onerous, after a country has ended up specialising in light indus­
tries. A strategic though temporary import substitution at an early stage of 
development is not at all in contrast with the development of a competitive 
edge in the world market. This strategy was implemented in Japan after 
successfully fighting its postwar inflation with a drastic monetary squeeze 
(well before Japan’s appearance on international markets).
The experience of tough deflationary monetary policy is shared by 
Italy, but that is all: the main differences between the two countries were 
soon to emerge. Indeed, government policy aimed at shaping Japan’s indus­
trial structure according to strategic long term choices continued long after 
the first postwar phase (the first stage defined by Komiya), and well into 
the late 60s. Generous support was granted in a variety of ways to a number 
of industries: the automobile industry, petrochemicals, machinery, electron­
ics, colour films, computers and semiconductors. Komiya is skeptical about 
the effectiveness of such support, maintaining that such industries would 
have developed anyway.
Italy had some good points at the start in many of the same sectors as 
Japan. The literature suggests that a selective “industrial structure policy” 
modeled on similar principles, though perhaps whith different priorities and 
key sectors, could have proved a success. This was not what happened, as is 
well known. Even the potentialities of a large section of state-owned firms, 
which could have been used for policy-purposes and were for this reason a 
very much admired heritage of the pre-war economy, at least up to the 60s, 
were to be soon destroyed for reasons that we know too well. These firms 
actually turned into a major source of weakness in the Italian industrial 
system as a wholq. Very recent events further confirmed this sad picture.
Komiya reminds us that the simultaneous presence of considerations of 
competition and efficiency in the traditional sense was preserved in the con­
ception and implementation of Japanese industrial policies. Such policies 
were solidly founded on microeconomic levels of action, reaching not only 
whole industrial sectors but also individual firms (even single plants). En­
couragement was given to mergers (in order to exploit economies of scale),
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and support granted to facilitate internal reorganizations of firms, standardi­
zation of methods and products, and so forth. Due attention was paid to 
devising tariff structures in clear preference to manoeuvres of the rate of 
exchange, even when this was clearly overvalued, as in the 50s.
As Komiya recalls, Japan pursued the target of trade balance as soon as 
possible. A trade deficit must be financed by capital inflows or curtailed by 
deflation. The former alternative sacrifices neither employment nor domes­
tic output; however, to let foreign capital enter without restrictions is certain­
ly onerous in the medium term, and in the short term it implies reduced 
autonomy in monetary policy. Only when “structural independence” has 
been reached can a program of trade liberalization be safely pursued. This is 
confirmed indirectly in Fodella’s comparison with European and US devel­
opment. He rightly emphasizes, it seems to us, that only “structurally 
strong” countries can afford (almost completely) free trade, and here the 
adjective “structural” designates what the Japanese seem to have always 
had in mind when deciding both individual measures and grand policy 
schemes, such as “MITI visions”.
Practical implementation of policy has changed in time, and Japanese 
government policy has also evolved, as reconstructed from MITI Research 
Unit director, R. Komiya. Even in the period immediately following the first 
oil shock, Japan’s policy tended to temper (or to “fine tune”) the targets of 
increasing the levels of competition and economic efficiency with that of 
stability via cooperation. In this period MITI produced a whole series of 
“visions”, documents based on consultations among private firms, trade 
unions, other social partners, ministerial civil servants and economic ex­
perts, that indicated the scenarios towards which the country was to move. 
This dissemination of comprehensive and homogeneous information, a 
drastically innovative instrument of industrial policy that became more and 
more important, effectively enabled otherwise uncoordinated economic 
agents to form robust expectations that could take into account explicit 
government “preferences” and carefully selected economic priorities. Public 
releases of “visions” practically reduced uncertainty in the general economic 
environment while forcing upon perhaps reluctant and short-sighted eco­
nomic operators an unusual consciousness of the long-term framework of 
economic decisions. Japan as a country became conscious of its attained 
structural strength and of the fact that it was the appropriate foundation for 
continued high-tech growth.
Unanimity in political decisions affecting the economy and social cohe­
sion are the foundations of Japanese government efficiency and competitive 
edge on the world markets. This is rendered possible by a peculiar blend of
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institutions, laws, rules and social procedures used to reach collective deci­
sions. Fodella observes the permanent, or slow changing role of culture and 
institutions that make up the unique physiognomy of a country (e.g. Japan, 
the NICs, etc.) and introduces a catchy neologism, “orgware”, to indicate this 
blend, or rather to indicate what is neither social “hardware” nor “software”. 
Obviously, these are issues which are becoming more and more relevant in 
the uncertain European scenario, as shown by the increasing emphasis 
placed by EC policies on targets of social cohesion.
3. The financial sector is perhaps the sector where cooperation, rather 
than competition, seems to prevail. It is well known that large Japanese 
corporations are typically organized in groups that also include small and 
medium size enterprises. Within each of these groups, large firms are con­
nected to one another by a closely knit network of cross and mutual owner­
ship. However, the single largest shareholder of a corporation is a major 
bank (its “main bank”) or an insurance company. This leads to the stabiliza­
tion of corporate ownership and the distinction between ownership and 
control tends to blur. Its main purpose is to eliminate the possibility of 
hostile or external takeovers, and these are indeed rare in Japan. Mergers, 
on the other hand, generally decided in the restricted circles of the top 
management of the firms involved, are comparatively more frequent.
The advangage of such a widespread property arrangement is that 
corporations are not discouraged from engaging in risky projects, unprofita­
ble in the short term, but promising major innovative breakthroughs in the 
long run. The so-called “short-termism” which seems to affect the Anglosax- 
on financial system, is unknown in Japan and firms are not compelled to 
target their strategies to the sole objective of pleasing the management of 
pension funds, as often happens in the US and UK. The absence of the 
so-called “sanction of the market” does not necessarily lead to lower 
efficiency and inability to compete worldwide, at least in Japan.
Against this background, T. Horiuchi focuses on the variety of relation­
ships between firms and their main bank(s). As a result of operating in 
collaboration with a large corporation over a long period, the bank acquires 
internal, firm-specific information, to the firm’s own benefit, especially in 
bad times when the bank is often called to the rescue. Being its major 
shareholder, the bank has a direct interest in the long-term health of the 
corporation. Contrast this with a situation in which internal information of 
the firms is freely available on the market (as is in the Anglosaxon ecp- 
nomic environment): share prices would tend to be less stable; takeovers
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would become feasible and the stable relationship between firms inside and 
outside the group is lost.
Again, competition is not altogether absent from Horiuchi’s picture, 
since large corporations have more than one main bank, and small to me­
dium size firms tend to be more dynamic on the capital markets. Exploiting 
data from a large empirical investigation, Horiuchi highlights the differences 
between the situation of large and of small and medium firms.
4. The differences in the industrial and economic relations entertained 
by small and medium size firms and those associated with large firms have 
provoked keen interest in economists concerned with the Japanese econo­
my. According to many, the best known features deemed to be characteristic 
of the Japanese system as a whole (eg. life employment, the seniority career 
scheme) are actually confined to large corporations. The extent of subcon­
tracting arrangements between large and small/medium size firms, the cru­
cial role of the latter as employment and output buffers, like the limited 
development of vertical integration, have also often been stressed. To 
increase their flexibility, large firms take advantage of labour market 
segmentation by delegating to small and medium firms that part of their 
production which might be environmentally dangerous or whose demand is 
unstable. It is a general observation that smaller firms have to raise their 
relatively lower wages to be able to recruit workers over an upswing, 
whereas they are the first victims of recession when the wage wedge re­
opens in favour of large firms. Japan’s dualism, cutting across the labour 
market and the enterprise structure, again reminds us of similar features in 
the behaviour and structure of the contemporary Italian economy.
B. Asanuma studies a fairly general aspect of these relationships be­
tween firms of different sizes, namely the relations between suppliers of 
intermediate parts and the assembler-manufacturer: his case study is the 
automobile industry. Here again we find another instance of “balanced 
mixture” between competition and cooperation which may be the key, 
among other things, to the high quality and reliability of Japanese manufac­
tured products and the “lean production” schemes, so famous in the auto­
mobile industry. To obtain these results, it is not sufficient to buy from 
whoever happens to be the least-cost supplier at any moment; it may be 
more important to have quality-dependable intermediate products and com­
ponent parts that comply to the exact specifications to fit the final product. 
For this, a closer relationship between the assembler-manufacturer and the 
subcontractor is required, extending down to the design and production 
planning stage. Asanuma points out some striking differences between stand­
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ard Japanese and typical North American behaviours in the automobile 
industry.
Such a close relationship presupposes a high degree of cooperation and 
trust. Competition, on the other hand, is somehow preserved through peri­
odically held auctions to contract out to the best supplier. This attitude 
reveals how “learning” is important for the smooth and efficient function­
ing of an economic system: “learning by doing” as well as “learning by 
talking”. Enlarging Williamson’s theory, Asanuma aptly labels the emerging 
skills, “relation specific skills”.
5. Another feature of the Japanese economy attracting attention in the 
West is the attitude and somehow legendary performance of the Japanese 
worker. To a Western economist the threat of being fired is the classical 
employer’s instrument for “convincing” workers to discipline on the shop 
floor. How can labour efficiency be compatible with lifetime employment? 
If the worker can be induced to identify with the firm employing him, his 
future is inextricably linked with the economic health of the firm. This 
attachment and the resulting good quality of work can be cultivated in 
various ways. One of them is stressed by M. Sako in her comparative study 
of the job-training systems in Britain, Germany and Japan. Continuous 
on-the-job training is a common practice in Japanese firms, and makes 
production processes smoother by incentivating workers to take an active 
part (eg. via quality circles and the like). Workers’ pay is related to age, but 
also to individual merit, Sako stresses. Before the advent of mass produc­
tion, the artisan or small producer took pride in his work. Fordist mass 
production is supposed to have swept this feature away; the Japanese seem 
to have found a way of preserving it.
6. Undoubtedly Japan has some sort of recipe “of its own” for high 
economic growth, and has been able to use it at least until very recent times. 
We do not know all its ingredients, and some of them, are probably not 
available in the West. This remark goes in the direction of Fodella’s theory 
that national orgware is the key element of a country’s performance and 
thus of Japan’s success. Fascinating as this theory is, it is hard to judge its 
merits in the present generalized climate of poor economic performance 
and growth.
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THREE STAGES OF JAPAN’S INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
AFTER WORLD W AR II
by
R y u t a r o  K o m iy a  *
I. In t r o d u c t io n
When looking back at Japan’s industrial policy in the post-World-War- 
II (WWII) period, it is important to pay due attention to its development 
over time. This is because Japan’s industrial policy has not been an unchang­
ing entity over the forty-five years since the end of WWII, but has been 
changing a great deal in its tasks, contents and tools to meet the changing 
needs of the times. As time passed, new approaches to industrial policy 
were adopted, and older ones altered or abandoned.
In reviewing Japan’s post-war industrial policy, it is best to start by 
dividing the whole period into three stages or periods in relation to Japan’s 
economic development.
The Japanese economy has shown a striking development over about 
half a century since the end of WWII, with its per capita Gross National 
Products (GNP) at a very low level in the decade immediately after the war 
but now exceeding that of the United States and most European countries in 
recent years. In the process of this remarkable development, the Japanese 
economy passed through several evolutional stages or periods. Industrial 
policy also went through several stages or phases correspondingly. Obviously
* Professor of Economics, Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo, and Director General, 
Research Institute of International Trade and Industry, MITI.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Fourth Italy-Japan Workshop at 
University of Siena, on September 21st and 22nd, 1991. The views expressed in this paper are 
personal ones of the author, and must not be taken as representing those of the institutions to 
which the author belongs. Comments on an earlier draft and the assistance provided by 
colleagues at MITI Research Institute are gratefully acknowledged, but they are in no way 
responsible for the views of the author expressed in this paper.
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it is difficult to divide this 45-year process into clearly distinct periods 
according to some precise criteria. Any division is bound to be arbitrary. In 
the following I will examine post-war Japan’s industrial policy in three 
stages as below \
Stage 1. 1945 — the First Half of the 1950s
This period may be described, in short, as a time of devastation, 
disorder, reconstruction, groping for the future, and “independence”. Hav­
ing lost more than 30 percent of its national wealth in World War II, Japan 
started pursuing economic recovery amid destruction, devastation and dis­
order due to the defeat. It was grappling with the near collapse of its 
industrial infrastructure, a large number of repatriates, sluggish industrial 
production, hyperinflation, and severe hardships among its people.
As Japan was occupied by the Allied Forces during most of this period, 
the nation’s economic policy was supervised by the General Headquarters of 
the Allied Forces, which generally meant the United States. The United 
States occupation policies changed with bewildering rapidity, due both to 
the changing international environment of those years and policy changes 
within the United States, often causing confusion for the Japanese authori­
ties. Japan nevertheless achieved “economic independence”, which meant 
bringing its balance of international payments on current account into bal­
ance without American aids and the Korean War “special procurement” and 
generating self-sustained growth. Industrial production recovered by and 
large to the pre-war level by the end of this period, thanks to the United 
States aids, the economic stabilization policy and the favorable economic 
effects of the Korean War. By fiscal year 1951, both real GNP and the 
industrial production index surpassed the levels recorded in 1934-1936.
The tasks for Japan’s industrial policy in this immediate post-war de­
cade, were economic reconstruction and “economic independence” in the 
above sense.
Stage 2. The Latter Half of the 1950s — the First Oil Crisis (1973-1974)
The most striking economic event in this period is the so-called “high
' For a detailed description of Japan’s industrial policy after WWII until around 1980, see 
Tsusho Sangyo Seisaku-Shi (The History of Japan’s International Trade and Industrial Policies), 
17 vols., Tokyo: Tsusho Chosakai, which is now being edited under the direction of Professor 
Mikio Sumiya. 13 volumes out of the total 17 have already been published as of March 1993. 
For an overview and economic analysis of Japan’s industrial policy, see Komiya, Okuno and 
Suzumura (1988).
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growth”. Under Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda’s national-income-doubling 
plan announced in 1960, following the relatively high rate of economic 
growth of the late 1950s, the Japanese economy experienced an average 
annual growth rate of slightly above 10 percent in terms of national income 
until the early 1970s, although there were cyclical fluctuations in the 
growth rate. Another feature of this period was the transition to an open 
economy of liberalized international trade (import) and “capital” movement 
(primarily inward direct investment). Under pressure from the United States 
and European countries that began in the middle of the 1950s and in­
creased in the late 1950s, in 1960 the Japanese government announced a 
“Basic Plan to Liberalize International Trade and Foreign Exchange Transac­
tions”, and subsequently enacted a related legislation according to the plan. 
As a result the ratio of liberalized to total import trade went up to over 90 
percent by the end of 1965. In addition, Japan became an Article 8 member 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1964 and joined the Organiza­
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) the same year. 
Liberalization of “capital” movement lagged somewhat behind, with the first 
step taken in 1967 and the fifth in 1973.
During this period, the aim of Japan’s industrial policy was to over­
come the two billows -  liberalization of import trade and liberalization of 
“capital” flows - ,  by steadily raising the “level of sophistication” of the 
nation’s industrial structure, which mainly meant the strengthening of “mod­
ern”, high-productivity sectors, and by enhancing “industrial competitive­
ness” of Japan’s industries in the world market. Thus one might describe 
this period as the heyday of Japan’s industrial policy”. New troublesome 
developments such as industrial pollution, the first of a series of Japan-U.S. 
trade disputes (1968-1972), and the issue of industrial location occurred 
toward the end of this period. These problems represented a new challenge 
to Japan’s industrial policy in the third period.
Stage 3. Since the First Oil Crisis to the Present
The salient features of this period could best be described as Japan’s 
rise to a major and mature economic power and further diversification of the 
tasks and contents of its industrial policy. The Japanese economy already 
ranked second in 1968 in GNP in the world after the United States. During 
this period, Japan’s competitiveness in sophisticated manufactures has in­
creased remarkably, and Japan has become the world’s leader in production 
and export of automobiles, electronic products, numerically controlled ma­
chine tools and semiconductors. At the same time, Japan has recorded huge
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trade surpluses and the corresponding capital outflows. All these are signs 
of Japan’s rise into a major economic power. The improved industrial com­
petitiveness brought trade and economic disputes — trade and economic 
“frictions”, in Japanese language -  with the United States and European 
countries, and some Japanese industries were forced to control their export.
Tasks for industrial policy have become more and more diversified in 
this period and included environment pollution, containment of high infla­
tion caused by sharp increases in oil prices, energy conservation, develop­
ment of alternative energy sources, restructuring of depressed industries, 
adjustment assistance to adversely affected small and medium enterprises, 
industrial location policy to ameliorate regional differences in industrial 
development and income levels, and “trade frictions” as stated above.
II. T h e  F ir st  S t a g e : 1945 — T he  F ir st  H a l f  o f  t h e  1 9 5 0 s
A. Continuation and Liquidation of Wartime Economic Controls: 1945-1950
At the outset of this First Stage, it was of paramount importance to get 
the nation’s economy off its wartime setting as quickly as possible. It was in 
this period that the basic framework was established for later economic 
growth of the Japanese economy as a free market economy in which private 
enterprises compete with each other to survive and prosper. Such frame­
work for fostering private economic activity was laid down by ending 
inflation and government budget deficits and removing wartime economic 
controls during this period.
In the years immediately after WWII, however, the strictly regulatory 
economic system during the wartime was continued until around 1949, 
since it was quite difficult to pursue economic reforms at once amid the 
devastation and confusion caused by the defeat. The wartime economy 
involved a rationing system and price controls for a wide range of commodi­
ties to mobilize resources for the military purpose and to sustain people’s 
living standards, who were then very poor. After the defeat economic regula­
tions were for some time strengthened by expanding rationing and price 
controls to a larger number of commodities.
Measures taken to keep prices of important goods low through “price- 
gap adjustment subsidies” for price-cost differences and the repayment of 
wartime debts resulted in huge government deficits and fueled vicious infla­
tion with serious detrimental effects on production. As a result the gap 
between the official and black market prices widened, forcing the govern­
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ment to frequently raise official prices. Hyperinflation also induced a vicious 
wage-price spiral which only worsened the plight of the people while leav­
ing production stagnant.
During this period, a large part of imports of raw materials were 
GARIOA-EROA aids granted by the United States. These grants-in-aid and 
the price-gap adjustment subsidies supported by the huge budget deficits 
were criticized as “the two legs of bamboo stilts” by Mr. Joseph Dodge, an 
American banker who visited Japan in February 1949 as the head of a 
special delegation in charge of designing the basic fiscal and monetary policy 
lines consistent with Japan’s noninflationary growth. The Japanese economy 
during this period was far from recovery and “economic independence”.
The shadows of that wartime economy, however, rapidly disappeared 
from 1948 through 1949 as a result of the so-called Dodge line, a strict 
guideline prescribed by Mr. Dodge, which cut off the bamboo legs. At that 
time, there was an influential opinion in the Japanese government in favor 
of pursuing mildly inflationary policies by providing subsidies or funds to 
some industries for raising production to certain levels. However, through 
the adoption in December 1948 of “the Nine Principles for Economic Stabi­
lization” and because of Mr. Dodge’s recommendations, in the following 
year the Japanese government chose a more drastic approach to economic 
stabilization: namely, to adopt austere and “ultra-balanced” fiscal policies. 
Price-gap adjustment subsidies were abolished altogether, financing by the 
Reconstruction Finance Bank was discontinued, and a fixed, uniform 
exchange rate of 360 yen to a dollar was adopted.
The effects of this so-called “Dodge line” were remarkable. The money 
supply, after peaking in January 1949, stabilized in the 1950s, and the 
wage-price spiral was brought to a halt. These deflationary policies brought 
severe depression to many industries. But the Dodge line served to bring 
down inflation and enabled to remove a large number of price controls and 
other regulations speedily. Thus the Japanese economy succeeded in wrench­
ing itself away from its wartime regime and overcame chaos and disorder 
induced by the destructive war, and the groundwork was laid for a free 
market economic system.
B. The “Priority Production Scheme” for Industrial Re construction: 1946- 
1948
This is a very special industrial policy adopted for a short period under 
rather extreme conditions immediately after WWII. In 1946, industrial 
production was severely depressed by a shortage of energy and raw mate­
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rials. Strict restrictions on import trade were imposed by the Allied Occupa­
tion Forces, and a severe shortage of both fuel and electric power was 
caused by sluggish coal output. Hyperinflation and an uncertain outlook for 
the war reparation problem led to a nation-wide production crisis in 1946- 
1947. To cope with the great difficulties, the government attempted to 
increase production of coal, electric power and steel under the so-called 
Priority Production Scheme”. This policy aimed at improving the shortage 
of coal and steel, which was then thought to be the most serious obstacle to 
economic recovery, and boosting their production and increasing the supply 
of electric power, which would spread benefits expanding to other in­
dustries.
For this purpose, available resources including imported oil meagerly 
allowed by the Allied Forces and increases in coal production were allocated 
to the steel industry on a special priority basis, and then a large part of the 
increased steel output was allocated to the coal industry to repair coal-pro­
ducing facilities. The increased output of coal was then used by electric 
power plants and industries, again on a priority basis. Funds from the 
Reconstruction Finance Bank were channeled to the steel and coal indus­
tries. This was thought to start moving the destructed, war-damaged econo­
my, gradually spreading the expansionary effects to other industries. The 
effects of the Priority Production Scheme began appearing in late 1947, and 
production of steel and coal regained half its pre-war level by March 1948. 
With increased supplies of coal and electric power, industrial production 
recovered to 70 percent of its pre-war level by December 1948, with signs 
of improvement seen in the supply of a number of products.
As stated above, “the Priority Production Scheme” as industrial policy 
was successful in increasing production under the special circumstances 
prevailing in the Japanese economy immediately after WWII. This is be­
cause although a considerable part of Japan’s plants and equipment were 
destructed by the bombing of the Allied Forces, yet probably more than 
70% still remained, and the Japanese economy then was stagnant primarily 
because of the shortage of energy supplies, that is coal and coal-burning 
electricity.
But the Priority Production Scheme was not an unqualified success, 
for it was financed by an inflationary method: it relied on funds from thé 
Reconstruction Finance Bank, which raised money by selling Reconstruction 
Finance Bonds to the Bank of Japan.
C. “Industrial Rationalization” Policy: First Half of 1950s
During this period, the Japanese industries had redundant, but much
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old-fashioned stocks of machine tools and equipment with low technological 
levels, left by the wartime economy. Japan had been isolated from technolog­
ical advances in the United States and Europe since the late 1930s. As a 
result, quite a few Japanese industries were unable to compete with imports 
under the new exchange rate of 360 yen to a dollar. What was called the 
“industrial rationalization” policy in this period can be interpreted as a series 
of policies adopted with the aim of removing bottlenecks and raising the 
technological levels in a number of Japan’s “key industries”, so as to “quick­
ly bring domestic prices close to international prices”.
The core of the “industrial rationalization” policy was the designation 
of “key industries” eligible for government support such as low-interest 
financing, preferential tax treatments, and protection from import competi­
tion. For designated industries, measures were taken to help promote:
1. “Rationalization” at the individual firm level: modernization of 
plant and equipment, and improvement of technology.
2. “Rationalization of industrial organization”: coordination of the 
kinds of products among firms, use of common facilities, stand­
ardization, mergers, etc.
3. “Rationalization of industrial structures”: promotion of heavy — 
and chemical — industries.
At the same time, measures were taken to develop industry-related 
infrastructure and to better organize small and medium enterprises.
Under the “industrial rationalization” policy, more than 30 industries 
in various fields were designated as “key industries”, eligible for government 
support. Among them the steel, coal, marine transportation/shipbuilding, 
and electric power industries were considered as the four top priority indus­
tries, essential to the nation’s basic industrial structure.
Next, a second tier of priority industries judged critical to national 
economic welfare were: chemical fertilizers chosen in order to increase 
domestic food production, and the synthetic fiber chosen to reduce Japan’s 
dependence on raw cotton and wool imports, to be used for clothing of the 
people, and at the same time to upgrade the nation’s textile industries.
Specific measures taken under the “industrial rationalization” policy 
ire as follows:
1. Low-interest financing by the Japan Development Banks, estab­
lished in 1951, and by the Export-Import Bank of Japan, estab­
lished in 1950.
2. Special tax treatments (accelerated depreciation, tax exemptions 
for important new products, preferential treatment in fixed asset
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(property) tax, exemption of customs tariffs on imported ma­
chinery).
3. Subsidies for interest payments, for ships built in Japan and 
operated by Japanese marine transportation companies.
4. Preferential import quotas under the general import quota 
system.
5. Foreign exchange lending by the Bank of Japan.
6. Borrowings from the World Bank (International Bank for Recon­
struction and Development) through the Japan Development 
Bank under the government guaranty.
These measures were implemented as follows. Low-interest financing 
by the Japan Development Bank contributed to plant and equipment invest­
ment in ‘key industries”. The coal and electric power industries were the 
largest recipients of such financing with 40-50 percent of their investment 
funds coming from the Japan Development Bank. The accelerated deprecia­
tion provision on new investment provided for designated types of plant and 
equipment in designated industries was not tax exemption, but essentially a 
postponement of tax payments. Thus the direct financial benefits to benefici­
ary enterprises were limited. But it contributed to increasing the supply of 
internal funds” within the firm, especially when the firm was growing 
rapidly and investing heavily. Also it had some “information effect”, since 
the fact that the government was favoring a ..particular industry or invest­
ment in a particular type of plant and equipment enabled the firms con­
cerned to borrow funds from private banks and other sources more easily 
than otherwise.
The role of the industrial rationalization was taken over by the “indus­
trial structure” policy in the second period.
D. Need for Economic Independence
As already noted the term “economic independence” in this period 
meant achieving international balance-of-payments equilibrium and sus­
tained economic growth without relying on the economic aids from the 
United States and the “special procurements” by the United States Forces 
related to the Korean War. But the fixed exchange rate of 360 yen to a 
dollar introduced by the Dodge line in 1949 proved to be an overvaluation 
of the yen, as it became clear soon that it was difficult for many industries 
to be competitive with foreign producers not only in overseas markets but in 
domestic markets as well, and that for Japan as a whole it was difficult to 
keep the balance of payments on current account more or less in balance.
THREE STAGES OF JAPAN’S INDUSTRIAL POLICY 977
Under these circumstances import restrictions since the beginning of WWII 
or even earlier were continued and a variety of policies to promote export 
were implemented.
A strict import licensing system was established under the Foreign 
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law and related ordinances, after the 
resumption of private foreign trade, and foreign exchanges available for 
imports were rationed. By doing so, the government attempted to maintain 
the balance of payments, and at the same time protect certain domestic 
industries with poor international competitiveness. Simultaneously, meas­
ures were taken to promote export, such as preferential tax treatments for 
export earnings, the establishment of the Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO) in 1951 for collecting and disseminating export-related informa­
tion and holding export exhibitions to develop overseas markets, the estab­
lishment of the Export Insurance Scheme in 1950, and that of the Export- 
Import Bank of Japan in 1950, mentioned earlier. Also, the “industry ration­
alization policy” as stated above was pursued in order to enhance interna­
tional competitiveness of Japanese industries.
Balance-of-payments constraints were quite acute during this period 
and the overvaluation of the yen was apparent, since various policies were 
necessary to promote export and to restrict import for the balance of pay­
ment reason. It would have been better to adopt a more realistic exchange 
rate rather than to promote export by offering various kinds of “hidden 
export subsidies” for export (i.e. tax-exemption on export earnings) and to 
restrict import through explicit or implicit tariffs (an import quota system is 
largely equivalent to an import tariff). Offering a flat 10-percent export 
subsidy and imposing a flat 10-percent import duty is largely equivalent to 
a devaluation of the yen exchange rate by 10 percent2.
E. Return to the International Economic Community
Another important development in this period is Japan’s return to the 
international economic community. After WWII Japan had been wishing 
earnestly to return to the international economic community, and that was 
by and large realized toward the end of this period. Immediately after 
Japan’s defeat in WWII, there was a debate in Japan as to the choice 
between “the domestic developmental policy” advocated by the late Dr.
2 In this regard it is apparently contradictory to apply tax exemption measures to export 
earnings even when quantitative restrictions — the so-called “voluntary export restraints” — are 
imposed on export on certain items in view of the request for such restrictions by importing 
countries.
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Hiromi Arisawa and Dr. Shigeto Tsuru, on the one hand, and the “priority 
on international trade” advocated by the late Dr. Ichiro Nakayama. Eventual­
ly the latter was more widely accepted than the other.
Before the war, especially in the 1930’s, a number of major trading 
nations discriminated against Japan in world trade, as Japan’s exports of 
manufactures increased rapidly in the condition of world-wide depression. 
Accordingly, wishing to develop as a peaceful trading nation Japan had long 
sought to be accepted as a normal member of the international economic 
community with the most favored nation status as other major trading 
nations. Since the Allied Occupation period, Japan had tried to sound out 
the possibility of its entry into GATT through the United States. In the 
beginning Britain, France, Australia and other countries blocked Japan’s 
move for GATT membership because of Japan’s alleged dumping of textile 
and other manufactures in the 1930s. In 1953 Japan was accepted as a 
provisional member of GATT, and became a regular member of GATT in 
1955. Until 1963-1970, however, a large number of GATT member coun­
tries including Britain, France, Australia and most other West European and 
British Commonwealth countries applied Article 35 of GATT against Japan, 
and did not establish the normal GATT relationships with Japan.
Japan joined IMF in 1952, and concluded a bilateral commerce and 
navigation treaty with the United States in 1953. The treaty includes, a- 
mong others, a clause under which the two countries mutually extend a 
most favored nation treatment in merchandise trade, and another under 
which the two countries extend a “national treatment” to each other’s firms, 
that is the same treatment as the treatment given to their own nationals.
It appears that at the time of Japan’s entry into the IMF the Japanese 
government was not sufficiently aware of the trade and foreign exchange 
liberalization obligations accompanying the entry. Also, both the Japanese 
and United States governments seem to have not been paying enough atten­
tion to the national treatment clause in the Japan-U.S. commercial treaty, 
since both governments have tried from time to time to treat the other 
country’s firms less favorably than their own nationals in the matter of 
direct investment, taxation, or mergers and acquisitions.
III. T he S e c o n d  S t a g e : T he Se c o n d  H a l f  o f  th e  1950s -  T he  F ir st
O il  C r isis
A. Two “Leitmotifs” on Industrial Policy
Two “Leitmotifs”, or two main currents, were intertwined in Japan’s
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industrial policy in this Second Stage. The first is “the current of free 
enterprise system and market mechanism”, which I would call “the westerly 
wind”. According to the economic thought underlying this “westerly wind” 
the market mechanism under the global free and multilateral trade, finance 
and investment system, driven by independent and voluntary actions of 
private enterprises and individuals, results in a more or less desirable pat­
tern of resource allocation and industrial structure of each country. Basically 
the government does not need to intervene in industrial and economic 
affairs except in limited types of situations, nor to determine a country’s 
overall industrial structure. Over the long run the industries which should 
thrive in each country would thrive. The second current is “the current of 
industrial structure policy”, which I would call the “easterly wind”. It aims 
at establishing a certain pattern of a country’s “industrial structure”, or at 
modifying it in a particular direction, such as the “heavy — and chemical — 
industrialization” or “sophistication of the industrial structure”. This is 
based upon the idea that it is necessary to work out basic principles of a 
country’s industrial structure policy, and to reorganize industries according 
to such principles under the guidance of the government. I call the first 
current “the westerly”, since it is basically the Anglosaxon (and Northwest 
European) economic policy thought, underlying OECD, IMF and GATT. 
The second is called “the easterly”, since its sources are (1) the German (or 
Prussian) economic policy thought of “rationalization” and cartelization of 
the 1920s and 1930s, and (2) Karl Marx’s two sector model of reproduc­
tion of a national economy, with the first sector producing producers’ and 
capital goods, corresponding roughly to heavy-industries — and chemical-in­
dustries —, and the second producing consumers’ goods and all the rest3.
5 Very few if any of the MITI high officials and experts who were active in the Industrial 
Structure Council (or the earlier Industrial Structure Research Committee) had been exposed 
much to the contemporary economics and the liberal economic thought prevalent in Northwest 
Europe and North America. They were mostly graduates of the Schools of Law. Some of them 
who were graduates of the Schools of Economics studied economics in the 1920s or 1930s 
when Japanese economics was under the strong influences of the German Historical School and 
later of Marxian economics.
Almost all MITI officials at that time and even now would deny — and be unconscious of 
— the connection between the economic policy thought underlying MITI’s industrial structure 
policy in Stage 2 and the Marxian economics, especially Marx’s two-sector reproduction model. 
But the Soviet Russian and Chinese policy of keeping the prices of energy, iron and steel, some 
chemicals, and transportation services at artificial, very low levels is quite similar to MITI’s 
early postwar policy. It reminds me of a remark made by John M. Keynes that the economic 
policy makers’ thinking was often much influenced, without their recognizing it, by old 
economic theories of defunct economists of many decades ago.
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Another reason for calling the second current as “the easterly” is that it 
represented the mainstream of patriotic industrial policy-makers of Japan, a 
most eastern country “where the sun rises first”, earlier than in any other 
country. The second current is often a dominant economic policy thought in 
a late-comer, less developed country, such as the 19th century Germany, 
Japan since the time of the Meiji Restoration (1868) until around 1965, the 
Soviet Union and China until very recently.
Japan ascended to an Article 8 member of IMF in 1964, became an 
Article 11 member of GATT in 1963 and joined OECD in 1964. Hence as 
a full member of IMF, GATT and OECD, in the 1960s Japan was re­
quested to liberalize import trade, foreign exchange controls, and inward 
foreign direct investment. In 1960 the Japanese government announced, as 
already stated, the “Basic Plan to Liberalize Import Trade and Foreign 
Exchange Transactions” and from then on steadily shifted to a free trade 
(and investment) system. Japan gradually became a major trading nation in 
the global free trade regime based upon the principles of GATT, IMF and 
OECD.
Japan around 1960 was a poor, late-comer industrializing country, 
however, and its industrial policy-makers felt it difficult to quickly accept 
the status of a full-fledged member of this global trading system by fully 
committing itself to free market principles. “Industrial structure policy” was 
thought, therefore, as a supplementary measure to help the Japanese econ­
omy industrialize itself more quickly and efficiently. The “industrial struc­
ture policy” was designed primarily to allocate resources to certain sectors 
with high growth potential, to minimize losses in the process of trials and 
errors inherent in the free market mechanism, and to achieve integration of 
the Japanese economy into the global free trade regime within a limited 
time period. For this reason, most measures under the industrial structure 
policy were implemented as temporary ones with specified time limits. Also 
they consisted mainly of incentives operating through the price mechanism 
such as government financing (loans and investments), and special tax 
treatments. Besides those preferential measures -  and after their time limits 
expired - ,  private enterprises had to stand on their own feet. The need for 
such “industrial structure policy” and government interventions embodying 
it gradually diminished, as most Japanese industries achieved steady growth. 
In this context, the “easterly wind” and “the westerly wind” may be said to 
have been complementary to each other, but the former dominated the latter 
in the beginning of this period and gradually gave in to the latter toward 
the end.
Not only the “industrial structure policy”, which had an ambitious goal
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of working out “the basic principles as to how Japan’s industrial structure 
should be”, but also “National Economic Plans” and various “national re­
gional plans” drafted by the Economic Planning Agency were originally 
thought of as some sort of “economic planning” based upon “the easterly 
wind” policy thought in the beginning of this period. But the “westerly 
wind” gradually gained its strength and steadily became dominant over the 
“easterly wind” toward the end of this period as Japan achieved a high and 
continual rate of economic and industrial growth, and became more and 
more closely integrated into the global free trading system as a major indus­
trial and trading nation. As a result the industrial structural policy, the 
national economic plan, and the national regional plan became a sort of 
projection or forecast, rather than a plan or planning, during the 1960s and 
1970s.
B. Industries Given Preferential Treatments under the Industrial Structure 
Policy
The leading slogans of “industrial structure policy” of the early 1960s 
were “heavy- and chemical-industrialization” or “sophistication of the indus­
trial structure”. The meaning of these expressions is not quite clear to me 
since the industrial structure policy at that time did not intend to eliminate 
industries other than the heavy- and chemical-industries and even called for 
“sophistication of light industries”.
To illustrate the difference between the “westerly” and “easterly” 
economic policy thoughts, the Research Committee on Industrial Structure, 
MITI’s main advisory body on industrial policy, announced in 1963 the 
following two criteria as the characteristics of industries which were thought 
desirable for Japan to expand:
1. The “income elasticity” criterion: industries for the products of 
which the income elasticity of demand is high.
2. The “productivity increase” criterion: industries expected to have 
a high rate of increase in productivity 4.
Thus the argument in favor of the industrial structure policy based 
upon the “easterly” thought proposed preferential treatments for industries
4 In 1970 the Industrial Structure Council, which was established in 1964, succeeding the 
Research Committee on Industrial Structure proposed the following two additional criteria.
3. The overcrowding and environment criterion: Aimed at reducing dependence on scarce 
resources such as land, water, environment.
4. The working condition criterion: To cope with labor shortage and the changing 
emphasis on the desire of the public.
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characterized by a high income elasticity and/or a high rate of increase in 
productivity. But according to the “westerly” thought such industries will 
naturally grow faster than others as a result of the function of the free 
enterprise and market mechanism, and there would be no reason for govern­
ment intervention in favor of them.
Under the industrial structure policy of the early 1960s, the following 
industries received preferential treatments.
Steel, coal marine transportation/shipbuilding and electric power, 
which were the four priority industries” in the previous period, and synthet­
ic fibers and chemical fertilizers continued to receive preferential treatments. 
In addition, automobiles, petrochemicals, machinery parts, general machin­
ery, electronic engineering, synthetic rubber, resin, color films, computer 
and semiconductor were considered as the new growth industries satisfying 
the two criteria, and received preferential treatments. Oil refining, under the 
policy of refining within the country”, was also protected.
C. The «Temporary Measures Laws” for the Machinery and Electronic Indus-
The machinery industry of Japan during this period tended to have a 
pyramid or duahstic structure with finished product manufacturers on top 
and suppliers of raw materials and parts forming a wide bottom. The bot­
tom was comprised mainly of small and medium enterprises which produced 
a large number of different types of products (raw materials, machinery 
parts and subassemblies) each in small quantity” with low productivity and 
obsolete facilities. The Law on Temporary Measures for the Promotion of 
Machinery Industry was enacted first in 1956 with a time limit of five 
years but later revised and extended several times until 1985, with substan­
tial changes each time. Earlier “industrial rationalization” programs were 
worked out to help improve technologies of parts suppliers in the machinery 
industry rationalize” or modernize their obsolete facilities and reorganize 
their industrial organization. Industrial reorganization aimed at improving 
the situation of “each producer producing a wide variety of products each 
in small quantity , by promoting cooperation, specialization and mergers 
among numerous producers in an industry, and by encouraging standardiza­
tion. Under the programs MITI assisted to organize “rationalization cartels” 
or standardizing parts and materials, reducing the variety of products, and 
preventing “excessive competition among small producers”, while the Japan 
evelopment Bank, the Small Business Finance Public Corporation pro­
vided funds for investment.
The purpose of the Law on Temporary Measures for the Promotion of
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Electronic Industry, which was initially enacted in 1957 for a seven-year 
period, but extended several times until 1985 similarly to the machinery 
industry law, was to modernize the materials, parts and subassemblies sub­
sectors of the electronic industry. Japan then lagged far behind the United 
States and Western Europe in this area. Under the Law, rationalization 
targets for each type of products were set, subsidies for research and devel­
opment provided, and tax and financial incentives given to promote mod­
ernizing investment on plant and equipment.
The two “temporary measures laws” gave priority on 20 to 30 subsec­
tors each, within the machinery and electronic industries including in the 
latter case transistor radio, color television, magnetic tape, acoustic equip­
ment, video cassette (or tape) recorder (VCR or VTR), and communication 
equipment. The two laws were combined in 1971 into a single law, which 
was finally abolished in 1985.
D. Tools of Industrial Policy
Tools or instruments of industrial policy which were used during this 
period were basically the same as those in the previous period, of which the 
principal ones are described below. In view of the membership of GATT 
and OECD, however, it became increasingly difficult for Japan to restrict 
imports and inward foreign direct investment, or give tax incentives on 
export earnings.
Priority in Resource Allocation:
Loans from the Japan Development Bank, Export-Import Bank 
of Japan and the Small Business Finance Public Corporation; 
special tax measures such as accelerated depreciation, tax exemp­
tions on “new important products”, and subsidy for interest 
payments for making available low-interest funds to shipping 
companies, for the purchase of ships and tanks built in Japanese 
shipyards.
2. Border Measures:
Importer restrictions and tariffs 5 to protect domestic industries 6, 
and loans from the Export-Import Bank and preferential tax 
measures to promote exports (special deduction from export in­
comes, reserves for exploration of overseas markets, reserves for 
losses from overseas investment), etc.
5 There was an extensive reform of the tariff rates in 1961.
6 Also, exemption or reduction of tariffs on certain imports was granted to preferred 
importers: for example, machine tools used by the automobile industry.
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3. Industrial Reorganization:
There was an argument within MITI in favor of “a New Indus­
trial Order” in 1961-1964, to the effect that the larger the enter­
prise, the better the chance of becoming competitive with large 
foreign enterprises, and that “excessive competition” among firms 
should be restrained as much as possible. Hence, it was argued, 
industrial reorganization was urgent. Specific measures to this 
end included promotion of mergers and acquisitions, formation 
of “rationalization cartels”, industry-wide deliberation to restrict 
investment on plant and equipment or to divide the spheres of 
production among firms, and government licensing system for 
production or investment (oil refining, shipbuilding, etc.).
4. Measures to Promote Sales of Japanese Made Computers:
In 1961 under MITI’s leadership the Japan Electronic Computer 
Corp (JECC) was established by seven domestic (indigenous) 
computer manufactures to develop the computer industry in its 
infancy, cope with formidable competition from International 
Business Machine Corp. (IBM). JECC received loans from the 
Japan Development Bank, private banks and life insurance com­
panies, and provided leasing funds for Japanese computer manu­
factures to enable them to offer the same leasing terms on their 
computers as IBM.
E. Assessment of Industrial Structure Policy
It is always difficult to assess the usefulness and effectiveness of a 
country’s industrial policy. In the case of the “industrial structure” policy, 
there are two questions: (1) whether the choice of industries given preferen­
tial treatments was appropriate, and (2) whether the preferential measures 
to promote such industries were really effective. Both of these questions 
are difficult to answer.
Protective policies in the early (infant) stages of development perhaps 
helped the development of the machinery, electrical machinery and electron­
ics industries in general, and contributed to the national welfare. In the case 
of automobiles, when the ban on import of passenger cars enforced under 
the Allied occupations were lifted and foreign exchanges began to be allocat­
ed in 1952, European cars were not only superior in quality but also less 
expensive than domestic cars even after paying shipping costs and the 40% 
tariffs. The Japanese automobile manufacturers apparently felt that they 
faced a crisis. Moreover, the Ministry of Transport, responding to requests
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from taxi operating companies, proposed to cut tariffs and liberalize 
imports. For the automobile industry in the great straits, the protective 
policy including import quotas and tariffs was highly effective in protecting 
the “infant” domestic automobile industry, in which Japan proved to have 
strong comparative advantage later.
The protective policy was effective for developing Japan’s color film 
industry, which challenged Kodak’s near-monopoly over the world markets. 
The synthetic rubber industry became independent soon after starting pro­
duction with substantial government assistance. The computer and semicon­
ductor industries benefited from import restrictions, government procure­
ment, government subsidies for research and development, and other prefer­
ential treatments. Japan’s computer industry successfully shattered IBM’s 
monopolistic position in the world markets. It may be noted that Britain, 
France and West Germany tried to develop respective national computer 
industries but by and large failed. Until today in Europe there is no compa­
nies effectively competing with IBM or Kodak.
On the other hand, a number of industries in Japan could not attain 
enough “international competitiveness” despite the government’s heavily pro­
tective policy. The coal industry and marine transportation are such ex­
amples. It might be argued that Japan was known to have had no compara­
tive advantage in these industries, yet had to protect these industries, be­
cause of the shortage of foreign exchange earnings. But foreign exchanges 
could have been earned by channeling funds and resources into industries 
where Japan had comparative advantage rather than into these industries. 
The oil refining, petrochemicals, and more generally most chemical indus­
tries perhaps fall into the same category. Furthermore, the aircraft industry 
failed to stand on its own feet despite substantial government assistance 
and protective measures. As these examples indicate, Japan’s industrial struc­
ture policy did not necessarily succeed everywhere.
Whether the industrial reorganization policy aimed at the economies of 
scale by reducing the number of independent firms and curbing “excessive 
competition” was successful, or even whether it was necessary, may be open 
for discussion. Generally, I would think the policy was not very successful. 
Economically rational reorganization of an industry, specialization and mod­
ernization of productive facilities would take place sooner or later by the 
working of market forces, without many government interventions.
Moreover, Japanese firms are willing to merge or be acquired only 
when they suffer serious financial difficulties or foresee business downturns, 
but otherwise they try hard to remain and thrive on their own. This
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tendency may be considered as a source of vitality and dynamism of Japa­
nese industries 1.
F. Relationship between the 'Westerly Wind” and the “Easterly Wind”
I described the development of the Japanese industry and industrial 
policy in this period (Stage 2) as a process in which the “westerly wind” 
gradually overwhelmed the “easterly wind”. The “westerly” steadily domi­
nated the “easterly” for several reasons. First, there was economic rationale, 
and also international constraints under GATT, IMF and OECD. These 
were the basic reasons for the existence of the “westerly wind”. Second, 
Japanese private enterprises had strong vitality, and the business circle, 
together with some politicians in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and 
the Ministry of Finance officials, did not like the bureaucratic controls. 
Third, there were a number of corporations which achieved remarkable 
development and became giant corporations well known all over the world, 
without much help of industrial policy: such as Sony, Honda, Kyocera, 
Yamazaki (machine tools), Funac, Epson, Pioneer, etc. In addition, there 
were corporations which resisted MITI’s administrative guidance at one 
time or another (Idemitsu Kosan, Kawasaki Steel, Sumitomo Metal, etc.). 
After all, postwar Japan has been “a country of free enterprise”.
Finally, it is important to see that the effective “leverage” toward 
individual firms which the industrial policy authorities had at hand in earlier 
periods were mostly phased out during this period. The import quota sys­
tem was steadily eliminated through the process of trade (import) liberaliza­
tion, and tariff rates were reduced through multilateral negotiations of 
GATT, while export subsidies (both explicit and implicit ones) were abol­
ished in view of the GATT rules 8. The government screening system for 
licensing of foreign technologies was abolished as a result of the liberaliza­
tion of service trade, since Japan became an Article 8 nation of IMF and 
joined OECD which instituted the liberalization code for service trade. The 
government approval system for establishing joint ventures of Japanese and 
foreign firms was also dismantled because of OECD’s liberalization code for
In Japan, most of the mergers of large corporations were one of the following patterns: 
when the industry or the corporation declined considerably or was expected to see such a trend 
(shipping, shipbuilding etc.); a declining corporation merged by a thriving one in the same 
industry or different industry (Nissan and Prince, Kyocera and Yashika etc.); a merger of 
corporations which were previously a single corporation, or of closely affiliated corporations 
(Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Nippon Steel and Mitsui Toatsu Chemicals).
Multilateral talks were held on the terms of export credit because many of the major 
industrialized countries provided low-interest export credit.
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capital movement. Loans from the Japan Development Bank progressively 
lost their appeal as capital markets developed and financial markets were 
liberalized.
Under these circumstances, the remaining “leverage” towards indivi­
dual firms which are readily available for the purpose of “industrial struc­
ture policy” was primarily fiscal appropriations, allocation of funds under 
the fiscal loans and investment program, and special tax measures. But those 
measures were also constrained by the tight government budget.
IV. T he  T h ir d  S t a g e : A f t e r  th e  O il  C r isis  u p  t o  th e  P re se n t
A. The General Trend of Industrial Policy
Japan’s industrial policy of this period may be characterized shortly as 
diversification of the policy issues and “policy deployment for problem 
solving”. In other worlds, this period saw a shift away from “industrial 
structure policy” and “industrial reorganization” which were dominant in the 
previous period, especially in its early part, towards resource allocation 
through the private enterprise and market mechanism. In this period, Ja­
pan’s international trade has become more and more based on free trade 
principles, and Japan’s industrial policy has been changing to a problem-solv­
ing type one, to deal with those individual issues related to industries which 
cannot be solved simply by depending on the functions of market mecha­
nisms and private enterprises.
Most of the issues taken up by Japan’s industrial policy in this period 
correspond to what is called the situations of “market failure” in economic 
theory. The policy shift started gradually from the early 1970s and became 
clear as Japan has become a major economic power and as the world 
economy has become more and more integrated.
B. Diversification of Issues and Development of Industrial Policy
The following are some typical examples of diversified issues and tasks 
for industrial policy, and major policy developments in Stage 3 9.
1. Energy Policy. — During the first oil crisis (1973-74), the Japanese govern­
ment implemented emergency measures including administrative guidance
9 For a more detailed description of Japan’s industrial policy in this period, see K o m iy a  
and Y o k o b o r i (1991).
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on conservation of oil and electricity which later became law. In addition, 
since 1975 Japan introduced a series of long-term comprehensive energy 
conservation programs. The “Law Concerning the Rationalized Use of En­
ergy” was enacted in 1979, setting standards of judgment for economized 
use of energy and requiring each firm to set up an internal organ to oversee 
its own energy conservation program. The so-called “Moonlight Project” 
was started to promote research and development on energy conservation 
technologies, and special tax incentives and financial subsidies were granted 
for research, development and investment in energy conservation projects. 
The “Law Concerning the Promotion of Development and Implementation 
of Alternative Energy Sources” enacted in 1980 aimed at reducing depend­
ency on oil, and set targets for alternative energy supply sources. The 
“Sunshine Project” was also started to promote new, alternative energy 
technologies, and to develop diversified sources of electric power supply 
such as nuclear, coal and natural gas power generation. The “Petroleum 
Stockpiling Law”, designed to promote stockpiling by both public and pri­
vate sectors, was enacted in 1975 to stabilize supply of oil. In addition 
diversification of overseas oil supply sources was sought through encourage­
ment of oil exploration projects.
2. Adjustment and Assistance to Declining Industries. — Industries in Japan 
such as textile, aluminum refining, synthetic fiber, alloy steel, chemical 
fertilizer, petrochemicals, and shipbuilding lost comparative advantage due 
to sharp rises in energy prices and wages, declining world demand for their 
outputs, and/or industrial development in neighboring Asian countries. The 
Temporary Measures Law for Stabilization of Specific Depressed Industries 
(for five years from 1978) and the Temporary Measures Law for the Struc­
tural Adjustment for Specific Industries (for five years from 1983) were en­
acted to facilitate the adjustment in those depressed industries. Under the 
laws firms in the industries reduced their excess capacity, were allowed or 
encouraged to form cartels to restrict new investment, and received govern­
ment guarantees for borrowing funds to deal with their excess capacity and 
to move out of the depressed industries to other more promising areas.
3. Promotion of Research and Development on Advanced Technology. -  In 
The Vision for International Trade and Industrial Policies for the 1980s 
published by MITI in 1980, which is generally referred to as “the industrial 
policy ‘vision’ for the 1980s”, MITI advocated industrial policy toward a 
“technology-oriented economy”, in addition to the orientation toward free, 
multilateral trade. In line with this new “vision” for the 1980s, MITI
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promoted research and development (R&D) of basic technologies for future 
industries. This was in addition to promotion of “large-scale R&D projects” 
which began in the 1970s. A well known example of the latter are the 
technologies for very large-scale integrated circuit (VLSI) project, of which 
the total cost was thought so large that it could not be borne by individual 
manufacturers. To tackle the problem, MITI launched an R&D program for 
VLSI related technologies as a national project and centralized R&D activi­
ties on a specialized R&D association. The government granted 29 billion 
yen in subsidies to this association for four years from 1976. The R&D 
association conducted research on technologies necessary for the production 
of VLSI, and contributed substantially to strengthening Japan’s semiconduc­
tor industry.
4. — Anti-Pollution Policy. — The problem of environmental pollution wors­
ened substantially in the latter part of the Second Stage, and became a 
serious social problem. When the Diet took up the pollution issue in 1970, 
outcries against pollution and against the industries causing it prevailed all 
over Japan. As pollution was closely connected with industrial activity anti­
pollution measures carried a major weight in industrial policies. MITI and 
the Environment Agency took various measures to prevent pollution. The 
Pollution Prevention Corporation was established, R&D to prevent pollu­
tion was promoted, and low interest loans or special tax incentives were 
provided to encourage pollution preventing investment. Recently the protec­
tion of global environment and the recycling of resources have become 
increasingly important issues, and are now considered as among the major 
tasks to be resolved by the industrial policy authorities.
5. Industrial Location Policy. — Since the First Stage up to the present the 
government has continued its efforts to improve industrial infrastructure 
such as roads, harbors, industrial land and water supplies. To overcome 
constraints of limited space, and water and labor force availability in already 
congested urban areas, and to achieve balanced regional development 
throughout the country, the Law to Promote Industrial Relocation (1972) 
and the Law for Accelerating Development of High-Technology Industrial 
Complexes (1983) were enacted. The policy under the latter was called 
the “technopolis” development program.
6. International Trade Policy. -  Unlike the passive and gradual process of 
liberalization during the previous period, Stage 3 witnessed development of 
active trade liberalization policy in response to Japan’s rising trade surplus
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and requests of trade liberalization by foreign governments. First, Japan 
took initiatives in the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations under GATT. In the bilateral trade relations, “trade fric­
tions” with the United States and Europe were important trade policy is­
sues, and Japan had often to restrict “voluntarily” its export of certain 
commodities such as steel, automobiles, color television sets, video-cassette 
recorders (VCR), and machine tools. Under the positive trade liberalization 
policy, Japan lowered or abolished tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Further­
more, in a sharp contrast to the policy to promote export, which the Japa­
nese government long pursued in earlier periods since the end of WWII, 
from the early 1980s it made strenuous efforts to increase import in an 
attempt to reduce its huge annual trade surpluses. Steps to this end included 
special tax measures for Japanese firms increasing imports and supports to 
trade fairs for foreign manufactures and exporters. Finally, with the advance­
ment of Japan’s industrial technology, it became increasingly important — 
and difficult -  to strictly comply with the rules of the coordinating commit­
tee for multilateral export controls (COCOM).
7. Policy to Assist Small and Medium Enterprises. — Against the backdrop of 
a series of events such as the adoption of the generalized preference scheme 
(GPS) of lower tariffs on developing countries’ products, the sharp rise of 
the wage levels in Japan, a shift to the floating exchange rate system and the 
resulting large appreciations of the yen, and the globalization of business 
activities, Japan’s small and medium enterprises often experienced great 
difficulties in coping with new and rapidly changing economic environ­
ments. The industrial policy towards small and medium enterprises in this 
period included industrial adjustment assistance, “promotion centers” for 
local industries and some protective measures for small and medium enter­
prises from the competition of larger enterprises.
8. Provision of Information and Promotion of Distribution of Information. -  
Provision and distribution of information was facilitated by the preparation 
and announcement of a large number of industrial policy “visions”. “The 
Vision for the 1980s” and “The Vision for the 1990s” are “visions” for 
Japan’s industry as a whole, while there have been many “visions” for a 
particular industry or for a subsection of an industry. While the reports 
published by the Industrial Structure Council or similar advisory bodies in 
earlier periods used to connote some sort of “blueprint” of Japan’s industrial 
structure or a program for a particular industry, the visions in this period
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especially in recent years gradually changed their character, and became 
more and more a sort of “long-term outlook” or “prospect”.
D. Changing Role of Industrial Policy
As already mentioned, the industrial policy authorities lost most of 
their “leverage” instruments towards individual enterprises, and the “divine 
power” which had once accompanied MITI’s administrative guidance was 
almost entirely gone in the 1980s. Yet, in reality, there were more roles in 
the 1980s industrial policy was expected to play actively, than someone 
unknowledgeable about Japan’s industrial policy might think. Specific needs 
for industrial policy had changed significantly from Stage 2 to Stage 3. 
Economic and social life has become more complex, the standard of living 
has risen, technology has advanced rapidly, and environmental destruction 
on a global scale has become more serious. Under these circumstances, 
expected roles of industrial policy have become more numerous and com­
plex, and its contents and measures have become more diversified and 
sophisticated. Some of the examples are:
1. In the past, industrial policy was expected to protect and develop 
the automobile industry, while at present, it is expected to con­
trol exhaustion, set safety standards, restrict export, and assist 
automobile manufacturers’ direct investment overseas (when so­
licited by host countries).
2. In the past, export promotion was called for, whereas today 
import promotion is called for, and on the export side there is a 
need to restrict export of weaponry and of high-technology prod­
ucts under the COCOM regulations.
3. In the past, there were import quotas and the governmental 
screening and approval system for imports of foreign technolo­
gies, while today there is often a need to implement “voluntary 
export restraint” and proper country-by-country application of 
the trade insurance scheme.
4. How to help industries attain self-sustaining growth was the 
major theme of industrial policy in earlier years, but recently it 
has become an important task for industrial policy to lead some 
secularly depressed industries towards “euthanasia” without too 
much pain for people and areas concerned, and to transfer re­
sources from such industries to more promising ones.
5. The primary target of industrial policy towards small and me­
dium enterprises was to rectify the disadvantages for such firms
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which were considered as forming the bottom of Japans’ “dualis- 
tic economic structure. But now the small and medium-size firms 
are recognized as a “vital majority” which can prosper progres­
sively and rationally. Thus, emphasis is now being placed more 
on policies to help improve their managerial capabilities for 
adjustments to changing economic, technological and labor- 
market environments.
E. Administrative Structure for Industrial Policy and Its Process
Finally, the process of drafting and implementing industrial policy, 
which is more or less common in Stages 1, 2 and 3, may be briefly 
described 10.
In Japan, an industry or a sector of the national economy falls under 
the “jurisdiction” (or administrative responsibility) of a particular bureau or 
division (“supervising bureau” or “supervising division”) of a government 
ministry or agency. A similar system seems to prevail in France and some 
other European countries, but not countries with Anglosaxon traditions. 
Although MITI has the administrative responsibility over most industries in 
the manufacturing sector, some of its subsectors are under the jurisdiction of 
other ministries: the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery has juris­
diction over food processing and non-alcoholic beverages, the Ministry of 
Finance over alcoholic beverages, the Ministry of Transport over shipbuild­
ing and rolling stock, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare over pharma­
ceuticals.
The planning process of industrial policy begins when individual indus­
tries or areas have specific policy issues”. From time to time producers, 
industries concerned, consumers, foreign governments, or international 
organizations raise policy issues”. When there is an issue, generally the 
“supervising bureau” or “supervising department” (under the “vertical 
division”) in charge of the industry or products first discusses how to deal 
with the issue. At the same time, the issue is also referred to a certain office 
or offices in the “horizontal division”, such as Industrial Policy Bureau, 
Trade Policy Bureau, or Minister’s Secretariat, in the case of MITI. Howev­
er, depending on the issue, there are also other possible cases as follows:
1. At first, some issue (import promotion, policies towards the Uru­
guay Round, promotion of energy conservation, etc.) is first dis­
cussed at one of the “horizontal” divisions or departments, and
10 For more details, see Komiya, Okuno and Suzumura (eds.) (1988) and Komiya (1990, 
esp. Chap. 7, Economic Planning and Industrial Plan).
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then passed onto several “vertical” divisions or departments.
2. There are cases where issues in connection with industrial policy 
need to be dealt with by more than one government ministries or 
agencies. The final decision is made after a consensus of those 
concerned is established. The examples are policy on labor short­
age, or policy on the promotion of private participation in public 
activities, etc.
3. There are cases where the “Council” or “Research Committee”, 
which is an advisory organ of ministries composed of members 
mostly outside the government, plays an important role in initiat­
ing the discussion and making decisions on an important policy 
issue. Sometimes the Council or “Research Committee” is quite 
powerful, especially when the influence of the politicians is 
strong, and the ministry or agency in charge may not be able to 
control its conclusions.
One of the points in the process of planning and implementation of 
industrial policy is that when industrial or economic issues are raised very 
often firms in the industry concerned, consumers, or politicians representing 
the general public request introduction of a new measure or measures of 
government intervention of one kind or another, rather than the removal of 
existing measures. Such a request is taken up and examined by the govern­
ment office having “jurisdiction” over an industry or a sector of the private 
business. The system of the “supervising bureaus and divisions” took root in 
the process of historical development of the Japanese economy since the 
Meiji Restoration, and also through the experience during the wartime 
controlled economy from the 1930s until the end of WWII.
It should be noted that in the process of planning and implementing 
industrial policy, interests of producers in the particular industry (or power­
ful groups within the industry) tend to outweigh other influences. This may 
be true in most countries. Producers’ interests are densely and narrowly 
concentrated and tend to exert disproportionately strong political pressure, 
compared with the interests of consumers and users of products which 
usually are widely but thinly spread and are weak in exerting political 
pressure. As a general rule, the politically powerful interest group tends to 
pay little attention to the “national interests”, whatever they are. It is more 
or less the case in Japan. In reality, it is not easy for industrial policy 
authorities to stand against demands for protection by industries in difficul­
ties and by politicians who represent the interests of industries in their 
constituencies, and especially those of small producers. In Japan, however, 
coordination among “horizontally divided” departments and other ministries
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or agencies often acts to counterbalance political influences of vested inter­
ests of particular industries. As a matter of fact, the strength of producers 
(industries) interests has declined after peaking out sometime in the 1960s. 
Also, the pressure from foreign governments or consumer groups 11 often 
exert considerable influence.
V. C o n c lu sio n
Japan’s post-war industrial policy has undergone substantial changes in 
its purpose, content and technique with the change of the times. As a 
natural consequence, certain lines of the industrial policy, which have lost 
their significance with the change of the times, end their role and cease to 
exist, while a new policy line comes up to cater to the needs of the time. 
Although there are various views in assessing industrial policy, in my view 
the miraculous recovery and high growth during Stages 1 and 2 are mainly 
attributable to economic rationality of the “westerly wind”, Japan’s return to 
the international economic community, and vitality of private enterprises, 
while Japan’s industrial policy was important in setting up economic and 
social infrastructures for the Japanese industries and in protecting a number 
of promising “infant” industries. The “leverage” and the “divine power” of 
“administrative guidance” exercised by industrial policy authorities in Stage 
1 and the earlier part of Stage 2 were by and large lost in later periods, but 
this did not mean the end of Japan’s industrial policy.
The “golden age” of Japan’s industrial policy, when MITI was active in 
designing Japan’s “industrial structure” and trying to allocate the funds and 
other resources among industries so as to enhance Japan’s “national inter­
ests”, was over long ago. It is now the age of industrial development led by 
private enterprise, free trade and market mechanism, under the dominance 
of the “westerly wind”.
Yet, Japan’s industrial policy is still expected to play an important role 
in the Japanese economy. It copes with more diversified and sophisticated 
policy issues, arising in a mature, industrialized economy, increasingly inte­
grated with other economies of the world. Japan’s industrial policy makers 
will continue to enjoy high prestige in the Japanese society as experts in 
these complex industrial issues. 1
11 For example, consumers’ pressure in resisting a rise in electricity fare or kerosene prices 
has considerable influence.
THREE STAGES OF JAPAN’S INDUSTRIAL POLICY 995
REFERENCES
Komiya R., The Japanese Economy: Trade, Industry and Government, Tokyo: University of 
Tokyo Press, 1990.
------ , Okuno M. and Suzumura K. (eds.), Industrial Policy of Japan, San Diego and Tokyo:
Academic Press, 1988.
------ and Yokobori K., Japan’s Industrial Policy in the 1980s, Studies in International Trade
and Industry, No. 5, Tokyo: Research Institute of International Trade and Industry, 
1991.
TRE STADI DELLA POLITICA INDUSTRIALE GIAPPONESE DOPO LA 
SECONDA GUERRA MONDIALE
Dalla fine della seconda guerra mondiale ad oggi la politica industriale giap­
ponese è molto cambiata nei suoi compiti, contenuti e strumenti adattandosi alle 
differenti necessità del momento.
Subito dopo la guerra (stadio I) il compito principale della politica industria­
le è stato quello di fornire all’economia giapponese una base per una economia di 
libero mercato. I controlli economici bellici furono aboliti e furono perseguiti 
programmi di razionalizzazione industriale. Per affrontare le difficoltà della bi­
lancia dei pagamenti si presero varie misure per promuovere le esportazioni e 
limitare le importazioni.
Nel periodo di “intensa crescita” (stadio II, 1955-1973) prevalsero due cor­
renti di politica industriale: quella della libera impresa e del meccanismo del 
mercato (il vento dell’Ovest) e quella della politica della “struttura industriale” (il 
vento dell’Est). Quest’ultima intendeva creare una auspicabile struttura industria­
le in Giappone attraverso trattamenti preferenziali per le industrie pesanti e chi­
miche. Verso la fine di questo periodo, il vento dell’Ovest gradualmente prevalse 
sul vento dell’Est.
Dopo la prima crisi petrolifera (1973-74) sino ad oggi (stadio III), il Giap­
pone è diventato una potenza industriale ed economica di primissimo piano e la 
sua economia si è integrata sempre di piu col resto del mondo. La maggior parte 
dei temi della politica industriale giapponese in questo periodo ha rispecchiato 
situazioni di ciò che in economia si chiamano “fallimenti del mercato” e furono 
adottate misure allo scopo di risolvere i problemi di queste situazioni.
.
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AN EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW OF THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK 
RELATIONSHIP IN RELATION TO FIRM SIZE 
(Based on the Results of a Survey Performed in 1990)
by
T o sh ih ir o  H o r iu c h i *
I. I n t r o d u c t io n
The aim of this study was to make a micro empirical investigation of 
the Japanese main bank relationship based on the data of a survey con­
ducted by the Japan Center for Economic Research in 1990. Responses 
came not only from large corporations but also from small and medium­
sized (hereafter S-M) firms. The total number of firms surveyed was 457 *. 
A data set of this kind, collected from various sized firms, has never been 
obtained before. Hence this study involves an innovation in the empirical 
analysis of the main bank relationship.
The survey asked firms to name their main bank, or at most three 
banks if necessary, from a list of banks. The main bank of a firm is defined *4
* Kyoto Sangyo University, Faculty of Economics, Kyoto (Japan).
Completely restructured and reorganized version of the paper presented at the Fourth Italy- 
Japan Workshop “Italian and Japanese Economies in the ’80s: A Comparative View”, held in 
September 1991 at the University of Siena.
' We sent the questionnaire to a total of 1,271 firms on October 1990 with the help of 
the Japan Center for Economic Research (JCER). The details of the survey are shown in the 
volume edited by Horiuchi T. (1991) and in the article by Horiuchi-Murakami (1991) published 
therein. The Sample included six subgroups: 1. All electrical corporations listed on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (Number = 118); 2. Other randomly sampled listed corporations 
(Number =  304); 3. All corporations listed on the Over-The-Counter Market (Number =  364);
4. Randomly sampled unlisted firms from the volume edited by Nippon Keizai Shinbun 
(Number =  301); 5. Randomly sampled firms investing overseas excluding the above 
(Number = 71); 6. All JCER member firms excluding the above (Number =  113). There was 
a total of 457 responders, 273 of which were from the manufacturing sector, the rest were 
from the non-manufacturing sector.
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as the firm’s most important bank 2. In addition, it asked firms to select a 
set of core banks, including their main bank, with which they have as 
important a relationship as with their main bank. This is the second innova­
tive point here, namely the empirical analysis of recent trends in main bank 
relationships. The responding firms were divided into four categories accord­
ing to number of employees (less than 300 employees) and status (listed or 
unlisted), and various qualitative and quantitative comparisons of the main 
bank relationship performed. Differences were revealed in the firms’ atti­
tudes to their main bank or core banks. The third innovation consists in 
considering the various aspects from the view point of the firms themselves.
The research of previous studies, except for a few such as those by 
Horiuchi (1988) has been tacitly based on large corporations. This is mainly 
due to the fact that only large banks such as city banks could have played 
the role of the main bank arid that their clients have mostly been large 
corporations 3 *. However, large banks started to strategically increase their 
lending to S-M firms in the period of financial liberalization. Their intention 
seems to have been to maintain their total lending growth. Relatively speak­
ing, then, large corporations have decreased their borrowing from banks and 
have replaced it with capital market finance during this period. Thus large 
corporations have been adjusting their main bank relationship.This relation­
ship, developed under the post-war regulation policies and Keiretsu relation­
ships 4, has begun incorporating more competitive elements than in the 
previous period. On the other hand, S-M firms have benefited from ex­
panded availability of funds — a point which will be analyzed later on in this 
paper. Accordingly, we may ask whether or not there are any significant 
differences in the main bank relationship among firms of both sizes.
In order to answer this question, the paper focuses on the firms’ 
attitudes toward their main bank in the face of competition between banks. 
It investigates the mechanism enabling firms to get more competitive effects 
under the main bank relationship. It also analyzes mechanisms mitigating 
asymmetry of information with banks involved in the relationship. The 
school known as the New Theory of Finance has paid close attention to the 
issue of information asymmetry and suggested that it can be mitigated by a
2 See footnote 8 for comments on the definition. The paper focuses on a realistic analysis 
rather than a theoretical one.
3 City banks are the largest commercial banks. They also have significant stockholdings in 
large corporations.
See Okumura (1991) for the keiretsu consideration and a historical discussion of the 
main bank relationship.
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long-term relationship between borrowers and lenders 5. The main bank 
relationship is considered to be typical. However, without the active behav­
ior of firms, long-term relationships would lose many competitive effects. 
Indeed, a flexible main bank relationship enables the balancing of competi­
tive and long-term effects. This paper explains how the main bank relation­
ship is an illustration of the so-called “flexible rigidity” in the management 
of Japanese firms 6 7.
The paper is composed of five sections. Sections II to IV investigate 
various elements of the main bank relationship. Section V concludes the 
paper. Section II deals with the composition of the main bank set and other 
banks sets such as the set of core banks. Section III discusses the flexibility 
of the main bank relationship. Section IV analyzes the main bank policy of 
firms and exemplifies the role of the main bank as a tacit organizer of 
de-facto corporate loan syndications, particularly for large corporations 1.
II. O v e r v i e w  o f  t h e  s i z e  c o m p a r i s o n
This section gives a comparative analysis of the main bank relationship 
according to firm size in terms of member composition of the main bank set 
and the main bank dependence, first with an emphasis on S-M firms, and 
then on large corporations.
A. What is the Main Bank of a Small Firm?
The result of the questionnaire sent to 1,271 firms shows that S-M 
firms and large corporations have considerably different main bank relation­
ships except for two similarities: both usually have only one main bank and 
the relationship becomes long-term. The following is an overview of the 
main bank relationship according to firm size, assuming four categories:
5 There are many theoretical papers on the desirability of the long-term relationship 
between both parties: Leland-Pyle (1977), Campbell-Krackaw (1980), Diamond (1984) 
(pioneering studies) and von Thadden (1990). Haubrich (1989) and Sharpe (1990) discuss 
new aspects of the long-term relationship. In particular, Sharpe mentions the negative effects 
of potential monopoly power of the banks. For an international comparison, see Mayer 
(1988).
6 See Dore (1986) on the idea of flexible rigidity.
7 See H oriuchi (1993) (the paper presented at The Japanese Main Bank Conference 
organized by the World Bank in 1992 and 1993) for the interaction between loan syndications 
and the main bank relationship.
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FI: 75 unlisted firms with less than 300 employees,
F2: 34 unlisted firms with 300 employees or more,
F3: 57 listed firms with less than 300 employees, and 
F4: 287 listed firms with 300 employees or more.
Dividing the total number of responding firms into four categories, 
Table 1 shows i) the number of main banks, ii) the member composition of 
the set of main banks, and iii) the degree of main bank dependence with 
respect to several finance transactions. The Table shown in the Appendix 
summarizes size comparisons of such characteristics as rate of net worth, 
growth rate, or profit rate, etc.
i) The number of main banks. -  The survey asked firms to name at 
most three as their main bank 8. About 70 percent of firms had one main 
bank in each category, and the others two or three main banks. Although 
firm size differed tremendously, there was no significant difference in the 
average number of main banks among the four categories. The average 
number of main banks varied from 1.2 for FI to 1.4 for F4. Flowever, the 
total number of banks differed widely from 5.7 for FI to 20.8 for F4. 
Nevertheless, even the difference is less than that of firm size itself9. In 
conclusion, despite differences in size, the majority of Japanese firms have a 
main bank relationship with only one bank.
ii) Who can become the main bank? -  Although the number of main 
banks per firm was similar, the details of member composition of the main 
bank set, i.e., the types of banks with which each firm has its main bank 
relationship, differed greatly in relation to firm size as shown in Table 1. 
The smaller the firm, the greater the tendency for it to have a main bank 
relationship with a small bank such as a regional bank or credit associa­
tion 10. The larger the firm, the more likely it is to have a main bank
As mentioned in relation to the definition of the main bank, the survey did not give its 
own operational definition. According to Horiuchi-Packer-Fukuda (1988) and Sheard (1989), 
for example, the main bank is defined rather more implicitly than explicidy. Their definition is 
similar to that of the survey: the main bank is what a firm considers the most important bank 
for itself. Theoretically speaking, the main bank is that to which a firm can assign the 
monitoring role, extending through ex-ante, interim, and ex-post phases.
9 This result shows the existence of economies of scale in bank trading.
10 Regional banks are smaller commercial banks than city banks and are located mainly in 
rural prefectures. Compared with city banks, regional banks have considerable monopolistic 
power in a particular region. Credit associations are financial institutions which have restricted 
their business to the smaller firm market or to a specific regional market. Their entries are 
concentrated in a few prefectures such as Kyoto and Aichi.
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Table 1
OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN BANK RELATIONSHIP IN RELATION TO
FIRM SIZE1
FI (75) F2 (34) F3 (57) F4 (287)
I. Number of banks in total (standard deviation)
5.7 (3.9) 19.6 (18.7) 9.7 (6.3) 20.8 (21.8)
II. Number of main banks (standard deviation)
1.2 (0.5) 1.4 (0.6) 1.3 (0.6) 1.4 (0.7)
III. Member composition of main bank set2.
a b c a b c a b c a b c
No. of firms 58 9 3 23 8 2 41 11 4 207 41 28
LCB 1 0 1 0 2 2 2 4 1 10 21 25
TB 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 9 12
CB 25 5 3 18 6 2 31 11 4 179 37 28
Others 32 12 4 4 7 1 7 5 5 17 15 19
IV. Degree of main bank dependence (standard deviation) and its stable trend
LTBR 49.3 (28.8) 36.9 (25.3) 50.0 (28.6) 30.3 (24.0)
FIBR 51.5 (26.9) 44.4 (26.2) 53.0 (28.9) 32.0 (25.3)
STBR 64.1 (24.7) 46.1 (25.0) 52.9 (29.7) 39.8 (22.9)
LDEP 60.4 (27.0) 48.8 (26.4) 50.0 (28.3) 44.3 (24.4)
FDEP 54.0 (28.4) 42.4 (26.4) 52.2 (27.1) 34.7 (25.5)
FEX 50.0 (37.4) 45.3 (33.6) 55.7 (35.2) 47.5 (28.1)
Notes:
1. The number of firms is shown in parentheses in the top row.
2. The firms are divided into three groups according to the number of their main banks: a) 
one; b) two, c) three. The figures show the number of banks having a main bank relationship 
with the firms in each group: LCBs (long-term credit banks), TBs (trust banks), CBs (city 
banks), and Others (such as regional banks, second regional banks, and credit associations).
3. LTBR = long-term borrowing, FIBR = fixed investment borrowing, STBR = short­
term borrowing, LDEP =  liquidity deposit, FDEP = fixed deposit, and FEX = foreign 
exchange transaction.
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relationship with a city bank. Moreover, city banks have a main bank 
relationship with half the firms in the F l group. In contrast with this 
preponderance of city banks as the main bank of S-M firms, other large 
banks such as long-term credit banks register less not only in F l but also in 
the F2 and F3 groups. These other large banks can only become the main 
bank of large corporations in the F4 group.
For firms with two or three main banks, in most cases one of them is a 
city bank. The others are either regional or mutual banks for F l and F2, 
and long-term credit banks or trust banks for F3 and F4 n . For F4 firms 
with two or three main banks that account for about a quarter of this group, 
city banks and long-term credit banks have approximately the same share as 
the main bank.
Comparison of main bank composition in relation to firm size bears 
out the segmentation of the loan market according to firm size in Japan: 
large banks with large corporations and S-M firms with small banks. Howev­
er, it also highlights the structural changes accompanying financial liberaliza­
tion. Generally speaking, more S-M firms can now incorporate a city bank 
into their main bank set.
hi) Main bank dependence. -  Size effects reveal themselves again in 
the degree of main bank dependence 12. Table 1 covers six types of banking 
transactions: long-term borrowing, long-term fixed investment borrowing, 
short-term borrowing, liquid deposit, fixed-term deposit, and foreign ex­
change transactions. The smaller the firm size, the more the firm depends on 
the main bank in each category of financial transaction (except for foreign 
exchange transactions). The average degree of main bank dependence varies 
from 50 to 60% in F l, and from 30 to 40% in F4. The degree of main 
bank dependence of the small firm is much higher than for large corpora­
tions. With respect to the degree of main bank dependence F2 and F3 are 
seen to be intermediate between F l and F4.
Mutual banks, now known as second regional banks, are commercial banks of similar 
size to regional banks, but with less monopolistic power. Long-term credit banks and trust 
banks have similar amounts of financial business, and specialize in long-term credit. City banks 
have now also expanded their business into long-term credit.
The questionnaire asks firms to choose one of five dependence ranges to facilitate 
processing of the answers: i) less than 20%, ii) 20 to 40%, iii) 40 to 60%, iv) 60 to 80%, v) 
more than 80%. The dependence is approximated to the middle figure in each range. Although 
the quality of dependence is not investigated in detail, it can vary in relation to relationship 
history or transaction technology development, and can also interact between various trans­
actions.
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B. Large Corporations in F4
In Table 2 we examine large corporations in detail. Comparing the 
characteristics of firms in terms of the number of main banks (i.e., one, two, 
or three main banks), there is no statistically significant difference in their 
total number of employees nor is there any significant difference in the 
average rate of current profit rate to total assets or borrowing ratio.
Table 2 also compares the average characteristics of various sub-cate­
gories of firms according to the number of banks in each bank set, namely 
the sets of main banks, core banks, clearance banks, and banks in total. 
Obviously the last set is the largest and includes the other sets. The set of 
main banks is the smallest. The sets of core banks and clearance banks 
include the set of main banks and are included in the set of banks in total. 
Core banks are defined in the survey as banks with which firms have a rela­
tionship as important as, or similar to, the main bank relationship. Clearance 
banks are those operating daily cash transactions for a firm, in many cases 
together with core banks, and thus to a certain extent the function of both 
banks overlaps. The average number of banks in total per corporation 
reaches twenty-one and differs significantly in relation to firm size. As 
shown above, the average number of main banks is only 1.4 and differs less 
significantly. The average for core banks is 6.4, and differs significantly 
according to the size of firms. Thus, the larger the firm, the more core banks 
it needs.
Most of the 276 firms that responded were able to name their main 
bank even without the operational definition in the survey. However, as 
will be discussed later, irrespective of an operational definition, the function 
of the main bank relationship converges from the standpoint of banks and 
firms alike, because about 90 percent of firms have the main bank relation­
ship with a city bank and because banks compete for firms’ business. An 
indication of this convergence appears — given the competition among banks 
— in the diffusion of a main bank policy into most firms in order to maintain 
the ranking of their banks. This point will be further discussed in Section 
IV.
Among the 207 large corporations with only one main bank, 179 have 
their main bank relationship with a city bank, as shown in Table 2. Other 
banks such as long term credit banks or trust banks register considerably 
less. Trust banks are a typical case. Among 207 corporations with only one 
main bank, only one trust bank appears as the main bank. Even in the case 
of all 276 firms with either one, two, or three main banks, city banks are 
the main bank of about 90 percent of firms. Among the 28 firms with three
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Table 2
DIFFERENCE TEST RESULTS OF AVERAGE FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
FOR DIFFERENT BANK SETS
No. of firms
Bank category Firm characteristcs (F-ratio)1






I. Set of main banks
a) Size 1 207 10 1 179 1A 6.2 16.7
b) Size 2 41 21 9 37 7.5 5.1 18.3
c) Size 3 28 25 12 28 7.7 4.6 17.2
(1.04) (2.07) (0.198)
II. Set of core banks (Average number of core banks =  6.4)
Above av. 100 117 168 520 7.8 5.5 18.4
Below av. 187 102 93 441 7.2 6.1 15.9
(15.4) (0.897) (1.76)
III. Set of clearance banks (Average number of clearance banks = 7.9)
Above av. 95 N.A. N.A. N.A. 7.9 5.0 16.8
Below av. 190 N.A. N.A. N.A. 7.2 6.3 16.9
(29.5) (5.84) (0.001)
IV. Set of banks in total (Average number of banks in total == 20.8)
Above av. 83 N.A. N.A. N.A. 8.4 4.8 23.2
Below av. 201 N.A. N.A. N.A. 7.0 6.3 14.3
(106.4) (6.69) (22.0)
Notes
L In parentheses F-ratio test statistics of fully factorial analysis of variance of character­
istic variables between two or three categories of firms in relation to bank type.
2. The figures in the Employees column are the natural logarithm of total employees. 
Those in the Profit ratio column are the percentage ratio of current profit before tax to total 
assets. Those in the Borrowing ratio column are the percentage ratio of total borrowing to total 
assets.
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main banks, each has a main bank relationship with a city bank. In these 
firms one bank is called 'the main bank and the others the long-term 
credit main bank (choki mein)" or “the sub main bank (heikou mein) . The 
main bank is generally one of the city banks and the choki mein bank either 
a long-term credit bank or a trust bank.
In short, as far as the main bank relationship of large corporations in 
Japan is concerned, city banks have a total majority share of about 90% 13 14. 
Also, comparing the number of core banks, city banks were found to have a 
majority share. In 100 firms having more than the average of 6.4 core 
banks, city banks accounted for 5.2. The share of city banks in the average 
of 6.4 core banks per firm was 3.3.
At this point it may be useful to ask the difference between city banks 
and other large banks such as long-term credit banks. Primarily, it seems 
that through their wide branch network they can adjust more flexibly to the 
diversified financial needs of large corporations. This applies both domesti­
cally and internationally. Also, through long-run syndication management 
experience covering both long-term and short-term lendings, and because of 
the fact that they have significant shockholdings in large corporations, city 
banks gain a competitive edge. Because of the higher potential management 
capability of city banks, firms can implicitly assign their most important 
main bank or core bank role to city banks. Thus city banks, in their role as 
main bank or core bank, accumulate firm-specific information through this 
implicit and long-run monitoring relationship. This information is diffused 
among core banks because, as analyzed in Section IV, through their main 
bank policy, firms pay close attention to core banks as a whole
I I I .  F l e x ib il it y  o f  t h e  L o n g -t e r m  R e l a t io n sh ip
This section is concerned with the degree of flexibility of the main 
bank relationship in terms of changes in the number of banks and the main 
bank dependence of firms.
i) Changes in the number of banks. — As far as adjustment flexibility in
13 Some of the large city banks have more than ten percent shares in our 276 firms: 
Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank in 50 firms, Fuji Bank in 38, Sakura Bank in 35, Mitsubishi Bank in 32, 
Sumitomo Bank in 29, etc. An exceptional case is the Industrial Bank of Japan (the largest in 
the long-term credit banks): it has main bank relationships with 43 firms. However, 32 of these 
are firms with two main banks.
14 This is consistent with the view of firms regarding the future of the main bank system, 
the result of which will be discussed in Section IV.
1006 TOSHIHIRO HORIUCHI
the number of banks with which firms have a financial relationship is 
concerned, S-M firms are less flexible than large corporations. About 65% 
of firms in FI did not change the total number of their bank set in the 5 
years preceding the survey (1985-1990), compared with less than 50% in 
F4. This comparative stability of S-M firms appears not only in the set of 
banks in total but also in the set of clearance banks: 79.7% and 64.2%.
Comparing the trend of firm size in relation to set of banks in Table 3 
we see that, with only one exception, the majority of firms have relations 
with a constant number of banks. The exceptional case appears in the 
comparison of the number of banks in total in F3: about half of the firms 
have increased the number of banks in the set of banks in total. F3 includes 
many firms recently listed on the over the-counter market. This rapid 
increase is mainly due to drastic changes into new forms of financial manage­
ment organization — a phenomenon that probably accompanies new banks in 
their role not only as major lenders but also as major stockholders. Howev­
er, as far as the average trend is concerned, firms tend to retain a stable 
number of banks, particularly with clearance banks, namely, core banks. In 
particular, about 80% of firms in FI have not changed the number of 
clearance banks over the last five years.
Though the majority have a stable bank membership diversification, 
the data of Table 3 does not contradict the fact that a considerable number 
of firms have adjusted their number of banks. For example, about one 
quarter of large corporations reduced the banks in their set of clearance 
banks in the period of financial liberalization. This type of flexibility in 
member composition is more evident in large corporations than S-M firms, 
and tacitly implies increased competition among banks during this period. 
Of course, the effects of competition have spread over firms of various sizes. 
Indeed, as illustrated above, a considerable number of firms in F3 have 
increased their number of banks.
ii) Changes in main bank dependence. — Large corporations have a 
relatively higher degree of flexibility in the number of banks, but less 
flexibility in the degree of main bank dependence than S-M firms. For 
example, with the exception of deposit transactions, S-M firms in FI have 
adjusted their dependence more flexibly than large corporations. Table 3 
shows main bank dependence in relation to firm size and type of financial 
transaction. The figures in Table 3 are the percentage distribution of firms 
having one of three different trends in the degree of main bank dependence: 
that is to say an increasing, a constant, or a decreasing trend. In Table 3,
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Table 3
ADJUSTMENT OF THE NUMBER OF BANKS 
AND THE MAIN BANK DEPENDENCE BETWEEN 1985 AND 1990
FI (75) F2 (34) F3 (57) F4 (287)
I. Changes in the number of banks
A. Number of banks in total
Increasing 16.2 32.4 49.1 24.9
Constant 64.9 50.0 36.8 49.1
Decreasing 18.9 17.7 14.0 26.0
B. Number of clearance banks
Increasing 8.1 9.1 27.3 9.5
Constant 79.7 81.8 63.6 64.2
Decreasing 12.2 9.1 9.1 26.3
III. Changes in the main bank dependence
A. Long-term borrowing
Increasing 28.3 26.9 28.9 18.5
Constant 48.3 53.9 46.2 57.9
Decreasing 23.3 19.2 25.0 23.6
B. Long-term fixed investment
borrowing
Increasing 20.0 17.9 20.0 10.5
Constant 58.2 67.9 52.0 63.6
Decreasing 21.8 14.3 28.0 25.9
C. Short-term borrowing
Increasing 32.4 25.8 26.8 23.0
Constant 60.3 67.7 60.7 60.0
Decreasing 7.4 6.5 12.5 17.0
D. Liquid deposit
Increasing 22.2 11.8 28.6 18.3
Constant 70.8 70.6 60.7 60.4
Decreasing 6.9 17.7 10.7 21.3
E. Fixed-term deposit
Increasing 31.4 17.9 30.9 12.2
Costant 52.9 60.7 54.6 55.5
Decreasing 15.7 21.4 14.6 32.3
F. Foreign exchange transactions
Increasing 22.2 0.0 27.0 19.5
Constant 70.4 81.3 67.6 75.0
Decreasing 7.4 18.8 5.4 5.5
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although most firms show a constant trend in every category, the share 
varies in each category and for each transaction.
As far as the difference in trade is concerned, firms tend to reveal more 
stable dependency in foreign exchange transactions irrespective of firm size. 
As has already been shown in Table 1, in such transactions, firms generally 
have higher dependence than in others. This is an example of higher depend­
ence accompanying a more stable relationship. On the other hand, in the 
case of long-term borrowing transactions, firms show less stability than for 
foreign exchange transactions. This is an example of lower dependence 
accompanying increased flexibility. The existence of both possibilities 
implies that firms have a strong desire to adjust their main bank dependence 
in terms of overall dependence 15.
iii) Large corporations. -  Table 3 reveals that in all financial transac­
tions, about sixty percent of large corporations have maintained the share of 
their main bank relatively stable. Borrowing transactions are so typical that 
they follow implicitly de-facto stable loan syndications 16. On the other 
hand, about one third of the corporations have changed the relative shares 
of the set of their main banks. The existence of both trends implies that 
large corporations not only seek stable syndications but also search for 
preferential borrowing conditions both within and beyond syndication mem­
bers. The mechanism behind this behavior will be discussed in Section IV. 
However, it is worth noting that long-term relationships with the main bank 
do not generally lead to lack of competition among banks.
The figures in Table 4 show an example of such competition. This 
table analyzes the interaction between markets of long-term and short-term 
lending. The number of firms keeping their main bank dependence in both 
transactions is less than half the total number of 230 corporations. A main 
bank keeping stable shares in long-term lending experienced competitive 
pressure in short-term lending. Also, a main bank with stable shares in 
short-term lending experienced competition in long-term lending.
In conclusion, large banks such as city banks have competed with each 
other in the corporate financial markets even though they belong to the core 
bank or main bank set. This competitive pressure strongly motivates these 
banks to converge their conditions of de-facto loan syndications. Thus, 
about half of all large corporations could continue to give the set of main
Theoretically speaking, this discussion is related to the simultaneous determination of 
main bank dependence and the adjustment cost of the relationship.
See Horiuchi (1993) (World Bank Conference) for discussion of the syndication loan 
of large corporations managed by a main bank.
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Table 4
INTERACTION BETWEEN MARKETS OF LONG-TERM (ROW) AND 
SHORT-TERM (COLUMN) LENDINGS:
DISTRIBUTION OF LARGE CORPORATIONS WITH DIFFERENT RELATIVE 
SHARE TRENDS OF THE MAIN BANK DEPENDENCE (NUMBER OF FIRMS)
.'.■ .. Long-term
Short-term
Increasing Constant Decreasing Total
Increasing 18 16 8 42
Constant 14 106 14 134
Decreasing 19 15 20 54
Total 51 137 42 230
banks or core banks relatively stable shares, despite the lack of many com­
petitive effects 17. In the next section, we will ask how such effects can 
arise.
IV. M a i n  b a n k  r e l a t i o n s h i p  p o l i c y
In thijS section we consider various qualitative comparisons in relation 
to firm size and analyze the mechanism whereby firms manage to display 
flexibility in the midst of rigidity.
A. Policy Motivation
i) Diversification. — As previously observed, most firms have been seen 
to maintain a stable main bank relationship, although they may have ad­
justed it to some extent. Needless to say, this potential for flexibility as­
sumes a multiple relationship with many banks. How do firms manage to 
maintain both a stable main bank relationship and a multiple bank relation­
ship? What are the reasons or motives behind both aspects of stable and 
multiple relationships? Do they differ in relation to firm size or not?
17 Thus banks having a long-run relationship with firms will gain monopolistic power over 
their finance. As revealed in the survey, this possibility may be worsened by any cooperation 
between banks without the active response of firms. See Sharpe (1990). Also see the 
discussion in Section IV.
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Table 5
MOTIVATION FOR MULTIPLE BANK RELATIONSHIPS 
AND STABLE RELATIONSHIPS WITH CORE BANKS
FI F2 F3 F4
A. Diversification motives (at most three) 
1. Large size of financial transaction 24.2 41.2 23.2 41.5
2. Enhanced competition 68.2 61.8 71.4 66.5
3. Information source 59.1 61.8 62.5 73.9
4. Avoidance of bank interference 20.0 23.5 28.6 31.0
5. Availability of funds 56.1 58.8 41.1 47.2
6. Merger history 3.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
7. Enhanced creditworthiness 21.2 23.5 28.6 14.1
Total number of responses 66 34 56 284
Number of non responses 9 0 1 3
B. Stability motives (at most three) 
1. Reliability 70.0 87.0 63.6 69.0
2. Information source 10.0 22.6 15.9 27.6
3. Large size of financial transactions 7.1 12.9 4.5 6.0
4. Wide network 11.4 16.1 6.8 11.6
5. Major stockholders 10.0 3.2 45.5 58.2
6. Local banks 51.4 32.3 20.5 14.2
7. Long customer history 68.6 71.0 79.5 64.9
8. High ability of banks 2.9 3.0 0.0 2.6
9. Advanced knowhow 7.1 16.1 6.8 11.9
10. Belonging to the same business group 8.6 12.9 22.7 14.2
11. Others 10.0 3.2 2.3 0.7
Total number of responses 70 31 44 268
Table 5 summarizes the size-related factors contributing to a stable 
relationship or multiple relationships. The figures in the upper part of the 
table embody the answers to a question about multiple relationships in 
which firms were asked to choose from among seven reasons (with at most 
three factors for their multiple bank relationships). The figures in the lower 
part embody the answers to another question probing their stable relation­
ship in a similar way.
Though results concerning multiple relationships vary little in relation 
to firm size, more than 60% of firms in every category responded to the 
second choice by emphasizing the competitive effect of bank relationship 
diversification. Examining the differences in detail, it appears that large 
corporations make it a top priority to maximize sources of information. In 
addition, they regard enhanced competition or fund source diversification as
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an additional motive. Unlike large corporations, S-M firms seek to enhance 
their reputation for creditworthiness via multiple bank relationships. Howev­
er, as far as the overview of diversification factors is concerned, we can 
conclude that there is no significant difference correlated with firm size.
This similar distribution of diversification motives, however, has been 
previously shown to accompany some interesting flexibility differences in 
terms of changing degrees of main bank dependence or membership in the 
set of banks. Also, as will be shown later, the survey highlights an impor­
tant qualitative difference in main bank relationship policy. However, be­
fore proceeding to the analysis, we may briefly examine the differences in 
motivation leading firms to maintain a stable main bank relationship.
ii) Stability. — In relation to motivation, the lower part of Table 5 
shows an interesting size-related difference. Although, as discussed previous­
ly, the majority of firms in every category maintains stable relationships 
with core banks, as shown in Table 5, they have significantly different 
motives.
Table 5 compares the motives of responding firms that did not in any 
way adjust the number of the set of core banks in the five year period 
before the survey. In every category except F3, more than 90% of firms 
responded to the question. The exceptional case of a 77 % response rate in 
F3 is mainly due to the fact that many of the firms surveyed were recently 
listed on the over-the-counter market and have begun to have new partners 
as their core banks.
One of the main reasons for the stable relationships of large corpora­
tions is that these banks have been one of their major shareholders. 
However this motive is completely insignificant for the S-M firms in FI 
and F2. S-M firms cannot expect any effect from bank stockholding 
because they have few bank stockholders. For these firms, the top priority 
is the reliability of core banks. The second is that such banks should operate 
in the same geographical area as the firms themselves.
This emphasis on the location of banks is extremely interesting. It 
implies that S-M firms can expect enhanced effects on their availability of 
funds from banks in their area. These banks are expected to contribute to 
the local economy because they concentrate their financial business on local 
S-M firms in the region. Banks have an incentive to support local S-M firms. 
They ensure the availability of funds for firms maintaining a stable and 
long-term relationship with them. However, this incentive mechanism 
works so implicitly that firms are driven to strategically adjust their pattern 
of main bank dependence.
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In conclusion, firms show different attitudes to their main banks: the 
explicit and stronger attitude of large corporations being based upon a 
stockholding relationship, the implicit and weaker attitude of S-M firms 
arising from local community relationships. Because of the implicit and 
weakly committed nature of their relationship, S-M firms, unlike large cor­
porations, cannot expect a similar ex-post monitoring role of so-called rescue 
finance from the main bank. Accordingly, they tend to be more flexible than 
large corporations 18. This contrasting state of affairs related to firm size 
accompanies an interesting difference in their main bank policy.
B. Main Bank Relationship Policy
i) Hierarchy policy. -  For large corporations, the stability of the main 
bank relationship is supported by a stable relative share policy (as analyzed 
in Table 6). The idea of this policy is to maintain as stable as possible a 
hierarchy of banks, in terms of the relative shares of banks with respect to 
borrowing, deposit, and other transactions 19. Though S-M firms also apply 
this policy, they do so significantly less frequently than large corporations. 
More than 60% of large corporations in F4 usually apply this hierarchy 
policy to their routine fixed investment borrowing. The rate of application 
in the same field by S-M firms in FI is less than 20%.
Although large corporations apply this policy to a great extent for 
routine finance, their application rate for new project finance is considerably 
lower. Indeed, for new project finance, the rate falls to the minimum of 
23.5% . Hence, as regards their general core bank policy, they not only 
maintain a completely stable relative share among banks, but in terms of 
their corporate finance as a whole, also seek competitive effects between 
banks.
18 Japanese markets may penalize banks that do not take into consideration their clients’ 
long-term growth. The punishment tends to become effective in local communities because of 
the limited alternatives available to banks. Thus S-M firms may have their main bank 
relationship with small local banks even though these banks cannot meet advanced financial 
needs as sufficiendy as city banks. On the other hand, local banks approach their clients by 
emphasizing that they are local banks that have to develop hand in hand with them in the local 
community. For a theoretical analysis of the reputation factor in the main bank relationship see 
O sano (1991). As far as empirical research is concerned, we have not yet concluded any 
definitive results because of the difficulty of identifying the various factors affecting the growth 
of firms.
19 The hierarchy strategy of Japanese firms is widespread and important. For a theoretical 
guide, see the general theory by Aoki (1988).
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Table 6
COMPARISON OF MAIN BANK POLICY
FI F2 F3 F4
A. Application of stable relative share policy '. 
1. Fixed investment borrowing
Always 19.4 59.3 46.2 60.9
Case by case 38.7 29.6 40.4 27.0
2. Working capital borrowing
Always 35.4 72.7 61.8 74.9
Case bv case 36.9 15.2 29.1 17.7
3. Equity share issue
Always 19.2 60.0 46.9 43.2
Case by case 7.7 10.0 34.7 38.2
4. Corporate bond guarantee
Always 12.9 50.0 51.2 51.0
Case by case 9.7 28.6 32.6 37.3
5. New project finance
Always 11.9 14.3 18.6 23.5
Case by case 35.7 42.9 48.8 44.3
B. Negotiation timing policy2.
1. Routine investment finance
Before plan settlement 21.4 18.2 27.3 9.9
At settlement 58.6 63.6 52.7 54.8
After plans have been made 18.6 15.2 18.2 29.8
2. New project finance
Before plan settlement 41.3 35.5 39.6 20.3
At plan settlement 52.4 48.4 52.8 48.5
After plans have been made 6.4 12.9 5.7 24.4
No tes:
1. There were two more choices “never” and “others”, besides the above two.
2. The fourth choice was “others”.
Of course, S-M firms also seek such competitive effects. Indeed, al­
though they undergo less adjustment in the number of banks than large 
corporations, they seek more flexibility in their main bank dependence. 
Their flexible dependence is a direct result of the main bank policy revealed 
in Table 6. Typically, the application rate for new project finance only 
reaches about 10% in group FI. The majority of small firms in this group 
prefers never to apply the ranking rule at all for new project finance. 
However, in group F4, this type of firm is in the minority. Generally, S-M 
firms seek more negotiation opportunities with banks than large corpora-
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tions. This process of negotiation or searching for new banks may well have 
resulted in the greater degree of flexibility observable among S-M firms. 
This strong negotiation capability relates to their simple pattern of manage­
ment organization and ownership. Most S-M firms are owned by their 
managers. Consequently, they display more flexibility in their financial man­
agement decisions, or, in simple terms, they have to behave flexibly. In 
other words, this flexibility may be enhanced by their weaker bargaining 
power with banks.
ii) Negotiation timing policy. — Large and small firms show another 
interesting negotiation policy difference towards their main bank or core 
banks. Differences in management structure and bargaining power with 
banks may be a contributing factor, as may be the asymmetry of information 
between banks and firms. Generally speaking, S-M firms are faced with a 
greater degree of asymmetry. However, comparing the asymmetry in various 
financial transactions, it is true to say that every firm has less information 
asymmetry with banks in routine investment finance than in new project 
finance.
Table 6 shows how S-M firms engage in early information exchanges 
with their banks. Large corporations, on the other hand, depend less on 
early information exchange and hence have lower negotiation costs. Howev­
er, even for them, new project finance involves earlier phases of negotiation 
than routine finance.
The lower part of Table 6 illustrates these differences in detail. It is 
based on the answers to a question having four alternatives, about negotia­
tion policy with core banks. We see that the number of corporations starting 
their negotiation for routine investment finance before the settlement of a 
plan is normally limited. Most firms initiate negotiations at the point of 
settlement. About 30% of large corporations choose merely to announce 
their plan. However, in the case of new project finance, unlike routine 
finance, they tend to rely more on an early negotiation policy.
Even in this case, which might seem to require more information 
exchange between banks and firms, about half the large corporations sur­
veyed were able to obtain loan money with limited negotiation, (i.e., 
merely by starting the negotiation with banks at the same time as the 
settlement of their investment finance plan). Thus, a long-term relationship 
can help both firms and banks to mitigate the asymmetry of information 
and decrease negotiation costs.
Compared to the strong bargaining position of large corporations re­
vealed in this negotiation policy, that of S-M firms is considerably weaker.
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Even in the case of routine finance, there are more S-M firms than large 
corporations that prefer an early start to negotiation. In the case of new 
project finance, about 40% of them usually start negotiations before settle­
ment. The equivalent rate for large corporations reaches a mere 20% . On 
the other hand, there are many S-M firms negotiating with the banks their 
investment plans 20.
V. S u m m a r y
The present study of the main bank relationship in large corporations 
and S-M firms highlights several qualitative and quantitative similarities 
and differences.
Both large and S-M firms have about one main bank with which they 
tend to hold a long-term relationship. Although it varies in relation to firm 
size and wealth, the main bank relationship is widespread throughout 
Japan.
The most interesting qualitative difference is that the relationship of 
S-M firms is more flexible than that of large corporations. Given the con­
straint of using banks with a convenient branch network in their location, 
or, equivalently, emerging city banks in their market, they seek greater 
availability of funds and tend to vary their main bank dependence to a 
greater degree than large corporations.
Large corporations depend more on the hierarchy rule in order to 
maintain stable relative shares of banks in various financial transactions. 
They depend more on de-facto loan syndications than S-M firms. They can 
give their core banks stable relative shares in normal times, and can expect a 
rescue role from the banks in times of financial distress. Clearly, the organi­
zational background supplying the motive for this is that these banks are 
major stockholders in the firms themselves. This mechanism does not gener­
ally apply in the case of S-M firms.
Nevertheless, not only large corporations but also S-M firms constandy 
seek competition effects between banks. These can be achieved by control­
ling the application of hierarchy policies, or by controlling the pattern of 
main bank dependence, or by adjusting the timing of negotiations. Indeed,
20 For firms in F2 or F3, the most probable negotiation policy tends to converge with that 
of FI. In Table 6, this similarity is evident in the case of new project finance. The result 
shows the existence of a gap between large corporations in F4 and other firms with respect to 
their finance opportunities. This is reflected in their differing answers to the questions on main 
bank policy.
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in the case of new project finance, even in the midst of long-term relation­
ships with banks, S-M firms depend less on the hierarchy rule and so tend 
to initiate early searches and negotiations with banks.
Banks tacitly assume competition among themselves. They compete to 
acquire higher market reputations for reliability or availability of supply. 
The main bank relationship is not entirely stable but can always change 
flexibly. In Japan, it began to incorporate more competitive elements in the 
period of financial liberalization. Differences related to firm size and wealth 
reveal the existence of an overall bargaining power. It is this power that 
forces banks to respond competitively to different demands, needs, and 
requirements.
APPENDIX
CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRMS IN RELATION TO SIZE 
MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION
Characteristics FI F2 F3 F4 Remarks 1
*










2. Average 5-year growth 2.4 8.0 12.3 7.9 FI
of annual turnover (7.1) (10.7) (12.0) (7.5) (F1-F3)
3. Gross profit 4.3 4.5 9.5 6.2 F3
/annual turnover (5.0) (5.1) (6.6) (5.3) (F1-F3, F2-F3)
4. Gross profit 6.0 6.4 7.3 5.8
/total assets (6.8) (4.7) (4.1) (4.8) —
5. Current profit 3.7 3.2 8.7 6.2 FI, F2, F3
/annual turnover (5.2) (4.5) (6.3) (5.2) (F1-F3, F2-F3)
6. Current profit 5.4 5.6 6.9 5.9
/total assets (7.0) (5.1) (4.2) (4.6) —
7. Net profit 1.8 1.2 4.4 3.1 Fl, F2
/annual turnover (3.1) (3.3) (3.5) (3.1) (F1-F3, F2-F3)
8. Net profit 2.4 2.4 3.6 2.9
/total assets (4.3) (2.4) (2.8) (2.4) —
No tes: 1. Size categories in this column indicate those of firms that have more than a 1%  
significant difference in main bank dependence with respect to the F4 category. Figures in 
parentheses show other different pairings with the same level of significance.
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RASSEGNA EMPIRICA DELLE RELAZIONI DELLE IMPRESE GIAPPO­
NESI CON LA PROPRIA BANCA PRINCIPALE DA UNA INDAGINE DEL 
1990 -  CONFRONTO TRA PICCOLE E GRANDI IMPRESE
Questo, articolo esamina gli aspetti microeconomici delle relazioni delle im­
prese giapponesi con le proprie banche principali e fa vari confronti fra dimensio­
ni d’impresa partendo da una indagine del 1990 basata su risposte provenienti 
da 457 imprese di varie dimensioni. Sebbene sia grandi sia piccole imprese in 
media abbiano una banca principale, esse mostrano differenze qualitative e quan­
titative nelle relazioni con le loro banche. Le piccole imprese hanno rapporti più 
flessibili delle grandi. Le grandi imprese mantengono l’allocazione dei loro rap­
porti finanziari con le banche la più stabile possibile attraverso l’applicazione di 
una politica gerarchica. Recentemente, tuttavia, anche la loro relazione con le 
banche principali ha incominciato a incorporare elementi di maggior concorrenza 
di prima. Qui, si esamina in dettaglio il meccanismo che bilancia gli effetti di lun­
go termine e quelli concorrenziali dal punto di vista delle imprese.
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 
Volume 40 (1993), N. 12, 1019-1040
INTERFIRM RELATIONSHIPS 
IN THE JAPANESE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
by
B a n r i  A sa n u m a  *
1. Introduction
In recent years, the nature of the relationships that major Japanese 
manufacturing firms have developed over a long period of time with their 
suppliers of parts and components has been discussed by scholars and policy 
makers from two different angles.
Firstly, in the context of trade conflicts between Japan and other 
industrialized countries, especially the United States, the relationships have 
become a major target of criticism. The critics have argued as follows. 
Major Japanese manufacturing firms, such as Toyota, Nissan, Hitachi, 
Toshiba, and so on, typically buy only from a select group of firms, called 
keiretsu, which has been formed having the purchasing firm either as the 
organizer or as a participating member. Members of such a group maintain 
perpetual business relations with each other, which nonmembers face 
difficulties to enter. Such practice is a Japan-specific phenomenon, and 
should be rectified, since it constitutes a major barrier to entry for those 
foreign firms who wish to sell parts in the Japanese market. The same 
argument has frequently been extended to accuse purchasing behavior of 
so-called Japanese “transplants”. It has thus been argued that initiation of 
offshore production by major Japanese manufacturing firms is always 
accompanied by concerted overseas investments by their incumbent suppliers 
in Japan, which precludes opportunities for firms in the host countries to 
initiate business with the core manufacturers’ “transplants”.
* Faculty of Economics, Kyoto University, Kyoto (Japan).
Revised version of the paper presented to the Italy-Japan Workshop held in Siena on 
21-22 September 1991. The author thanks Professors Ian Nish and David Metcalf and other 
participants for the comments provided at the workshop.
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Secondly, on the other hand, a growing number of researchers and 
practitioners have come to perceive that the manufacturer-supplier relation­
ships developed in Japan must contain several elements that have contrib­
uted to increase responsiveness of the production system constituted by a 
core manufacturing firm and its suppliers. For instance, the MIT Commis­
sion on Industrial Productivity (1989) has presented the following remarks. 
First, a remarkable feature observable in the Japanese automobile industry 
is that “team approach” seems to have worked well both in product devel­
opment and in daily production. Second, such approach has been developed, 
not only across different functional departments within the internal organiza­
tion of major car companies, but also across different firms between each 
car manufacturer and its suppliers. Third, regarding this aspect, the relations 
that major Japanese car manufacturers have developed with their respective 
suppliers seem to have outperformed both the vertically integrated organiza­
tion of GM and the arms-length purchasing from outside suppliers by 
Chrysler ‘ .
Thus, concerning the nature of the Japanese manufacturer-supplier 
relationships, two sharply contrasting strands of view emerge. The first 
view focuses on exclusiveness, which is regarded as stemming from some 
Japan-specific factor, and maintains that the relationships should be reform­
ed since they constitute an aberration from the Anglo-American model of 
interfirm transactional relations that occur, or are supposed to occur, across 
the normal market. The second view focuses on the factors underlying the 
competitive strength achieved in some of the Japanese industries, regards 
such factors as worth emulating by manufacturers in other countries in order 
to gain or regain competitiveness in the corresponding sectors of the econ­
omy, and seeks ways to develop similar factors outside Japan. A similar 
coexistence of two strands of view is also found, although to a somewhat 
lesser degree, regarding the manufacturer-dealer relationships 2.
Due to the coexistence of such two strands of view, it has become 
especially difficult to have a precise picture of the relationships that have 
been developed by major Japanese manufacturing firms with other f i r m s
See the MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity (1989, Vol. 1 , 1-51).
Representatives of U.S. automobile manufacturers have often maintained that their cars 
are hard to sell in Japan because it is difficult to find good dealers there who are willing to 
sell their cars, and this can be traced back to the tight control exercised by major Japanese core 
firms on the dealers who belong to their keiretsu. On the other hand, Chapter 7 of W omack et 
al. (1990) has regarded Japanese manufacturer-dealer relationships as an integral part of the 
lean production system and tried to find several factors therein contributing to the competitive 
strength of the system.
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across vertically related stages of production and distribution. The purpose 
of this paper is to present an integrative view of the relationships based on 
my research which focuses on the manufacturer-supplier relationships in 
the automobile industry 3. By the adjective “integrative”, I mean to repre­
sent a feature of the methodology that I adopt in this paper. Namely, I try 
to provide a framework in which both the issue of new entry, the main 
concern of the first strand of view seen above, and the issue of efficiency, 
the main focus of the second, can be dealt with in a consistent way.
Section 2 gives a theoretical introduction to the remainder of the 
paper. Section 3 discusses the characteristics of the manufacturer-supplier 
relationships developed in Japan from the viewpoint of international compar­
ison. Section 4 explains the concept of relation-specific skill that I deduced 
from the results of my field research. It is shown that precisely this concept 
provides the link between the entry issue and the efficiency issue. In the 
latter part of the section which concludes the paper I discuss the implica­
tions of my findings to the entry issue.
2. A Note on the Conceptual Framework
2.1. Problems with the Term “Keiretsu”. -  In the discussions about the nature 
of interfirm relationships in Japan, the Japanese word keiretsu has been fre­
quently used to name an especially close and cohesive kind of relations 
between firms, or alternatively, to name a collection of firms linked by such 
relations. I do not regard this term, however, as a useful concept for analy­
sis for the two following reasons.
The first reason is that the word is ambiguous and often brings 
unnecessary confusion into the discussion. The ambiguity occurs in the 
following twofold sense. Firstly, the word has been used to designate two 
different sorts of entities. One sort of entity is a collection of firms which 
share the same ex-zaibatsu origin, often called horizontal corporate group­
ings. An often quoted example is the collection of member firms of Kin-yo- 
kai, the Presidents’ Meeting of the large companies, whose roots can be 
traced back to the pre-war (WWII) Mitsubishi Zaibatsu; the collection of
’ The main results of my research hitherto on manufacturer-supplier relationships have 
been published as A sanuma (1984a, 1984b, 1989, 1992). In addition, A sanuma and Kikutani 
(1992) have presented the results on the risk-sharing aspect of the manufacturer-supplier 
relationships in the Japanese automobile industry acquired through an econometric study of the 
data on individual suppliers, extending a pioneering work by Kawasaki and M cM illan (1987) 
conducted on the classified industrial data.
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member firms of Nimokukai is its counterpart for Mitsui, while that of 
Hakusuikai is its counterpart for Sumitomo 4. The other sort of entity 
represented by the term keiretsu is a collection of firms linked with a major 
core manufacturer by close and cohesive relations and constituted mostly by 
the suppliers and dealers of the core firm, often called vertical corporate 
groupings. Though one could find some resemblance or common elements 
between these two types of corporate groupings, the structure of the 
correspondence is rather blurred, so that the logical knot that warrants 
giving the same name to the two is not entirely clear
The main object of research in this paper, the relationships that major 
automobile manufacturers in Japan have developed with their respective 
suppliers, is an area which has conventionally been characterized by the 
notion that keiretsu in its second meaning, or vertical corporate groupings, 
are ubiquitous. But, even if we confine our attention to this second mean­
ing, the term still bears ambiguity. In fact what is the criterion used to 
determine whether or not a given firm that has transaction with the core 
manufacturer actually belongs to the keiretsu that its core firm is supposed 
to have developed? Is the shareholding by the core firm the decisive 
criterion? Or, is the existence of longstanding transactional relations with 
the core firm regarded itself as the decisive mark? Depending on which 
criterion is used, the assumed scope or membership of a specific keiretsu 
under discussion will differ. Nevertheless, the criterion adopted is rarely 
shown by the discussant. Why do we not make our discussions in a more 
straightforward way in terms of subsidiaries, related companies, long-term 
contractual relationship, and so forth?
The second reason for my avoidance of the use of the term keiretsu is 
more important. The use of this Japanese term in a sentence, which 
otherwise is written (or spoken) in English, inevitably induces readers *I
4 See Chapter 8 of Uekusa (1982) for more details.
3 One of the early writers who explicitly used the word keiretsu to designate horizontal 
corporate groupings is M iyazaki (1964). Miyazaki seems to have intended by such use of the 
word to distinguish zaibatsu that existed until their resolution after World War II, a distinctive 
characteristic of which was the existence of the holding company at the top of each zaibatsu 
and the hierarchical control exercised therefrom, and their remnants after the resolution, that 
are characterized by the lack of such headquarters, or by more horizontal mutual relations 
among constituent firms. O kumura (1990) has criticized such terminology asserting that 
extending the use of the word keiretsu to include horizontal corporate groupings is misleading.
I share the same opinion on this point, but proceed cne step further. As will be clarified in the 
text below, my position is that the notion of keiretsu is too coarse to discriminate fruitfully 
various types of interfirm relationships spanned across vertically related stages of production 
and distribution and is therefore powerless for analytical purposes.
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(or other participants in the discussion) to presume that whatever object 
meant by the word is bound to be something Japan-specific, like sushi, 
sashimi and sumo. Then the discussion evoked by the sentence naturally 
tends to go on within a closed circuit: Participants in the discussion would 
tend to search Japan-specific factors to explain seemingly or allegedly 
Japan-specific phenomena without questioning whether or not these pheno­
mena are really Japan-specific. Such orientation in the research would make 
it difficult to pay due regard to the common task or challenge that contem­
porary manufacturing firms face regardless of their country-origin.
To appreciate the nature of this challenge precisely, and further to 
analyze from a comparative viewpoint the way in which each firm has 
coped with this challenge, we need to develop a conceptual framework that 
has not yet been incorporated in standard textbooks of microeconomics, a 
framework that is applicable universally regardless of the country-origin of 
the firm concerned. Let us elaborate this point a little more in the next 
subsection.
2.2. An Underdeveloped Area in the Current System of Economic Science. -  
Be it a personal computer, a copier, or an automobile, a mass marketed 
durable good characteristic of today’s economy is neither completely made 
by one single firm responsible for the brand it bears, such as IBM, Xerox, 
GM, or Toyota, nor sold directly by this firm to final consumers. A substan­
tial portion of its parts and components are procured from outside suppliers, 
and most of sales activities are carried out by separately owned dealers. In 
other words, a typical manufactured good in today’s economy is produced 
and sold by a network of firms, which a firm responsible for a specific brand 
(or a set of specific brands) creates by initiating business relations with 
other firms.
At the level of intuition, everybody will be able to understand without 
difficulty that the competition in manufacturing and selling today’s typical 
goods inevitably becomes a competition between such networks. Neverthe­
less, very little has been known systematically as to the way in which the 
core manufacturer secures necessary adaptations on the part of the suppliers 
and dealers in the network it has created as environmental changes occur. 
Nor are economists today sufficiently equipped with the methodological 
tools necessary to compare structure and performance between different 
networks, or to give advice on how to set up or improve a network. This 
is a serious drawback in the current system of the economic science.
2.3. Toward Development of a Systematic Analysis of the Network of Firms.
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-  Until recently, many economists seem to have been satisfied with a very 
simplistic notion about the governance structure of transaction between 
firms. The notion is that, in normal cases, the market will serve as this 
governance structure. Moreover, it had been taken for granted that, in 
normal cases, the market is sufficiently approximated by the model of the 
spot or auction market. As far as such notion was dominant, a longstanding 
transactional relation between a pair of firms was bound to be regarded as 
an anomaly from the viewpoint of theory. This seems to be the basic reason 
why economic analysis of the network of firms lagged behind the develop­
ments that have occurred in the real world.
Since the 1970s, however, several economists have started to develop 
conceptual tools that provide useful footholds for the systematic analysis of 
networks of firms. Among others, focusing on procurement of intermediate 
goods by a manufacturer of some final good, Williamson (1979) submitted 
a theoretical framework that explicitly recognizes and can systematically 
deal with several different sorts of governance structure of transaction. The 
essence of this framework can be summarized as follows. First, the form of 
optimal governance structure differs depending on the nature of the specific 
transaction. Second, transactions can be classified according to (a) the degree 
of uncertainty involved in the environment of that transaction, (b) the 
degree of frequency of the transaction, and (c) the degree to which transac­
tion-specific investments are incurred in connection with the transaction in 
question. Third, if we focus on a set of transactions characterized by an 
intermediate degree of uncertainty and relatively high frequency, the degree 
of specificity of the investment incurred (or of the asset formed by this 
investment) determines the optimal form of governance structure in the 
following way. When the degree of specificity is low, reliance on the usual 
spot market is least costly or most efficient. When the degree of specificity 
becomes intermediate, as in the case of customization of the materials to be 
supplied, the relational contract serves as the most efficient mechanism. 
Such a kind of contract between a fixed pair of parties leaves room for 
ex-post adjustments. Finally, when the degree of specificity becomes high, 
vertical integration becomes the best in view of transaction costs minimiza­
tion.
This hypothesis submitted by Williamson is noteworthy. First, it has 
clarified, for the first time, that there are cases in which maintaining transac­
tion for the time necessary for amortization of the transaction-specific assets 
between a fixed pair of firms becomes optimal from the viewpoint of 
economic theory. Second, it is based on a dynamic point of view. The 
central concern of the theory is whether under a given sort of governance
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structure it is possible -  and how much it will cost — to adjust price and/or 
quantity according to the environmental changes occurred after the initial 
agreement has been made.
To analyse the network of firms formed by a given core manufacturer, 
I use Williamson’s framework as a useful foothold. More specifically, I 
start from the observation and characterization of the goods or services 
transacted and other features of the transaction concerned. To use expres­
sions used in the system theory, this is the phase of investigation on the 
real sphere of a system 6 7. Then, as the next step, I observe the governance 
structure, and try to deduce general properties of the governance structure 
that corresponds to each major category of transaction. This constitutes the 
phase of research on the control sphere of a system. When the transaction 
concerned is an interfirm transaction, rather than an intrafirm transaction, 
the object that must be investigated in every case as the basic part of the 
governance structure is the contractual framework adopted to regulate this 
transaction. Studies of shareholding could be added at a later stage as 
investigations on an upper layer of the governance structure. In this sense, 
my methodology can be called a transaction-based approach. In the next 
section, I present a picture of the manufacturer-supplier relationships in 
Japan that becomes observable when we adopt this transaction-based 
approach 1.
We may note here that, reflecting the concern dominant among econo­
mists during the 1970s, the arguments made in Williamson (1979) have 
been focused on the price adjustment vs. quantity adjustment issue. In this 
sense, the perspective adopted in that work is only partially dynamic; the in­
termediate goods to be transacted are assumed to have already been devel­
oped before the analysis starts. Widening this perspective, I include the 
product development stage into the object of observation. By doing so, 
various types of interactions are observed to be required between the core 
manufacturer and his suppliers to keep going the production system 
constituted by them. Based on this observation, I have developed the 
concept of relation-specific skill, which will play the central role in fulfilling 
the aim of this paper.
3. Manufacturer-Supplier Relationships
3.1. Customized Goods and Longstanding Relations. — Before going into the
6 For the meaning of the real and control spheres of an economic system, see Kornai 
(1971).
7 Due to the limitation of space, only a very rough picture can be given in this paper. For 
more details, see the papers referred to in footnote 3.
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automobile industry, I show data taken from the Japanese electronic/elec- 
tric machinery industry. The data, in a sense, provides evidence that 
supports one of Williamson’s predictions.
Figure 1, which is based on my field research and has originally ap-
1
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Figure 1. Composition of parts and materials and that of their sources: an example.
(Source: Asanuma, 1989, p. 10)
peared in Asanuma (1989), gives data on a major plant which belongs to 
one of the representative large electronic/electric machinery manufacturers. 
The data shows the composition of the parts and materials procured by this 
plant (in the left-hand column) and that of the sources of supply for a fiscal 
year in the 1980s. The term purchased goods designates those types of 
items for which the supplier sets the specification and offers to the public 
regardless of the will or specific needs of the core firm. In other words, the 
core firm can purchase such items by merely selecting from the catalog 
provided by the supplier. Therefore such items are often called alternatively 
as shihanhin (marketed goods). On the other hand, the term ordered goods 
means those goods or services which are supplied by outside firms according 
to specifications issued by the core firm. It can therefore be interchangeably 
named as customized goods.
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Regarding the sources of supply, the term subcontractors (shitauke 
kigyo or gaichu-saki) has been historically connected with the supply of 
ordered goods. The term suppliers in general (ippan kohnyu-saki) means the 
sources for purchased goods. From these, it can be seen that related 
companies, companies in which the core firms hold substantial shares, must 
provide both purchased goods and ordered goods.
According to the interviews that I made with managers of the purchas­
ing division of this plant, for the purchasing goods category there has not 
been any specific tendency or policy on the part of the buyer to continue 
purchasing from a given supplier even if this supplier is awarded business 
at some time. It is said that 20 percent of the suppliers to this plant change 
annually as a consequence of competition, and that this frequent change 
occurs predominantly in the category of suppliers in general. In contrast, 
for the ordered goods category, such frequent changes do not occur. Basical­
ly, the buyer tends to keep the relation to some degree once a supplier has 
started to supply items in this category.
But the buyer does not apply exactly the same policy to all the sup­
pliers that are supplying such items. Based on the ratings that the purchas­
ing division exercises as to the abilities of the individual supplier and the 
degree of importance of the item supplied, each of the incumbent suppliers 
is given some rank. Thus suppliers are classified into A, B, C and D. The 
excellent subcontractors category in Figure 1 comprises Rank A and Rank B 
subcontractors, and the common subcontractors category in the same diagram 
subsumes Rank C and Rank D subcontractors. Based on this ranking 
system, the buyer applies his effort to develop relationships selectively.
Excellent suppliers are supposed to be suitable candidates with which 
the core plant should seek to build close and longstanding relationships, 
subject to repeated reappraisal. Among them, Rank A firms are those which 
have been most successful in establishing their reputation and the core plant 
often seeks to acquire part ownership with them. In contrast, Rank D firms 
are those which have finally come to be evaluated as hopelessly lacking the 
possibility of improvement, and the core plant wants to terminate the rela­
tion with them at a suitable time. Rank C firms are marginal suppliers. 
They are not necessarily awarded business continuously, but are given orders 
intermittently as the demand for parts or processing services goes up beyond 
the capacity available from in-house part manufacturing shops and excellent 
subcontractors. In other words, Rank C firms are retained on the first tier 
of suppliers as capacity buffers.
The facts reported above suggest the following regularities. First, while 
major Japanese manufacturing firms do endeavor to develop close and
1028 BANRI ASANUMA
longstanding relationships with some of the incumbent suppliers as has been 
widely perceived, such effort is exercised selectively depending on (1) the 
category of items transacted and (2) the ratings given to individual sup­
pliers. As to (1), the effort is concentrated to the area of customized goods. 
As to (2), the effort is concentrated to Rank A and Rank B subcontractors.
Regarding the effect of (1) in the paragraph above, we can see a 
regularity that is consonant with Williamson’s notion on the correspondence 
between the supply of customized goods and the maintenance of transac­
tional relation under the governance via relational contract. But, there is 
also a subtle difference. In Williamson’s framework, development of the 
goods transacted is assumed to have been already completed before the 
analysis begins. Thus, duration of the transaction is logically bound to be 
some time period within the life cycle of a specific part or material. On the 
other hand, the longstanding relations in the case of the Japanese plant we 
have seen generally continue beyond the life of a given model of a part. 
What is the factor that explains this sort of continuity? We shall come back 
later to this point.
3.2. Differences between the Automobile and Electronic/Electric Machinery 
Industries. — Let us touch upon the structural characteristics of the manufac­
turer-supplier relationships in the Japanese automobile industry and com­
pare them with the corresponding relationships in the Japanese electronic/e- 
lectric machinery industry.
In both industries, the central portion of the first-tier suppliers of a 
given core manufacturer tend to organize themselves into an association 
named kyoryokukai (cooperative association), which is a forum for informa­
tion exchange between the core manufacturer and the member firms and 
for mutual learning through common seminars and mutual factory visits. To 
be eligible as a member, some qualifications are required. Though details 
differ between associations, generally annual sales to the core manufac­
turer are required to clear some threshhold level, and continuity of the 
supply to the core manufacturer is required to surpass some mark, say, three 
years. Thus, members of this association can be taken as the relatively stable 
and important portion of the first-tier suppliers of a given core manufac­
turer.
If we compare this portion of suppliers between the two industries, we 
can readily note the following differences, (a) Most of the automobile 
manufacturers have the cooperative association of suppliers at the level that 
corresponds to the corporate headquarters, while in the electronic/electric 
machinery industry, cooperative associations are found at the plant or
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product division level, (b) The proportion occupied by the members of the 
association in the first-tier suppliers is significantly larger in the automobile 
industry compared with the corresponding figure observable at the major 
plants in large electronics firms, (c) The number of new entries to and exits 
from a cooperative association in a year has tended to be small in both 
industries, and especially small in the top manufacturers in the automobile 
industry, (d) Purchasing managers in the automobile industry tend to per­
ceive less necessity of securing capacity buffer type marginal suppliers on 
the first-tier, in comparison to their counterparts in the electronic/electric 
machinery industry.
The differences (a) to (d) above seem to be explained by the following 
factors. Difference (a): Automobile manufacturers in Japan concentrate on 
producing one single product, automobiles, while major electronics manufac­
turers in Japan generally produce a wide range of different products, assign­
ing different sets of products to different plants. Differences (b) and (c): In 
comparison to large electronics manufacturers in Japan, Japanese automo­
bile manufacturers buy a much smaller amount of items that belong to the 
purchased goods category in proportion to the total amount of the parts, 
materials, and services procured from outside sources. Difference (d): For 
some of the products offered by a typical large electronics manufacturer, the 
demand occurs only intermittently or shows a discontinuous time profile, 
while the demand for automobiles, especially for passenger cars, normally 
remains positive during the life of a given model, showing a continuous time 
profile.
3.3. Classification of Parts and Interactions between a Supplier and the Core 
Firm. — Let us go into the more detailed structure of manufacturer-supplier 
relationships developed in the Japanese automobile industry. Table 1, which 
is based on my interviews at various automobile manufacturers and sup­
pliers and originally appeared in Asanuma (1989), shows a classification 
scheme of parts and suppliers.
The criterion for classification in this scheme is the degree of initiative 
that a typical supplier of a given category of part can exert vis-à-vis a given 
core firm in the development and the manufacturing stages. This variable, 
which henceforth will be called the degree of technological initiative for 
brevity, is measured along the horizontal axis of Table 1. The left-hand 
extreme of this axis corresponds to the situation in which the supplier can 
exert only a very passive role both in the development and the manufactur­
ing stages. The further rightward we go, both stages increasingly contain 
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tiate two major categories marketed goods and ordered goods, and, further, 
seven subcategories from I to VII. The reader may be able to notice without 
difficulty that the marketed goods category here is identical with the pur­
chased goods category in Figure 1, and the meaning of the ordered goods 
category is the same as in Figure 1 and is equivalent to customized goods.
The main difference between Figure 1 and Table 1 is that in Table 1 I 
have introduced one very important dichotomy into the ordered goods cate­
gory. That is the distinction between DS parts and DA parts. The former 
means the parts that are manufactured by outside suppliers according to the 
drawings supplied by the core firm, while the latter designates the parts 
manufactured by outside suppliers according to the drawings made by the 
respective suppliers themselves and approved by the core firm. Thus, DS 
stands for drawings supplied (taiyo-zu) and DA for drawings approved (sho- 
nin-zu). The distinction between DS parts and DA parts is critical, because 
in the supply of the latter the supplier is asked to be engaged in not only 
manufacturing but also in product development. Subcategories from I to VI 
add finer partitions into DS parts and DA parts. Suffice to note here that 
examples in Table 1 are shown only as an illustration, and the actual loca­
tion of a specific part may change depending on the actual bilateral relation 
between a specific core firm and its supplier.
During the duration of supply, a given core firm and its supplier 
interact in various aspects. This is because delivery has to be made continual­
ly as required by the buyer, while the volume of the part demanded by the 
core firm fluctuates from month to month as the demand for completed 
vehicles changes. In addition, to accomodate changes that may occur as to 
costs and prices, and to achieve systematic cost reductions, price renegotia­
tions are conducted at regular intervals.
For later international comparisons, I note that in the Japanese auto­
mobile industry, a well-established practice is to let a given supplier 
continue to supply the same sort of parts during the life of a given model of 
car, provided that this supplier has been designated as the supplier of that 
sort of parts for that model of car at its development stage. But, when the 
full model is changed, normally at four-year intervals, there is no guarantee 
for the supplier that he will be awarded the order for the same kind of part 
of the next model; then competition resumes among the suppliers that have 
capabilities to supply similar kinds of parts. In sum, delivery of a given part 
normally continues for four years. During this period, price renegotiations 
are conducted at six-month intervals, and quantities are adjusted every 
month, and actual deliveries are made according to kanbans or other signals, 
as vehicle assembly proceeds over time, following the just-in-time philoso­
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phy. If problems arise regarding quality or delivery, suppliers have to make 
corrective actions immediately upon receipt of notices from the core firm, 
since, otherwise, the production line concerned would have to stop.
The former paragraph referred only to the production stage. But, in the 
case of the ordered goods (or customized goods) type parts, interactions 
between the core firm and a given supplier should begin in the development 
stage, except in the case of a relatively small number of parts determined at 
the outset by the product development staff of the core firm to be carried 
over from a previous model of vehicle. Especially in the case of DA parts 
(plus the border-line subcategory of III), suppliers, or more precisely, 
candidates of suppliers, are asked to be involved quite early in the devel­
opment stage. In response to the rough specification of the part communi­
cated from the core firm, these firms conduct initial drawings, proto-type 
manufacturing and testing, report the results to and have consultation with 
the engineering staff of the core firm. Similar cycles will be repeated until 
final drawings for commercial production are completed.
Both in the case of DA parts and DS parts, not only the performance 
and quality, but also the price has to clear the target set by the core firm. In 
order to achieve these goals, the suppliers have to be engaged in process 
development as well.
3.4. High Proportion of DA Parts in the Procurement by Japanese Core 
Firms. — It has been widely perceived that, in comparison to GM and Ford, 
Japanese automobile manufacturers spend a higher portion of the costs 
needed to manufacture a unit of vehicle for payment to outside suppliers of 
parts and processing services. But, a more meaningful fact is that, in the 
Japanese automobile industry, the proportion occupied by DA parts in the 
total money amount paid for all the parts procured from outside sources is 
significantly higher in comparison with the same industry both in the United 
States and in Europe.
Asanuma (1984b) has noted that this must be an important character­
istic of the Japanese automobile industry 8. Recently, a beautiful quantita­
tive evidence has been provided by Clark, Chew and Fujimoto (1987). They 
have collected several kinds of numerical data concerning passenger, car 
development projects for the cars introduced in the 1980s. Their sample 
covers 8 car companies and 12 projects in Japan, 3 car companies and 6 
projects in the United States, and 9 car companies and 11 projects in 
Europe. Table 1 in their paper summarizes several basic numerical data by
8 See Asanuma (1984b, p. 48; English version: p. 52).
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regions. Of a number of variables listed in the table, the variable named 
Share in procurement costs is pertinent for our purpose here. The parts are 
classified into the following three categories: (a) Supplier proprietary parts,
(b) Black box parts, and (c) Detail-controlled parts. From the definitions of 
these terms given in the footnote to the table, we know that category (a) 
corresponds to the “marketed goods” type parts, (b) to DA parts, and (c) to 
DS parts in my terminology. The table shows that the percentage share of 
each category of parts is as follows. For Japan, (a) 8, (B) 62, (c) 30. For the 
United States, (a) 3, (b) 16, (c) 81. Finally, for Europe, (a) 7, (b) 39, (c) 54.
Clearly, the high weight of (b) in Japan stands out. The phenomenon 
represented by these figures has the implications that I set out in the 
following subsection. I should add that a recent study conducted by a 
graduate student under my supervision on a TV set manufacturer in Japan 
also has shown that the share of DA parts, or Black box parts, is higher than 
the other two categories 9.
3.5. Recent Movement in the U.S. toward Longer-Term Relations. — Asanu- 
ma (1992) has presented a U.S.-Japan comparison of parts procurement 
practices by automobile manufacturers based on his field research conducted 
in the United States in 1986. The findings reported therein can be asso­
ciated with the differences between the two countries we have just seen.
First of all, as touched upon in Subsection 3.3, a well-established prac­
tice in Japan is to let a given supplier continue the supply of the same sort 
of parts during the life of a given model of car, provided that this supplier 
has been designated as the supplier of that sort of part for the vehicle model 
at its development stage. This means that the supplier can expect that its 
business on a specific part would continue for four years under normal 
circumstances, once it has been awarded that business. This practice seems 
to be very natural for DA parts, since, except for a limited number of 
carried-over parts, each of the DA parts used in a given model of vehicle 
is developed in the development stage of this model predominantly by a 
firm which is to become the supplier of that part in the commercial produc­
tion stage; under such a practice the firm can expect to recover the devel­
opment cost over the life of the model.
On the other hand, until the period from 1980 to 1983, which marks a 
turning point in the history of the American automobile industry, a well-es­
9 Of all of the parts purchased by the TV division of Company M, the “marketed goods” 
type parts occupy 20 percent, while DA parts and DS parts constitute 55 and 25 pero 
respectively. See Wu (1991).
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tablished practice for U.S. automobile manufacturers was to set the duration 
of the delivery as one year for most of the parts. Especially in the case of 
GM, the corporate headquarters used to require the buyers in their purchas­
ing organizations to reshuffle suppliers of each purchased items at one-year 
intervals through the mechanism of bidding. Such a policy or practice would 
have been effective, had the items transacted been standardized commodi­
ties. But, as described in Subsection 3.3, customized goods need significant­
ly more complex interactions between the core firm and each of the sup­
pliers than the “marketed goods” type parts. For such interactions to be 
exercised efficiently, skills are required to be accumulated in the organiza­
tions of the core firm and of suppliers and used in an effective way; to this 
end learning through continuous transactions and a sense of commitment 
of the supplier are crucially important.
Note here that the transactional relation implied by the one-year 
contract is not exactly identical with that implied by the spot market. 
Delivery continues repetitively for one year. The price is fixed at the outset, 
subject to some adjustment at the end of the contract period in case 
unpredicted nonnegligible changes in environment occur during the period. 
In view of these features, the one-year contract should be regarded as a kind 
of relational contract in Williamson’s terminology. But, in the spectrum of 
all conceivable relational contracts, it occupies a position close to the spot 
market.
It is because as much as 81 percent of the purchased parts belonged to 
the DS parts category that the representative of the American core firms 
was able to switch the supplier of each purchased part at one-year intervals. 
Since, in the case of DS parts, drawings are owned by the core firm, the 
core firm could simply take back the drawings from one supplier and lend 
them to another.
However, by the period from 1980 to 1983, American core firms came 
to perceive that one of the competitive edges acquired by Japanese core 
firms must reside in their effectiveness in the product development process. 
At the same time, American core firms noticed that part of this effectiveness 
stems from the availability of so many DA parts suppliers that Japanese 
core firms enjoyed. Based on this perception, American core firms decided 
to change the structure of their supply network; they started to increase the 
proportion of DA parts and of their suppliers of DA parts. This change of 
policy has led these core firms to the life cycle concept. In this regard the 
Japanese and U.S. systems tended towards convergence.
3.6. Recent Movement in the U.S. toward Procurement at Higher Stages of
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Assembly. -  Among other observed facts reported by Asanuma (1992) there 
is the following. Whereas the typical number of suppliers of each of the 
vehicle assembly plant in GM was 800 as of 1986, the number of suppliers 
of the Takaoka plant, which is one of Toyota’s vehicle assembly plant, was 
125 as of 1983. If we take the following two factors into account, these 
figures mean that, on average, the suppliers of GM tended to supply parts 
in lower stages of assembly in comparison to the suppliers of Toyota. The 
two factors are: (1) the Takaoka plant has twice as large a capacity of 
assembly as a typical vehicle assembly plant in North America; and (2) 
whereas the Takaoka plant has a stamping shop inside, a typical vehicle 
assembly plant in North America does not.
In Subsection 3.5, I have noted that the period from 1980 to 1983 is a 
turning point in the history of the US automobile industry from which 
American core firms started to change the manufacturer-supplier rela­
tionships they had developed. One of the targets of this change is, as already 
noted, to increase the proportion of DA parts and suppliers thereof. Another 
target is to reduce the number of the suppliers on the first tier through 
removing technologically inferior suppliers, and to let those suppliers who 
survived this screening process supply parts at higher stages of assembly, 
even if the parts in question still remain in the DS parts category.
For instance, for GM, a previous practice was to assemble seats inside 
vehicle assembly plants, purchasing frames, adjustment levers, springs, pad­
dings, and seat covers from outside sources. But the company has changed 
this practice and is now procuring assembled seats from outside. Typically 
for each of the vehicle assembly plant, one of the suppliers of the parts for 
seats in the previous period has been upgraded to the seat supplier of the 
plant, and the rest have either become the suppliers of this seat supplier or 
have been removed. In other words, a two-tier structure has been created 
instead of the previous single-tier structure, as the company began to 
procure seats from outside as a “system component”.
Here again, we may note that the issue of the international difference 
of the structure of business organization or interfirm relationships should 
not be discussed in a static context. Several characteristics of the systems 
compared can change over time, and an important task for observers is to 
deduce from their observations which way the systems are moving and 
why 10.
10 Based on a questionnaire survey, Helper (1991) has provided an assessment of the 
current status of the manufacturer-supplier relationships in the American automobile industry 
held by the U.S.-based core firms after a decade of reform. She intends to extend this research 
to cover Japan-based core firms operating in North America.
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4. Generalizations from the Observed Facts
4.1. Relation-Specific Skill. — In Subsection 3.1 I considered a major plant 
of a large Japanese electronics manufacturer and showed that the suppliers 
with which its management tries to develop close and cohesive relationships 
are limited to those suppliers of customized goods who receive high ratings 
in terms of capabilities. Regarding major Japanese automobile manufac­
turers, as noted in Subsection 3.2, the proportion of those who have kept 
close and longstanding relationships in the population of all first-tier sup­
pliers of a given automobile manufacturer is significantly larger in com­
parison to the case of electronics manufacturers. This difference can be 
explained by the structural factors referred to in Subsection 3.2. The 
purchasing attitude itself has been observed to be largely common between 
the automobile and the electronics manufacturers.
Thus, from the theoretical viewpoint, the main problem to solve boils 
down to the following. Why do the close and longstanding type interfirm 
transactional relations concentrate to the area where customized goods are 
transacted? In Subsection 3.2, I first noted that the findings summarized in 
Figure 1 are basically consonant with Williamson’s framework. At the end 
of that subsection, however, I also noted a subtle gap between Williamson’s 
treatment and a facet of the practice observable at the Japanese plant. To 
repeat the point, the gap is as follows: In Williamson’s framework, the 
development of the intermediate goods transacted is assumed to have been 
already completed before the analysis starts. Thus, duration of the transac­
tion is logically bound to be some time period within the life cycle of a 
specific part or material. On the other hand, the longstanding relations 
observable at the Japanese plant generally continue beyond the life of a 
given model of a part.
As noted in Subsection 2.2, the key introduced by Williamson to 
explain the existence of the relational contract is transaction-specific in­
vestment or specialized asset. However, if, by the term specialized asset, we 
only think of such kind of asset that is entirely specific to the needs of 
supplying one specific model of a part, such as specific dies, equipment, or 
drawings, the sort of longstanding relations that extend beyond the life of a 
given model of a part is hard to explain. To explain such sort of relations, 
we need to expand Williamson’s notion of specialized asset.
What Asanuma (1989) has submitted by introducing the concept of 
relation-specific skill is one way of achieving such an expansion. This 
concept categorizes the supplier’s capabilities to secure an efficient response 
to the needs of a specific core firm. To assure satisfactory performance
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as to quality and delivery, even in the case of “marketed goods” type parts 
suppliers are required to make the levels of corresponding components of 
their organizational skill clear some threshhold. But, as noted in Subsection 
3.3, in the case of customized goods, suppliers need to be engaged in 
complex interactions with the core firm starting from the development 
stage of a particular part. The capabilities required for such interactions 
are nurtured, to a considerable degree, by the learning achieved through 
repetition of similar interactions with a given core firm. I think this is the 
fundamental factor that underlies the continuity of the relations beyond the 
life of one single model of a customized good 11.
4.2. Implications to the New Entry Issue. — Now I turn back to the new 
entry issue raised in the context of trade conflicts. What are the implications 
of my explanatory framework to the issue of entry of parts manufacturers to 
the supply network spanned by a core firm?
For the items that fall under the “marketed goods” type parts or 
material, new entry is relatively easy as illustrated by the case discussed in 
Subsection 3.1. However, even for this type of goods, a relation-specific skill 
is required to maintain quality standards and delivery schedule issued by 
the core firm.
For DA parts, new entry is most difficult. This is because in the case of 
DA parts suppliers are required to participate in the development of the 
next model of the final product from a very early phase, and it is not easy 
for any supplier to demonstrate to have a sufficient level of capabilities to 
have interactions in an efficient way with that core firm, unless the core 
firm already has experienced interactions with this supplier in the past. 
This is the fundamental reason why incumbent suppliers tend to be in an 
advantageous position to receive orders or inquiries, as far as their perform­
ances continue to get high scores from the core firms in the rating it 
continually exercises.
For DS parts, the situation is in-between. Suppliers of DS parts are 
required to have — in addition to relation-specific skill of the kinds that are 
required in the case of the “marketed goods” type parts -  abilities to clear 1
11 To have interactions with the suppliers effectively and efficiently, it is also required on 
the part of the core firm to develop a set of organizational skills inside its organization. For 
instance, to implement the JIT system in an appropriate way, it is indispensable for the core 
firm to develop techniques to achieve leveling of production both in volume and in kind, and 
to develop the monthly production plan very carefully so as not to change it abruptly once it 
has been made and sent to the suppliers to let them prepare for the delivery in a coming 
month. See Asanuma (1991) for this point.
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the price target set by the core firm through an assiduous effort to improve 
the process and the design of the product. Like in the case of DA parts, 
incumbent suppliers tend to have some advantage over nonincumbents, 
since the core firm could save the screening cost by using those firms who 
already have demonstrated during the course of recent transactions to have 
sufficient capabilities.
However, the foregoing argument does not mean that there is no 
possibility of entry for nonincumbents. Firstly, as set out in detail by Asanu- 
ma (1989), the relation-specific skill has a two-layer structure. The learning 
from the past experience of transactions with the specific core firm affects 
only the upper layer. The basic layer is determined by investments in 
technology. In those product areas where basic technology is relatively in a 
fluid state, firms with a strong basic layer can relatively easily overtake such 
incumbent suppliers that have a weaker basic layer. Secondly, among large 
manufacturers there exists one common tendency in their purchasing 
attitude. That is, they prefer to develop and keep many sources for the 
items they have decided to procure from outside, as long as their demand 
volume calls for many sources and these are available. The motive for this 
is to keep competitive stimuli. For this reason, core firms tend to gradually 
add new sources of supply to the incumbents, provided that the business of 
the core firm in question keeps growing over time.
Besides seeking to supply some DA parts to a new core firm from the 
outset, which is a more demanding task, there are two possible roundabout 
routes to go into the business of supplying DA parts to a given core firm. 
One is via evolution from the supply of some “marketed goods” type parts 
of a similar nature. The other is via evolution from some related DS parts.
In this way, if we carefully investigate the regularities of longstanding 
transactional relationships based on a methodology that can accomodate 
evolution of the economic system and its components linked by these rela­
tionships, such studies can not only shed light to the elements overlooked 
by conventional approaches, but also serve to help new entry.
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RELAZIONI FRA IMPRESE NELL’INDUSTRIA AUTOMOBILISTICA
..... ?“ Giappone la natura delle relazioni fra produttori e fornitori è diventata 
difficile da capire per la coesistenza di due visioni differenti. In una prevale Te­
se usività e considera le relazioni come una aberrazione del normale concetto di 
scambio mediato dal mercato; l’altra sottolinea l’efficienza e cerca di trovare ele­
menti trasferibili in campo internazionale. Sulla base dei risultati di una ricerca 
sul campo questo articolo presenta uno schema teorico che può affrontare il pro­
blema dell’esclusività e quello dell’efficienza in modo integrato. La chiave per 
capire il problema è il concetto di abilità specifica derivato come sviluppo della 
nozione di Williamson di patrimonio specifico per incorporare le interazioni fra 
le imprese allo stadio di sviluppo del prodotto.
Si mostra che questo concetto chiarisce perché le relazioni di scambio con­
tinuano spesso oltre la vita di un dato modello, e che nello stesso tempo è utile 
ai fornitori potenziali che cercano di entrare nel mercato.
Rivista Intemazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 
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TRAINING PRACTICES IN 
JAPANESE, BRITISH AND GERMAN FIRMS
by
M a r i S a k o  *
1. Introduction
Education and training (ET) and its contribution to industrial competi­
tiveness have been at the centre of public policy concern in most advanced 
industrial countries. Establishing empirically the causal link and direction 
between ET and industrial success has proved difficult. Many other factors 
besides ET influence industrial productivity (Pratten, 1990). But as world 
markets in manufacturing goods have become increasingly integrated, and 
physical capital more mobile, views as to the source of Japan’s industrial 
success have changed. Whereas in the past people might have thought that 
the key to Japan’s competitiveness was more and better physical capital, 
today they regard the Japanese edge as deriving from its capacity to generate 
a well-educated and trained workforce. Consequently, Japanese companies 
can implement flexible, worker-dependent production methods, giving high 
discretion and control to workers. The resulting dynamic interaction between 
machinery and labour -  which Shimada and Macduffie (1986) appropriately 
call ‘humanware’ — facilitates shorter product development cycles and contin­
uous process innovation which are becoming essential for a relatively high 
wage nation to remain competitive in the world economy. This undeniable 
logic has led to the recent US-Japan bilateral SII talks to identify ET as one 
of the ‘structural impediments’ to international trade.
It is in this context that this paper discusses the following questions 
with respect to Japanese multinational companies (MNCs) in Britain and 
Germany.
(a) Is there a systematic difference in performance (as measured by produc-
* London School of Economics, Industrial Relations Department, London (Great Britain).
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tivity and quality levels) between Japanese plants located in Britain and 
those located in Germany? If so, how much of the difference appears to 
be explained by differences in the approach to training?
(b) What modifications, if any, are being made to the philosophy and type 
of training Japanese companies provide in Japan when training non-Jap­
anese workers at their European plants? Do the nature of modifications 
differ from country to country in Europe, and if so what is the reason 
for them?
With respect to (a), previous British-German comparisons have indi­
cated a wide gulf in productivity. In particular, in a series of studies which 
compared productivity in indigenous British and German companies in a 
range of sectors (namely metalworking, woodworking, clothing, hotels and 
retail sectors), West German productivity was found to be up to 60 per cent 
higher than British productivity (Prais et al., 1989). Earlier, Pratten (1976) 
also found in his study of multinational companies with plants in Europe 
and North America that productivity was up to 35 per cent higher in 
Germany than in Britain. Does a similar British-German gap exist within 
Japanese MNCs? This is what one would expect from previous studies 
which attach importance to the better qualified manpower in Germany than 
in Britain.
A study of Japanese multinational plants in Europe provides a poten­
tially ideal setting for assessing the implications of training for performance. 
This is because by comparing Japanese plants in Japan and their European 
counterparts, it would be possible to separate the contributions to productiv­
ity of national cultural influences from organizational techniques (including 
those in the training areas) commonly applied in Japan (Ryan, 1991). For 
instance, if the application of identical techniques in British-based plant 
under British cultural conditions leads to the same performance outcome as 
at its HQ plant in Japan, the role of national culture is diminished.
Also a number of variables may be controlled in the comparison. First, 
the quality of management (at least at the top) can be controlled to a certain 
extent as management in Japanese plants in Europe has not yet been greatly 
localized. Moreover, given that the product development and design func­
tion has not been decentralized by most Japanese MNCs to date, British- 
based and German-based plants are producing goods similar to the ones 
manufactured at their HQ plants in Japan. Their process technology may 
also be alike because large investment decisions are taken not autonomously 
at the plant level but with the approval of the MNC HQ in Japan. These 
facts undoubtedly make it easier to conduct a study of the link between 
training and its performance outcome, which is infested with a multiplicity
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of explanatory variables. It may be hypothesized that the less localised 
management, product design and process technology are, the less likely that 
the British-German productivity gap persists in Japanese MNC plants. Here, 
the need for standardization in training practices may be seen to derive 
from uniform product design and process technology. Japanese management 
may also apply the same investment criteria across locations, so that for 
instance, British-based Japanese plants would not suffer from the short- 
termism British-owned firms are often said to adopt when investing in 
physical or human capital.
The above picture is, however, rather mechanistic in its focus on 
unidirectional causation. It may well be that modifications are made to 
equipment and machinery, so as to suit the level of local manpower quality. 
The productivity gap between countries may thus be preserved or accen­
tuated. This points to the possibility of a difficult-to-break virtuous circle of 
skill promotion, i.e. a “high skill equilibrium” (Finegold and Soskice, 1988) 
on the one hand, and a vicious skill-denying circle on the other hand. These 
aspects of productivity will be examined in the empirical section of this 
paper.
The next section will consider the second question (b) in general 
terms, before turning to the case study evidence of Japanese multinational 
plants in Britain and Japan.
2. Training Systems and Labour Markets in Britain, Germany, and japan
This section does not provide a general description of how education 
and training systems function in Britain, Germany and Japan ’ . Instead, it 
will compare and contrast the main features of the three countries’ systems 
so as to gauge the options available to Japanese MNCs in modifying, or not 
modifying, their training philosophy and practices when setting up plants in 
Britain and Germany. A certain degree of stereotyping — or “stylization” — is 
inevitable at this level of generalisation. The comparisons focus on domi­
nant practices in dominant sectors in each economy. This focus is considered 
not so inappropriate to our present context, which is confined to the interna­
tionally traded sector in which Japanese MNCs invest overseas.
For initial training of young people, the two host countries to be 
studied, Britain and Germany, have had similar apprenticeship-based train-
1 See Table 1 for a summary of the education and training system and surrounding 
institutions in the three countries.
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Table 1
ENTERPRISE TRAINING IN WEST GERMANY, JAPAN AND BRITAIN
W. Germany Japan Britain
Training modes * Dual System * Short-term off- * No predominant
* Formal courses the-job training mode
and qualifications and continuous * Decline in
* Opportunities for OJT traditional




Historical * Medieval craft * Employment * Laissez-faire and
tradition stabilization self-help since
* Training and strategy in c20th Industrial
trade schools * Paternalism Revolution
since 16th century * US practices 
(Taylorism, QC)
* Discontinuity in 
government policies
Education system * Selective * Comprehensive * Comprehensive
* Broad curriculum * Broad curriculum * Narrow
* High maths * High maths curriculum with
attainments with attainments with anti-industrial bias
small dispersion small dispersion * Large dispersion




rates * Low staying-on 
rates
Labour markets * Occupational * Internal labour * Youth labour
labour markets markets (“lifetime markets exist
* Payment by employment”) * Payment by skills
vocational * Payment by and experience
qualification seniority and merit * Narrow pay
* Steep skill * Steep pay differentials by age
differentials in pay differentials by age and skills
Inter-firm relations * Network of * Cooperative sub- * Absence of
business contracting cooperative inter-
associations relations firm relations
* Inter-plant * Cooperative joint * Reliance on
training centres training provisions market
* Group training 
associations
by small firms mechanisms
TRAINING IN JAPANESE, BRITISH AND GERMAN FIRMS 1045
ing systems (Marsden and Ryan, 1990). However, a contrasting trend is 
evident in the two countries. In Germany, the sole route to skilled status 
remains the Dual System, which encompasses over 70 per cent of young 
people (aged 16 to 19), spread across all sectors of the German economy. A 
relatively low apprentice allowance has been maintained in occupational 
labour markets by ‘social partners’ (i.e. employers’ associations and trade 
unions) which jointly regulate training standards as well as pay levels. High 
pay differentials by skill status ensures that returns to apprenticeship are 
high for individuals, and that employers’ incentive to provide training is also 
enhanced. Moreover, a strict linking of qualifications to pay levels in in­
dustry-wide collective agreements contributes towards eliminating ‘poaching’ 
as a viable alternative to training for most employers. Thus, the German 
training system is sustained by external regulation, which requires much 
coordination among employers, unions, and the public sector. Although 
such coordination may be prone to rigidities and inertia, the tripartite actors 
in Germany have worked towards adapting the Dual System to meet new 
needs, for e.g. in technology, within the existing regulatory framework, 
rather than attempting to transform it in any fundamental way.
In Britain, by contrast, apprenticeships have been eroded particularly 
in the 1980s, for instance from 150,000 in 1979 to 55,000 in 1988 in the 
manufacturing sector (Training Agency, 1989, p. 15). Youth Training, or 
the Youth Training Scheme (YTS) in the past, is not recognised as an 
alternative form of long-term training for young people. Consequently, by 
1988, only 16 per cent of 15-16 year olds were on YTS, while 32 per cent 
were in full-time education. The rest were either employed (42 per cent) or 
unemployed (10 per cent). Outside YTS and declining apprenticeships, long 
duration training given by employers is the exception rather than the rule; 
three-quarters of the school leavers going into employment outside YTS in 
1986 received either no training or training lasting less than a year (Train­
ing Agency, 1989). Marsden and Ryan (1990) attribute the erosion of 
apprenticeship-based training, and the degeneration of British labour mar­
kets into more internal forms, to the absence of an appropriate regulatory 
framework as in Germany. In particular, as part of deregulation policies in 
the 1980s, Industrial Training Boards and Wage Councils were abolished. 
This led to the widening of youth-adult pay differentials in sectors requiring 
relatively little training, while relative youth pay crept upwards in sectors 
such as engineering requiring expensive training. The latter was an outcome 
of collective bargaining, in which unions feared “low pay, low quality” 
apprenticeships in the absence of a regulatory safeguard against apprentice- 
adult worker substitution. The perverse incentives created for employers as
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well as individuals not to train are evident. It is unclear whether the newly 
created TECs (Training and Enterprise Councils) would regenerate em­
ployers’ commitment to train through local-level coordination.
From the viewpoint of Japanese MNCs, British and German labour 
markets offer a different trade-off of opportunities and constraints. On the 
one hand, Germany may be chosen as a location because of the availability 
of good quality technical manpower. But the statutory regulation concerning 
training would bind Japanese MNCs to conform to the German way if they 
were to build a reputation for being good corporate citizens. On the other 
hand, Britain may be selected for its lack of regulations in training and other 
areas, because this allows Japanese MNCs to adopt the same well tried and 
tested methods as in Japan. But they must face a labour market with 
workers whose levels of general educational attainment are lower on aver­
age than in Japan. Thus, as far as the issue of regulation is concerned, one 
may hypothesize, apropos of Question (b), that Japanese plants located in 
Germany assimilate more to the host country’s philosophy and method of 
training than plants in Britain.
Deregulation in Britain, however, only creates a scope for applying 
Japanese-style training philosophy and methods, which are characterized by 
broad-based initial training of young recruits with high general education 
attainments; this becomes a basis for recurrent training and retraining in 
lifetime employment careers. Conditions may be created by Japanese MNCs 
to Japanize their British workplaces, by choosing a greenfield site unaf­
fected by past experience, by signing a single union agreement which 
enables flexible working and the de-linking of pay from skill status, by 
engaging in rigorous selection for attitudes as much as for technical skills, 
and by offering employment security and internal promotion prospects. 
However, Japanese plants cannot be totally insulated from external labour 
markets particularly because of their small and medium size. The lack of 
lifetime employment orientation is likely to militate against the wholesale 
adoption of Japanese training philosophy and methods. Moreover, lower 
educational attainments of shopfloor workers may have led Japanese MNCs 
to modify process technology, thus affecting training requirements. These 
issues will be examined later.
In Germany, the apprenticeship-based training giving rise to clear-cut 
occupational labour markets is often portrayed in stark contrast to enterprise 
training in internal labour markets of large Japanese companies. The former 
enshrines the principle of individual freedom inherent in training contracts; 
no skilled worker is obliged to remain loyal to the firm which trained 
him/her, and no training firm is obligated to employ those young people to
TRAINING IN JAPANESE, BRITISH AND GERMAN FIRMS 1047
whom it provides training. Qualifications attained through training are per­
fect passports to future job mobility. However, in reality, large prestigious 
German enterprises prefer to train apprentices in-house and retain them 
after training. This is because externally available apprentice-qualified work­
ers are second best to the best pick large firms have had among a cohort of 
school leavers. Skill qualifications, therefore, are to an extent indicators of 
general ability (just like educational qualifications in Japan) as well as of 
technical competence in Germany.
Despite different labour market structures, other common features ex­
ist in the training area in Germany and Japan as follows (Sako, 1991).
(a) Both German and Japanese employers provide a broad-based foundation 
training of technical knowledge and skills for young workers as a basis for 
further learning.
(b) The individual motivation to acquire skills is enhanced by employers 
who provide a clear progression route for promotion and reaching higher 
skill levels (via the Meister qualification in Germany, and via more finely 
graded promotion to group leaders and supervisors in Japan).
(c) Employers’ incentive to provide general as well as specific training is 
enhanced by lower relative youth pay, although the steep earnings profile 
corresponds to skill differentials in Germany and to seniority in Japan.
(d) Much responsibility for training young workers falls upon supervisors 
and foremen who themselves receive sufficient training in pedagogical skills 
as well as in technical skills.
In fact, this last feature points to a German-Japanese similarity in 
shopfloor work organization: much discretion is given to supervisors, lead­
ing hands and operators who are entrusted to solve problems and to engage 
in mutual learning as well as to carry out routine tasks. Sengenberger makes 
a related point as follows:
“Jobs in Great Britain are defined in terms o f a set of tasks or a job territory and 
viewed as a property right by the job holder, whereas in Germany, jobs tend to be 
defined more as a range and level of technical and organizational competency. So, 
the difference is really between a rather exclusive job territory and a non-exclusive 
territory o f skill or competence. And it is in this respect where I consider the 
Japanese system of work place relations despite the absence of vocational training 
to be much closer to the German than to the Anglo-Saxon pattern”. (Sengenberger, 
1987, pp. 256-7).
To summarize, from the discussion above, Japanese MNC plants are 
expected to conform more to the German training methods when located in 
Germany than to the British mode when located in Britain because of a
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greater degree of regulation and coordination among ‘social partners’ which 
is more necessary in Germany than in Britain. However, the German train­
ing principles are not so different from the Japanese one, making assimila­
tion by Japanese plants easier than is often thought.
3. The Case Study Companies
The following sections report on preliminary findings from an on-going 
research project on Japanese MNCs in Europe 2. The sample consists of 
Japanese manufacturing MNC plants in Britain and Germany. The two 
countries were chosen not only because they are the most popular (in the 
case of Britain) and the fourth most popular (in the case of Germany, after 
the Netherlands and France) locations for Japanese direct investment within 
Europe. It is also because one of the purpose of the research, as mentioned 
earlier, is to examine if the performance gap between British and German 
plants persists in the case of Japanese MNCs.
Japan’s direct overseas investment (on an accumulated value basis) in 
Europe as of March 31 1990 was worth $45 billion, which constituted 18 
per cent of Japan’s worldwide overseas investment. Of the $45 billion, $8 
billion was in the manufacturing sector (Anglo-Japanese Economic Institute, 
1991, p. 16). Within the manufacturing sector, a regular JETRO survey 
identified 529 Japanese subsidiaries and affiliates as of the end of January 
1990 (JETRO, 1990). Japanese manufacturing companies’ participation in 
Europe has accelerated particularly since the latter half of the 1980s. Of the 
529 firms, the greatest concentration is seen in Britain (with 132 firms), and 
the third highest concentration after France in Germany (with 89 firms’). By 
sector, electronic and electrical machinery is most common, accounting for 
86 firms, of which 25 are located in Britain and 19 in Germany.
The investigation concentrates on this sector so as to enable inter-plant 
comparisons of machinery and skills. The electronic and electrical machinery 
sector, which includes the manufacture of such goods as colour television 
sets  ̂ VCRs, and printers, happens to be a sector in Japan enjoying relatively 
high productivity, together with the car industry, compared to the rest of 
the economy (such as retail and distribution) (Abbeglen and Stalker, 1985 
p. 61-2). In these sectors, the assembly processes involve a large number of 
interdependent steps which must be coordinated, thus rendering potential
Tt Pr°iect is funded by STICERD (Santory Toyota International Centre 
and Related Disciplines) at the London School of Economics.
for Economic
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SUMMARY OF CASE STUDY FIRMS
Table 2
COMPANY NAME ESTABLISHED CAPITAL EMPLOYEES
A Electronics Ltd 1981 £ 9.5m 1062 (7)
B Electronics Ltd 1981 £ 5m 600 (12)
C Electronics Ltd 1984 £ 9m 900 (15)
A Electronics GmbH 1986 DM 12.95m 220 (5)
B Electronics GmbH 1984 DM 13.5m 410 (8)
C Electronics GmbH 1982 DM 20m 574 (6)
N.B. The employee figure in brackets is the number of Japanese at the plant.
loss in productivity due to machine breakdowns and line stoppages great.
Of the 25 plants in Britain and 19 in Germany, there are a handful of 
Japanese companies which have plants in both countries. This paper concen­
trates on three such cases of paired plants in Britain and Germany (see Table
2). The sample to date is too small to make broad generalisations, but 
details on variation between, as well as within, Britain and Germany are of 
interest and will be the basis for further investigation.
All plants were visited, for a factory tour and semi-structured inter­
views. Interviews lasted between two hours and a day and a half. At a 
minimum, one Japanese manager and one local top manager were inter­
viewed at each plant. Usually, the local manager was in the personnel 
function, while the Japanese manager was knowledgeable about industrial 
engineering, and could make explicit comparisons of performance at the 
British-based or German-based plant and its HQ plant in Japan. According 
to circumstances, specific questions were also addressed to other Japanese 
and local managers in quality control and purchasing, and to supervisors.
4. Productivity and Quality Levels
Table 3 shows the average productivity and quality differentials be­
tween each Brisith-based or German-based plant and its corresponding HQ 
plant in Japan. The limited size of the sample ought to be kept in mind. But 
plant by plant variations are so great that no generalisation can be made 
about whether British-based or German-based plants are performing better. 
In comparisons with the HQ plants in Japan, however, British and German-
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Table 3
PRODUCTIVITY AND QUALITY DIFFERENTIALS
BRITAIN GERMANY
COMPANY A Ltd B Ltd C Ltd A GmbH B GmbH C GmbH
PRODUCTIVITY 92.5 90 95 85 95 87.5
QUALITY 750 255 200 + 150 200 365
N.B. Productivity in Japan = 100
Quality defect rate in Japan = 100
based plants are worse in their quality performance than in their productiv­
ity levels.
The measure of productivity most commonly used in the sample plants 
is the ratio of standard time to actual time taken to process and assemble 
final products. Standard time is calculated in Japan and adjusted locally, for 
example for the degree of automation. Equivalent measurements are avail­
able for each European-based plant and its corresponding HQ plant in 
Japan by virtue of their belonging to the same MNC. Thus, comparability of 
measure is preserved, even if the measuring formula may differ from com­
pany to company. The British-Japanese productivity gap ranges from 90 to 
95, while the German-Japanese productivity gap ranges from 87.5 to 95.
The measure of quality varied more greatly from plant to plant. Some 
companies used the end-of-line reject rate (or the corresponding pass rate), 
while some others counted the number of defective points discovered 
plant-wide. Whatever measure was used, however, the consistency of meas­
ure between each European-based plant and its Japan-based counterpart 
again ensures comparability. The British defect rates range from twice to 7.5 
times as high as in Japan, while the German defect rates range from twice to 
3.65 times as high as in Japan.
The sources of productivity and quality differentials are various. The 
rest of this section concentrates on (i) the nature of product markets and 
competition, (ii) the quality and origins of raw materials and components, 
and (iii) the organization of work.
(i) The nature of product markets. -  The fierce competition which exists in 
the Japanese domestic consumer electronics markets has been transposed in 
Europe through direct overseas investment by all major Japanese manufac­
turers in Europe. The competition is based as much on new product develop­
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ment and shorter product cycles of existing goods incorporating new fea­
tures, as on competitive prices. In Japan, the model cycle for such estab­
lished goods as colour television sets and VCRs which the case study 
plants manufacture is said to have shortened to one year. The cycles within 
Europe, according to some plants, are apparently slightly longer, by up to 2 
years. However, the same pressure to shorten model cycles exists due to the 
competition among Japanese manufacturers, and because the design and 
development of chassis in the case of TVs and the mechanism in the case of 
VCRs are undertaken at the HQ plants in Japan.
While there might be respite for some European-based plants due to 
longer model cycles, they must also cope with a smaller target market than 
their Japanese HQ counterparts or the subsidiary plants in the USA. The 
target market for the case study plants is the EEC region in most cases, 
which consists of 12 countries requiring different specifications. Consequent­
ly, British- and German-based plants produce a greater number of models in 
smaller batches than their HQ plants in Japan. For example, in Germany, A 
Electronics GmbH makes 60 to 70 models in a year, B Electronics GmbH 
55, and C Electronics GmbH 40. In Britain, A Electronics Ltd makes 110 
to 120 models and C Electronics Ltd 30 models. At B Electronics Ltd, the 
number of models, 80, was smaller than the 200 models produced at the 
HQ plant in Japan for export and domestic purposes, but the average batch 
size, ranging from 500 to 1000, was considerably smaller than the Japanese 
plant average of 3000 to 5000.
Smaller batch sizes make it more difficult to exploit economies of scale 
and to control for quality. Although no precise figure was available, the 
degree of automation at British-based and German-based plants was also 
said to be lower than at their HQ plants in Japan due to small batch 
production. In Japan, some companies such as C Electronics also have two 
separate factories, one specializing in product development, and the manufac­
turing of prototype and small batch high value-added products, and the 
other specializing in larger batch production. The productivity and quality 
comparisons are complicated by this, and figures in Table 3 shows the 
average variations as against the two plants in Japan.
(ii) Quality and origins of raw materials and components. — Next, plant-level 
performance is affected by the quality of raw materials and components. 
The sourcing of raw materials and components within the EEC is said to be 
the greatest problem facing Japanese companies (JETRO, 1990). There is 
also evidence that with the exception of a few European supplier companies 
such as Philips, the general lack of involvement of local suppliers in the
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product development and design process hinders European-based Japanese 
plants from pursuing continuous cost reduction and quality improvements 
jointly with local suppliers (Sako, 1992).
The six case study plants all had local contents ratios well above the 
EEC guideline. The modal ratio was in the range of 60 to 65 per cent, with 
C Electronics achieving a maximum of 90 per cent. By the time of the 
interviews, none of the plants was simply assembling from SKD (semi 
knock down) kits; the nature of the assembly and processing was therefore 
more than mere screw driver operations. In this context, the inferior quality 
and locally purchased components was mentioned as one of the several 
reasons why British and German-based plants had lower productivity and 
quality than at their Japanese HQ plants. C Electronics also mentioned the 
lack of service of some suppliers; for instance, a reason why some non­
standard components were not automatically inserted onto printed circuit 
boards was said to be because the local supplier of those components 
refused to undertake special packaging so as to be able to feed them direcdy 
onto the insertion machines.
Loss of efficiency also derived from the higher level of inventory-hold­
ing at European-based plants partly because the leadtime for ordering from 
the Far East is longer, and partly to insure against late delivery from local 
European suppliers.
(hi) Organisation of work. — Within each case study plant, a major reason 
for the inferior performance as compared to the HQ plant in Japan was said 
to be the nature of internal work organisation and management. In particu­
lar, individual workers’ work speed and technical skills are said to be not so 
different from those at the plants in Japan. WTiat are different are workers’ 
attitudes on the one hand and supervisory management on the other hand.
At the individual level, there is first a difference in quality conscious­
ness. Careless mistakes due to lack of concentration may become acceptable 
and normal on the shopfloor. At B Electronics plants in both Britain and 
Germany, a version of Quality Control Circles has been implemented recent­
ly, contributing to an improvement in in-house quality levels. Further im­
provements in quality by eliminating defects caused by individual operators 
were said to be a matter of time.
More difficult to inculcate is a sense of teamwork, according to some 
Japanese managers. For example, A Electronics Ltd mentioned British opera­
tors’ inability to work in a team, referring specifically to their tendency to 
pass on defective items to the next operator if defects are due not to oneself 
but to previous operators. The Japanese manager at B Electronics also
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implied that attitudes, in particular a sense of responsibility, are more impor­
tant than technical skills in improving quality. According to him, In Japan, 
there are overlaps in tasks between workers, so that mistakes are avoided by 
several people following up the same task or issue from different angles. 
This overlap is perhaps what responsibility is all about”. British workers 
attitudes have been changing, but only slowly in his judgement.
At A Electronics Ltd, a Japanese industrial engineer pointed out the 
British inspection operators’ tendency to reject assembled products with 
faults summarily, thus raising the defect rate and repairing costs. At A 
Electronics’ HQ plant in Japan, by contrast, inspection operators tend to 
adjust and repair minor faults there and then without rejecting. Moreover, a 
repair operator is likely to tell the inspection operator what was wrong and 
what to do next time if she came across similar faults again. Such informal 
communications across functions was said to be relatively absent at the 
British-based plant. A Japanese manager at C Electronics GmbH also 
thought that besides the daily five minute meeting which takes place among 
the line leader, quality assurance personnel and a production technician, 
more informal, yet essential, communication about quality and other matters 
tended to happen less in Germany than in Japan due to less overtime and 
socializing after work in Germany.
5. Machinery and Production Organisation
This section considers evidence on differences in the use of machinery 
among the six plants with respect to the following aspects: (i) the number 
of machines per employee (or manning levels per machine); (ii) rates and 
causes of machine breakdowns; (iii) ages and technical sophistication of 
machinery and equipment; (iv) relationships with equipment suppliers. All 
these aspects concern the “humanware” (Shimada and MacDuffie, 1986), 
which highlights the complementarity between capital equipment and la­
bour. Implicit comparisons are made with the corresponding Japanese plants 
wherever appropriate.
(i) Manning levels. -  Direct comparisons among all six plants proved impos­
sible due to not all plants having a single common process in which machi­
nery played a major part. But there is strong evidence that manning levels at 
the British-based plants are higher than at their HQ plants in Japan, and 
weak evidence that the German-Japanese gap in manning levels is small.
The comparison of the three British-based plants is in the automatic
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insertion machine workshop. At A Electronics Ltd, one operator attends one 
machine, whereas its plant in Japan has an operator looking after up to 5 
machines. The difference was not so stark at C Electronics Ltd, which had a 
manning ratio of 1 operator to 2 machines compared to 1:4 in Japan. B 
Electronics Ltd had a manning ratio of 1:1 at the time of the inverview, 
although up to 4 machines per operator were considered possible at busy 
times. The only German-based plant with an auto insertion machine stop, A 
Electronics GmbH, had a normal manning level of one operator per line, 
with 3 to 4 machines per lines, which was said to be the same in Japan’ 
What is different from Japan in all four cases is that in Europe, each 
machine is self-contained and standalone, while in Japan, insertion or sur­
face mount machines along a line are all inter-connected. A lack of skills in 
preventive maintenance in-house in Europe was cited as a major reason for 
this difference.
Hi) Machine breakdowns. -  Inter-connected machines tend to make it diffi­
cult to achieve a high machine utilization rate because a breakdown of one 
machine affects all other machines in the line. Even without such a problem, 
machine breakdowns were said to be higher at the British-based plants than 
at their HQ plants in Japan. At C Electronics Ltd for example, the mean 
time between failure (MTBF), which is the average time between stoppages, 
was said to be three times longer in Japan than in Britain. Low maintenance 
skills and inferior component quality were said to cause more frequent 
stoppages. Both B Electronics Ltd and C Electronics Ltd pointed out the 
absence of machine operators and technicians with long lengths of service as 
in Japan, who have accumulated a better expertise than the machine manu­
facturers on how to maintain, repair and improve the machines. At A 
Electronics GmbH, by contrast, the machine utilization rate was judged to 
be the same as at its HQ plant in Japan, if smaller batch sizes in Germany 
were taken into account. Interconnecting machines was said to be just a 
matter of time and experience. However, small batch production contributes 
to a slower pace of learning.
(ni) Age and technical sophistication. -  Older machines and newly installed, 
technically sophisticated machines are more difficult to maintain. There was, 
however, no major differences in the age, the size, the running speed, nor 
the technical sophistication of machines used at the European-based and 
Japanese-based plants. In the case of automatic insertion and surface mount 
machines, the same Japanese brand of machinery was installed at the Brit­
ish-based and German-based plants as at their HQ plants in Japan. These
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machines are relatively standardized, and are already tried and tested at the 
Japanese plants by the time they are installed in Britain or Germany.
At B Electronics GmbH and C Electronics GmbH, where PCB inser­
tion was sub-contracted out in the Far East, questions were asked about the 
video cylinder machining shop. The machines were all Japanese made, ex­
cept for a few Swiss made ones. In fact, some of the machines at B Electron­
ics GmbH had been used, and were handed down, by its HQ plant in 
Japan. However, both German-based plants showed a strong preference for 
in-house innovation and joint development with German equipment sup­
pliers. In the case of B Electronics, a Japanese manager proudly pointed out 
testing jigs and equipment which were developed by German technicians at 
their initiative; the ease of maintenance and the accumulation of in-house 
know-how were said to be two important reasons for encouraging such 
innovation. At C Electronics GmbH, the German production manager saw 
at one of his regular visits to the HQ plant in Japan that two assembly 
processes which were difficult to control manually were automated. On his 
return to Germany, he asked a German equipment supplier nearby to jointly 
develop two customized machines to automate the processes. They are now 
running, attended by one operator.
(iv) Equipment suppliers. — It is common for users of machinery to prefer to 
buy locally whenever possible, for ease of repair and service. As pointed out 
above, the British-based and German-based plants are using predominantly 
Japanese brand machinery and equipment, mainly because the investment 
decision is taken by Japanese managers in Europe and Japan. There is an 
advantage in using Japanese branded machinery, as it is well tried and 
tested in Japan, and the good relationship the plants in Japan developed 
over the years with equipment suppliers can be extended to their European 
subsidiaries.
However, it also has its disadvantages, as Japanese equipment sup­
pliers tend not to have resources to post too many service personnel at their 
European sales offices. This means that a major machine breakdown is not 
serviced immediately, and a high level of inventory must be carried to be 
prepared for a long period of stoppage. Moreover, B Electronics GmbH 
pointed out that Japanese equipment suppliers tend not to be experienced in 
installing machinery in Germany, where the health and safety regulation 
requires various unfamiliar modifications to be made, adding 20 per cent to 
the equipment price. German equipment suppliers are therefore preferred, 
as they are located nearby, have more service personnel, and are familiar
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wiih German requirements. None of the British-based plants mentioned the 
possibility of sourcing equipment from British suppliers.
6. Training, Skills and Qualifications
The last, and the core, aspect to be examined, which contributes to 
differences in productivity and quality levels, is education and training, and 
the resulting skill levels and qualifications of the workforce. This section 
concentrates on examining differences in the amount, mode, quality and 
breadth of training provided between the British-based and German-based 
plants, while making implicit comparison with their HQ plants in Japan 
where appropriate. As discussed in Section 2, this section will also explore 
the extent to which skill formation has been affected by external regulation 
in each country, and by the level of general and technical education attain­
ments. The latter interacts with shopfloor organisation, resulting in varying 
degrees to which decision-making power is devolved to lower levels of the 
shopfloor hierarchy, placing a greater or lesser need for problem-solving 
intellectual skills on the part of operators and supervisors (Koike and 
Inoki, 1987, Koike, 1991). Limits must be noted to gauging this aspect of 
work organisation in the present research which relies solely on interviews 
with managers.
As expected, German workers were generally educated to a higher 
level, while the German-based plants had more technically qualified workers 
than the British-based plants. The British-based plant more easily adopted a 
system of internal promotion up to a higher level of shopfloor organisation 
than the German-based plants which adopted the German qualification- 
centred job grading system. The findings in more detail will be summarised 
below, first with respect to the job grading system, and second with respect 
to training provided to semi-skilled operators, supervisors, and apprentices.
(i)Jo b  gradmg systems. -  The job grading systems at the case study plants 
differed from those at their HQ plants in Japan, which points to the need to 
adapt to local ways to suit the respective national labour markets. The only 
exception was C Electronics Ltd which adopted wholesale Japanese HQ 
grading systems with its finely graded length-of-service and job responsibil­
ity related rungs in the payment system. C Electronics Ltd is the least 
localized of all the plants, with Japanese advisors shadowing various job 
functions including personnel. In other plants, the personnel function, par­
ticularly when it concerns non-management shopfloor workers, was very
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much left to local managers. In Germany, this was said to be a necessity 
because Japanese managers lack the knowledge of German labour law.
In general, the British-based plants have put an emphasis on flatter 
organisation with little job demarcations; the extreme case is B Electronics 
Ltd which is said to have 70 per cent of all workers on one grade. The 
length of service was reflected in pay at A Electronics Ltd and C Electronics 
Ltd, but not at B Electronics Ltd.
In Germany, the three plants all observe the tariff agreement with IG 
Metall. This involves evaluating each job in terms of its technical knowledge 
and organisational responsibility requirements, and working out a one- 
to-one correspondence between the job, the job grade, and its wage rate. 
There is therefore no scope for introducing length-of-service related pay in 
Germany. At C Electronics GmbH, there are 48 jobs to be evaluated by a 
committee for blue-collar workers alone. However, this does not hinder job 
rotation as (a) jobs are defined not in terms of demarcated tasks but in 
terms of technical and organisational competence and responsibility (a point 
made by Sengenberger (1987) as noted in Section 2), and (b) there is a tacit 
understanding that the main job is what a worker spends at least 50 per cent 
of one’s time doing.
Another major difference between Britain and Germany emerges when 
the shopfloor work organisation is compared. In particular, more technically 
qualified workers and supervisors are directly part of the shopfloor organisa­
tion in Germany than in Britain, a contrast also found by Daly et al. (1985). 
At the three British-based plants, a typical assembly line has three layers of 
hierarchy. Each line is headed by a supervisor (commonly called a “team 
leader”) whose task is to oversee the overall line workflow and the inter-per­
sonal relation of up to 40 operators on the line. A distinction is made 
between the majority of operators and a handful of experienced operators 
(variously called “senior members”, “leading hands” and “key operators”) 
whose tasks include training of new recruits and relief for absent operators. 
Typically, supervisors heading assembly lines have been internally promoted 
from the ranks of operators. B Electronics Ltd is most conspicuous in 
actively encouraging internal promotion, so that two employees who had 
started out as ordinary operators were promoted to supervisors and are now 
production controllers. Moreover, no specialist repairmen exist at B Elec­
tronics where repairing to defective products is done increasingly by experi­
enced operators on job rotation.
In Germany, the three plants had four, rather than three, layers of 
hierarchy specific to an assembly line. Each plant is slightly different, howev­
er, in its degree of departure from the German convention. C Electronics
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GmbH has the most undiluted German qualification-based system, in which 
a clear distinction is made between skilled and semi-skilled career tracks. 
Each assembly line has one line leader, one forewoman, several “jumpers” 
who can undertake part or all of the tasks on the line, and a few dozen 
operators. There are also a handful of repair specialists attached to each line, 
who have the dual apprenticeship qualification in radio, TV and communica­
tion electronics. The line leader is responsible for administration, for think­
ing of improvements to be made, visiting suppliers at times and coping with 
normal technical and engineering problems, while forewomen are respon­
sible for managing the line flow and taking interest in operators’ personal 
well-being so as to create a good social environment to work in. Operators, 
who are nearly all female, can be internally promoted up to the forewoman 
level, but their initial semi-skilled entry status forecloses any chance of their 
rising higher, as line leaders must have a Meister qualification which in turn 
requires prior technical dual apprenticeship qualification.
The other two German-based plants have made modifications to the 
pure qualification-based system, as follows. At B Electronics GmbH, the 
four ranks are section managers, group leaders, spares, and line workers. 
The four section managers, each handling an assembly line, are variously 
qualified as an engineer, a technician, a Meister and a skilled worker. Each 
line has 6 group leaders, who are expected to possess some expertise in 
technical matters as well as in interpersonal relations. The 18 group leaders 
consist of a minority of apprentice-qualified repair specialists on job rota­
tion, and a majority who have been promoted from spares (i.e. those who 
can carry out multiple tasks on a line).
A different modification is made at A Electronics GmbH to accommo­
date similarly more flexible internal promotion. Each line is headed by a 
junior supervisor, who oversees 2 to 3 group leaders, a jumper, and opera­
tors. Group leaders and junior supervisors must be Meister qualified. 
However, a preference for internal promotion had led to the following 
measures. First, 5 women who were recruited as operators and promoted to 
jumpers were trained in-house on-the-job in quality assurance, repair, and 
leadership, and were conferred an in-house Meister qualification upon satis­
factory continuous assessment. Second, 3 women who were also recruited as 
operators received 3 months training by in-house engineers in repairing; 
upon passing written and oral examinations and a practical test set by A 
Electronics GmbH, they were promoted to become repair helpers, working 
alongside ex-apprentices in radio, TV, and communication electronics. The 
skill and knowledge base of this in-house training programme was said to be 
much narrower than the Dual System curriculum. Moreover, the in-house
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qualifications are of no use outside A Electronics GmbH in German occupa­
tional labour markets. However, the flexibility they afford and the accompa­
nying training provide women who might otherwise be stuck in a semi­
skilled status for life an opportunity to be promoted.
(ii) Semi-skilled operators. — The great bulk of recruits at the six case study 
plants are for semi-skilled assembly jobs. In both Britain and Germany, the 
selection method was similar, involving a practical dexterity test, references 
and school reports, and an interview. The personnel managers interviewed 
both in Britain and German showed a preference for a good age mix, so that 
some recruits were school leavers while others were mature women in their 
30s with children. The initial induction training, health and safety regula­
tions, the product range, and some basic tasks (such as component recogni­
tion and soldering) lasts from one day up to 5 days. Thereafter, newly 
recruited operators are looked after by team leaders and supervisors who 
provide training on-the-job, and to whose discretion they rotate in a few 
different tasks during the probationary period of up to one year. A Electron­
ics Ltd has the most formalized system of training every operator in a broad 
base of skills initially, by insisting that all new recruits acquire competence 
in at least 3 tasks, which are commonly manual insertion, soldering, and 
mechanical assembly.
By far the clearest difference between Britain and Germany lies in 
educational attainments of operators prior to recruitment. In Germany, oper­
ators had gone through a 3 to 3.5 year dual system training, typically in 
sales assistantship, garment making or hairdressing. They were therefore 
receiving some form of education at least until the age of 18. The dual 
system qualifications in these occupations were considered as signals for 
dexterity required in assembly operations.
In Britain, by contrast, operators had typically left school at the age of 
16 with barely recognisable qualifications. For instance, only 10 per cent of 
direct workers at A Electronics Ltd were said to have some educational 
qualifications of any worth (i.e. at least one CSE with grade 3 or above). 
Similarly, 4 or 5 CSEs of any grade were said to be a typical educational 
qualification of recruits at B Electronics Ltd. The British manager at B 
Electronic Ltd was so appalled by some operators’ inability to spell and add 
up that he started registering a simple literacy and numeracy test as part of 
the initial selection, while providing remedial education to a few operators 
at the company’s expense.
(iii) Supervisors. — Production supervisors, as discussed above, tend to be
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internally promoted from among operators more commonly in Britain than 
in Germany. As supervisors at the plants in Britain are expected not to have 
technical expertise, training is focused more on leadership and inter-personal 
relations skills than on engineering skills. The only plant which recently 
adopted a training programme from its HQ plant in Japan is B Electronics 
Ltd. This training -  TWI (Training Within Industry) — is totally in-house, 
and uses the English translation of the manuals used at the Japanese plant. 
Both A Electronics Ltd and C Electronics Ltd have recently started training 
supervisors and team leaders in supervisory skills, as part of a one year 
NEBSM course taught by instructors from local Further Education Colleges. 
The course is continuously assessed, and involves no final examination.
In Germany, as noted before, the plants appointed Meister qualified 
workers to the position of supervisors. None of the plants have as yet had 
their employees studying for and passing the Meister examination after 
recruitment. The Meisters already possess broad-based technical knowledge 
in the relevant area, and pedagogical skills to train apprentices. Because of 
the norm that those in supervisory position have technical expertise, internal­
ly promoted group leaders at A Electronics GmbH and B Electronics 
GmbH have been given training in technical matters by internal engineers.
(iv) Apprentices and long-term trainees. — Five out of the six plants have 
apprentices. The plant with no apprentices is A Electronics Ltd, which had 
two past apprentices who successfully completed the programme in the past, 
but had all subsequent recruits leave before completion. B Electronics Ltd 
and C Electronics Ltd both have around 20 long-term trainees, mostly in 
maintenance skills. The courses last four years and are coordinated by the 
Engineering Training Association (which superseded the abolished Engineer­
ing Industry Training Board). The first year is totally off-the-job while the 
next 3 years involve on-the-job training with block releases at local FE 
Colleges. Both plants show a general policy to retain apprentices, although 
some have left for other employers or to pursue a university degree in 
engineering.
In Germany, the number of apprentices at the three plants is not so 
impressive compared with at the British-based plants, but the thorough 
attention apprentices receive at the company’s expense is. A Electronics 
GmbH, due to its recent establishment date, had 3 apprentices in general 
office administration only; the personnel manager showed a wish to recruit 
apprentices in the technical field in the future when enough in-house proc­
esses and facilities are installed. Both B Electronics GmbH and C Electron­
ics GmbH had apprentices, 15 and 12 respectively, in both technical and
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office administration occupations. The technical occupations were mainly 
“radio, TV and communication electronics” and also maintenance. The tech­
nical apprentices typically spend 4 days at the plant and one day at school. 
Not much work contribution is expected from apprentices, however, as 
much off-the-job training takes place in the plant’s education room, and 
because they must study for the school and pass the examinations. At B 
Electronics GmbH, one engineer with a supplementary trainer qualification 
from the Chamber of Industry is responsible for educating the technical 
apprentices. Such a person used to be a Meister, but was changed to an 
engineer, reflecting the rapid technological change in the electronics field. 
Training by in-house engineers is also quite common in Japan (Dore and 
Sako, 1989). At C Electronics GmbH, there is, besides 6 in-house qualified 
trainers of apprentices, one full-time additional outside trainer, who is a 
teacher paid by the plant to provide supplementary instruction, for example, 
by explaining to apprentices what they did not understand at vocational 
school classes. Training was provided on the expectation that around half 
would leave upon completion. This, the plants’ personnel managers consid­
ered acceptable, as “education is always also for the common society, not 
only for the company”.
7. Conclusions
Since the research reported in this paper is still at an early stage, all 
conclusions which may be drawn from such a small sample can be no more 
than tentative. With this proviso, the following summarizes the main fin­
dings. First, the productivity and quality differences between Britain and 
Germany appear to be not as great at Japanese-owned multinational plants 
as at indigenously owned plants. This may be because decisions over prod­
ucts design and development and process technology are largely controlled 
at the HQ plants in Japan. Where differences are pronounced are in gaps 
between quality levels achieved at the British-based and German-based 
plants on the one hand, and those achieved at their HQ plants in Japan. 
Inferior quality in Europe is due to a combination of reasons, including 
small batch production, inferior component quality, and the lack of aware­
ness and accumulation of know-how in maintaining and improving quality.
Second, although the British-German performance gap was not de­
tected from the sample evidence, there are grounds for thinking that the 
speed of performance improvement may be more rapid at the German-based 
plants than at the British-based plants. One important reason is the better
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qualified workforce in general in Germany than in Britain. Not only are 
semi-skilled operators better educated in basic numeracy and literacy in 
Germany; lower-level supervisors are better trained and qualified in techno­
logical matters, thus enabling them to deal with technical as well as manage­
rial problems at source quickly. This pattern in which supervisors and some 
blue-collar workers possess sufficient engineering knowledge to solve prob­
lems approximates the situation in a typical shopfloor in large Japanese 
firms. The advantage in productive efficiency of this work organisation, as 
compared to an organisation in which the technically qualified staff is more 
scarce and centralized appears obvious.
A related reason is the clear-cut external regulation concerning training 
in Germany, which forces Japanese plants to conform to the German mode 
of training in order to remain good corporate citizens. By contrast, British- 
based Japanese plants would not be able to fully reverse the erosion in 
British apprenticeship, particularly as Japanese plants require skills in con­
sumer electronics which no British-owned companies require any longer.
Yet another factor is the availability of local equipment and machinery 
suppliers which Japanese plants would wish to use in Germany and their 
relative absence in Britain. The ease of maintenance and the speed of 
response in repairing in Germany would enable a lower holding of invento­
ries at German-based plants than at British-based plants.
These are some of the reasons which may reinforce the location deci­
sions of Japanese multinational companies in the future, with Britain being 
chosen mainly for its low labour costs and Germany for the availability of 
technical manpower for design and development as well as for process 
innovation.
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METODI DI ADDESTRAMENTO NELLE IMPRESE GIAPPONESI, BRI­
TANNICHE E TEDESCHE
Questo articolo illustra i risultati di una ricerca sistematica sui metodi di 
addestramento e i loro effetti sulla performance nelle fabbriche giapponesi di elet­
tronica con sede in Gran Bretagna e Germania. Le questioni importanti sono: 
come si adeguano i metodi di addestramento propri delle imprese giapponesi ai 
sistemi di addestramento dei paesi ospitanti? Le differenze in questi metodi e la 
competenza accumulata dei lavoratori britannici e tedeschi si riflettono sulle dif­
ferenze di performance a livello di fabbrica? È risultato che le fabbriche giappo­
nesi modificano i loro metodi di addestramento per adattarsi a situazioni locali 
nazionali (per es. usando apprendisti e qualifiche vocazionali), ma in modo da 
non pregiudicare la loro fondamentale preferenza per l ’addestramento sul lavoro 
e per le promozioni interne. Non è stato identificato nessun chiaro legame tra 
addestramento e performance a livello di fabbrica. Questo è attribuito, in via di 
ipotesi, alle decisioni manageriali relativamente alla scelta del luogo, al disegno 
del prodotto e all’ingegneria del processo che in Giappone sono ancora condotti 
ad un livello di alta qualità.
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 
Volume 40 (1993), N. 12, 1065-1082
CAN THE WEST COMPETE W ITH JAPAN? 
It Can by Applying a Differentiated Protectionism 
as a Function of Orgware
by
G ia n n i F o d e ll a  *
Since the Sixties, the world economic order shaped in the early post­
war years has gradually revealed features that are very distinct from those 
that characterized it during the first half of the century.
Three main factors have contributed to this epochal change:
1) the growing availability of primary industry goods at decreasing 
prices and the ever-diminishing contents of raw materials and energy in 
products and services. Such a de-materialization, coupled with the increased 
accessibility to raw materials has damaged the relative position of all primary 
goods producers and exporters; on the other hand the dependency from 
imported raw materials for transforming economies like that of Japan has 
diminished. For example, during the high growth period of the Sixties 
Japan’s imports of raw materials (excluding energy) equalled 3% of GNP, 
in the Eighties they had fallen to just 1.6% of GNP. Japan’s consumption 
of imported energy has fallen in the same period from nearly 7 % of GNP to 
below 5% . Also conservation and industrial re-structuring are responsible 
of such a change, but de-materialization plays an important role: in 1984 
Japan used only 60% as much raw materials per unit of manufacturing 
output as it did in 1973;
2) the introduction of microelectronics in production processes has 
contributed to discourage direct foreign investments in the less developed 
countries. The application of microelectronics has enabled companies belong­
ing to industries once labelled as “mature” to remain in the developed
* University of Milan, Department of Economics, Milan.
This is a revised version.of the essay published by Japan Forum, Vol. 4, N. 1 (April 1992), 
Oxford University Press.
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countries, and has deprived the developing countries of a flow of capital 
from the direct foreign investments in manufacturing induced by the low 
cost of labour;
3) the availability of technology through the purchase of patents or 
licensing. This has reduced the importance of technological monopolies 
giving the most dynamic technology takers an advantage over the technology 
makers, who were not as able to fully exploit their own technological inno­
vations.
These three factors contributed to shift foreign direct investments from 
the least developed countries to the more developed or promising economies 
and gave an evergrowing weight to foreign investments in services. It is a 
framework that has favoured the more agile transforming economies of 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, to name just a 
few, all technology takers that in addition are heavily dependent on imports 
of raw materials, but that were able to respond with greater vitality than 
technology makers like the United States or the United Kingdom to a 
challenging situation and even to severe constraints like the one caused by 
the energy crises of the Seventies. This new reality could hardly be imagined 
over twenty years ago.
As a consequence we can detect in the world six areas with different 
speeds of economic growth, three of them highly promising (Eastasia), or 
already developed (Europe, North America with Oceania and South Africa) 
and three less developed (South and West Asia with North Africa) or 
declining (Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa) with a widening gap between 
the former and the latter group.
If we consider the dynamics that characterized foreign trade, we can 
easily see that during the Sixties, Seventies and Eighties while the percent­
age of US exports on world exports declined, that of Europe remained stable 
while those of all East Asian and of some South-East Asian countries almost 
doubled.
More precisely Eastasia — a cultural rather than a geographical concept 
defining the area dominated or strongly influenced by Chinese civilisation, 
or where live important minorities of Chinese origin, that includes China 
(with Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao), Japan, Korea (South and North), Viet­
nam, Thailand, Malaysia with Singapore and Brunei, Indonesia -  has seen 
its share of world exports grow from 9% in 1950, to 11% in 1970 and to 
21% in 1990. At the same time the share of the less developed countries 
was halved, from over 30% to less than 15% during the same period, while 
that of the developed Western economies remained almost stable showing a 
slight increase in Europe and a slight decrease in North America. Further­
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more the gap between the already developed and the highly promising 
economies on one side, and the less developed countries on the other, in 
terms of overall economic performance, has considerably widened, while it 
has been shrinking between Europe and North America.
In a classical work (Denison, 1967) the 1960 situation of some of the 
most developed among the European economies (Italy was not included.) 
was considered equivalent and was therefore compared to that of the United 
States of 1925. Even if the per-capita income levels and standards of living 
of 1925 USA were roughly similar to those of 1960 Europe, the growth 
rates were higher in Europe than in the United States. As a result of such a 
different dynamics in the 30 years 1960-1990 a 35-year gap (1925-1960) 
has been filled, since today the income levels in the United States and in. 
Europe are almost equal, if not in dollar terms at least in comparable 
welfare or in purchasing power terms.
The growth rates have since then continued to be higher in Europe 
than in the United States. In the 24 years from 1965 to 1988 for example, 
the average annual growth rate of real GNP per-capita grew 3.5% in 
Norway, 3.4% in Yugoslavia, 3.2% in Finland, 3.1% in Portugal, 3% in 
Italy, 2.9% in Austria and Greece, 2.5% in Belgium, France and West 
Germany, but 1.6% in the United States and 4.3% in Japan.
In 1965 the GDP of the United States was 701 billion dollars, that of 
the European Community (12 members) was 457 billion dollars (65% of 
the US) and that of Japan 91 billion dollars (13% of the US). In 1988 the 
figures had respectively become 4847, 4614 (95% of the US) and 2844 
(59% of the US) (The World Bank, 1990). In 1990 the European Commun­
ity GDP, including the 12 member countries plus the 13th “hidden memb­
er” (East Germany), has overcome that of the United States while Japan has 
considerably reduced its gap with them. Among the developed countries 
Japan’s economy has undoubtedly been the most surprising, although the 
extremely brilliant performance of China (with Taiwan and Hong Kong), 
Korea, Singapore and other Eastasian economic systems, should not be 
overlooked.
American GDP grew, between 1965 and 1988, about sevenfold and 
that of 12-country Europe tenfold, in dollar terms using current exchange 
rates, but Japan’s GDP grew over 31 times and that of South Korea over 57 
times. China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and 
Malaysia also experienced in 1965-88 real GNP per-capita rates of growth 
equalling or exceeding an annual average of 4% . Even the most dynamic 
European economies did not approach the performance of Eastasia as a 
whole. Europe has been able to grow at a pace quicker than that of the
1068 GIANNI FODELLA
United States, but slower than that of the “magnificent seven” of Eastasia.
Although the future is not to be assumed as a simple extrapolation of 
the past, it might be relevant to investigate the reasons behind the trend that 
developed in order to see what Europe and America may have to do in 
order to deal with such an economic challenge effectively. For example, the 
reasons behind Japan’s ability to thoroughly diffuse within the companies of 
its economic system the technology produced in Japan and elsewhere, in 
making accessible to its companies the world natural resources they need, in 
managing its monetary and exchange-rate policy and its long-term industrial 
and trade strategy, imply not only the adoption of highly efficient policies at 
country level, at industry level and at company level, but also the operating 
of an orgware (the structural organization that stems out of the institutions, 
rules/laws that define them, actual behaviours and their reciprocal interac­
tions together with a particular time horizon that characterize the agents of 
an economic system) of far superior quality than that of Europe or the 
United States. The high quality of orgware seems to be a common feature 
not only of Japan but also of Eastasia as a whole and it might be necessary 
to spend a few words on it.
After the decline of the economic power of the British Empire, the 
economic system economic theory used to refer to became that of the United 
States. When the United States became the most powerful economic system 
of the world it had by definition no external threats to fear and its only 
problem was to preserve rather than to protect its own system through the 
rules of the game that it had inherited from Britain.
These rules were essentially concerned with the mechanisms of competi­
tion within a free-trade framework and were aimed at protecting both 
citizens (as consumers) and entrepreneurs (as producers) from the power of 
domestic monopolies, the only visible menace to overall welfare and to a 
healthy competition among companies.
Being the institutions, rules and behaviours almost identical in the 
British and American economic systems, there were no reasons to consider 
orgware as an element deserving a special interest or attention when dealing 
with competitivity or other aspects peculiar to the economic system.
In other words all companies were rightly considered to be competing 
on an equal footing, since each developed economic system was based more 
or less on the same type of structural organization. On the other hand 
companies belonging to less developed economic systems had the “advan­
tage” of reduced labour costs to balance other shortcomings that might 
characterize their own economic systems, and in any case such companies
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were not on the world top list, since the most competitive companies 
belonged to the Western world.
In the last few years, however, with Japan and also increasingly with 
Korea, we have experienced a different situation. Not all companies compet­
ing in the world market come from economic systems that have the same 
type of institutions, rules and behaviours of the Western world and we have 
begun to suspect that the structural organization of the country system may 
positively affect their competitivity, and not only their style of behaviour. 
Although the word orgware, or another equivalent expression, has not been 
used with the meaning attributed by this author, companies have become 
increasingly sensitive about their social and economic environment, realizing 
sometime confusedly that something more than external economies might 
be at stake in enabling them to compete in the market arena.
Perhaps orgware, although ignored or disregarded, has always been 
important and, for example, the causes of underdevelopment might have 
their roots there. But so far economic theory has failed to recognize even its 
existence. This problem requires investigation that goes beyond the scope of 
this paper but this author would like to use this conceptual framework as a 
tool in investigating the competing ability of Japan and Eastasia in a compar­
ative perspective.
If we consider Japan we can see that in the 1950s it was largely 
ignored by the major industrial countries of Western Europe and North 
America. It was thought to be an unimportant country, forced by military 
defeat to play but a marginal role in world affairs. As a producer of manufac­
tured goods it was widely considered to be destined to reproduce foreign 
goods and to export cheap, low quality, industrial products.
In the 1960s Japan’s near miraculous economic growth was generally 
attributed to the low wages paid to Japanese industrial workers. As a 
product of cheap labour, Japanese industrial growth was generally believed 
to be based on social dumping and thus probably short-lived.
In the 1970s, when Japanese growth rates, though smaller than in the 
previous decades, remained much higher than in the other major industrial 
nations, the prevailing expectation was that soon the Japanese people would 
start enjoying life like everybody else and stop being so productive and 
thrifty. Wages were increasing in Japan and living conditions were improv­
ing rapidly. Yet Japan was still competitive with the rest of the world in 
manufactures and services, notwithstanding the continuous revaluations of 
the yen, due in large part to a sustained current account surplus. The 
popular explanation of Japan’s continuing success then became ‘Japan Incor­
porated’, a kind of unholy alliance between the private sector and gov­
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ernment aimed at fostering production and exports, made possible by the 
acquiescence of labour.
In the 1980s, the appeal of ‘J aPan Inc.’ also waned, and no other 
explanation of the success of Japan found acceptance. The general conclu­
sion in the West seemed then to be that Japan had become invincible, and 
companies, both from America and from Europe, became even more eager 
to establish ties with Japan.
The most innovative Western firms, for example, left to Japanese firms 
the production and especially the commercialization of new products that 
they did not feel confident enough to market by themselves. Many Western 
government authorities (including many state governments in the United 
States) sought direct investments from Japan, offering all kinds of incentives 
for the location of productive enterprises within their jurisdictions. Western 
firms in increasing numbers sought joint ventures with Japanese firms to 
produce in and for the Western markets.
European but also American companies tend to export to Japan by 
making use of Japanese general trading companies, which control almost 
two thirds of Japanese imports and develop the local market according to 
their strategies, which do not always coincide with the interests of the 
foreign company of which they market the products in Japan.
The main trading companies are part of informal groups of companies 
(keiretsu) that have continued to exist even after the formal dissolution of 
pre-war financial cliques (zaibatsu). This fact helps the well-known and 
well-practiced capacity of Japan to substitute efficient domestic production 
for imports. Every time a foreign product attracts a growing number of 
Japanese consumers, local companies are ready and able to produce it for 
the domestic market (in general under license), usually adapting it specifical­
ly to Japanese consumers. Advertising and packaging of the product are part 
of this process of adaptation to the domestic market. This type of import 
substitution does not stem from government policies, but from a spontane­
ous reaction of the market. This helps to explain why, while foreign trade­
marks are increasing in number in the Japanese market, there is no corres­
ponding increase in imports.
Foreign products have traditionally been considered expensive in Jap­
an, something made for special occasions and not for daily use. Although 
this attitude is changing, it is still deeply rooted. The consumption of wine 
and of whiskey, for example, is expanding in Japan, but this new demand 
has been met by increased supply of domestic products, rather than by 
imports. Japanese consumers also feel more confident with products fabri­
cated in Japan. This is  not a problem of quality, but of acceptance. In some
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cases, the traditional quality problem has been reversed. For example, Japa­
nese producers of Italian-type pasta claim their product is better than that 
produced in Italy and, while this seems unlikely, it has increased acceptance 
of the product.
No doubt Japanese consumers may often believe that locally produced 
goods are better than equivalent foreign products, for they are proud and 
sure of the manufacturing ability of their country, which is proving superior 
to that of all other countries in many areas, but very often the domestically 
sold product is of a poorer quality than the equivalent product marketed 
abroad.
The low volume of imports of manufactured goods in Japan can also 
be due in part to the internal distribution system which does not favour 
foreign products. Foreign firms do not offer wholesalers and retailers the 
same benefits (such as credit) and guarantees (such as stability of supply and 
service) offered by local producers. Yet, it would be misleading to see in 
this a major reason for the poor performance of foreign exports in Japan. 
Some responsibility lies in the foreign companies themselves, which often 
rely on Japanese general trading companies to enter the local market, with­
out realizing that this approach may be appropriate only when the targeted 
market is seen as a marginal one. The Japanese general trading companies, 
especially when they belong to a group that represents Japanese manufactur­
ers of products similar to the foreign ones, may lack the incentive to aggres­
sively push the sales of foreign-made products that could directly or indirect­
ly displace products manufactured within the group (formal or informal) to 
which they belong.
Japan in the 1930s was still a relatively small exporter of manufac­
tured goods, never accounting for more than 4 per cent of total world trade. 
Its sudden emergence on the world scene was not due to low wages (wages 
had always been low), but to gains in productivity. The new circumstances 
which strengthened Japan’s competitive abilities “were the market gains in 
technical efficiency and business organization achieved through the decade 
1926-36 and the violent dislocation of costs, prices and exchange rates 
precipitated by the Great Depression” (Lockwood, 1968, p. 68).
In the 1990s Japan is no longer a new entrant, willing to transfer to 
foreign consumers the benefits of currency depreciations, tied to the export 
of cheap manufactures and shying away from direct investments outside 
Asia. Japan has become an established industrial power, willing to assert 
some of its weight in the world. With a greater market power -  almost one 
tenth of world exports -  maintained compatible with a strong national 
currency that dredges resources from foreign countries, Japan’s weight in
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world trade and investments, and gains drawn from this participation in the 
world economy, are far greater than the simple market shares indicate. The 
situation today is sharply different from that of the 1930s, when an invest­
ment-shy and weak-currency Japan provided cheap exports to the rest of the 
world, largely to the benefit of foreign consumers.
Today the resources drawn by the strong yen flow generously towards 
Japan, while the growth of Japanese exports frightens the United States and 
the EC in ways that are strongly reminiscent of the 1930s.
The near hysteria aroused by Japanese trade surpluses in the United 
States (accompanied for the first time in 1991 by a net inflow of capital 
towards Japan) and the more muted, but nonetheless critically important, 
European preoccupations with further possible Japanese penetration of EC 
markets after 1992 -  from automobiles to financial services -  if they appear 
consistent with reality they appear to be unjustified on the basis of tradition­
al factors. The yen is hardly undervalued. Japanese wages are not those of 
a labour-rich developing country. Japanese tariff, and probably also non­
tariff, barriers do not seem to be significantly higher than those of the other 
main industrial countries.
What, then, is the secret of Japan’s continuing trade expansion and the 
reason for the strongly protectionist response of the main trade partners to 
Japans success in trade? The ‘secrets’ of Japan’s industrial success are many. 
Rationalization of industrial output, within the framework of a superior 
structural organization, which allows a thorough diffusion of technology in 
the economic system, is a primary one, while fast growth of labour produc­
tivity is another.
Japan uses trade and industrial policies in a way markedly different 
from its main industrial competitors. Trade policies in the United States and 
trade and industrial policies in Europe are mostly directed at protecting 
declining industries. They are, in other words, defensive and status quo 
oriented. Japan, on the other hand, encourages by all means the growth of 
the most promising industries, while reducing at the same time the weight 
of declining ones.
Japan, moreover, is rather protective of the technologies developed by 
its companies and is probably the country that offers the least access to the 
results of its own technological research. On the contrary, many Japanese 
companies obtain licenses for the use of advanced technology produced by 
foreign companies, often at bargain prices. Research institutions as well as 
private researchers do not generally consider the potential damage to the 
competitiveness of their countries done by the sale of licenses to overseas 
producers. In the West the interest of the individual company, researcher,
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consultant, etc. comes first, not that of the economic system. One of Japan’s 
assets lies in the ability to diffuse the technology that Japan has gained. 
Very often Japan has been able to fill a technology gap in a particular field:
-  by sending to the most advanced countries promising young peo­
ple (not only students) ready to learn and bring home the results of their 
learning;
-  by offering attractive contracts to young foreign experts who, 
though not yet well known in their own countries, have valuable knowledge 
in their fields;
-  by hiring as consultants promising researchers in fields of special 
interest, or buying, in full or in part, innovative foreign companies endowed 
with efficient research structures. It is a style that allows to acquire at the 
same time two products difficult to create (the know-how and a share in a 
previously unknown market) but that are nevertheless for sale. While Ja­
pan’s ability in marketing and in manpower strategy, added to its financial 
might, are not for sale. They could only be created thanks to the quality of 
Japan’s orgware.
Joint ventures are a particularly useful vehicle for acquiring technolo­
gy. In general, after a few years, the joint ventures with Japanese partners 
dissolve, since the Japanese partner either has grown too strong or has 
learned enough not to need its foreign counterpart any longer.
In entire sectors and industries where Western technological leadership 
(for example, home electronics, personal computers, optical equipment, auto­
mobiles) was the rule, Japan has in recent years eroded the position of both 
the North American and the European companies.
This is explained in part by the remarkable increase in R&D outlays 
that occurred in Japan. Today R&D expenditures are five times greater in 
Japan than in the United Kingdom, three times greater than in France and 
Germany, and one-third greater than in the Soviet Union. This indicator, 
though generally unsatisfactory in explaining technological diffusion -  the 
only aspect of technology that matters in economic terms -  is quite appro­
priate in this case since Japan devotes resources specifically to “devel­
opment”, and therefore also to the diffusion of technology. The fact that 
Japan is the main world buyer of foreign consultancies also contributes to 
the same final result.
Paramount in permitting the diffusion of technology in the most impor­
tant sectors of the economy have been the institutions, rules and behaviours, 
and their reciprocal interactions, that form the orgware of Japan. The very 
key to economic success is to be found in having equipped with the most
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efficient technologies the greatest part of the productive units belonging to 
the most important industries of the Japanese economic system.
In certain cases the diffusion has required hardware, material and finan­
cial resources, or more skilled labour that had to be formed (again using 
resources and precious time). In other cases the increase in efficiency has 
come solely or almost exclusively from a better way of making things 
happen following a pattern devised to increase efficiency, a blend of orgware 
and of software (technology and management).
If in an economic system like that of Japan communication networks 
(from rail to mail, from telex to fax) work well, it is easier for companies to 
be punctual in their deliveries. If all companies are punctual it is not 
necessary to stock spare parts in large numbers or may not be necessary at 
all, as it happens with the JIT (just-in-time) system of production. Thus 
costs are reduced and, all other conditions being equal, competitivity is 
enhanced.
If we consider another element of competitivity, the cost of capital, 
orgware plays an important role here too, since borrowing and lending rates 
may have huge differentials (like in the case of Italy) or be less apart (like in 
the case of Japan).
The strategy of Japan seems to be moving from direct exports of goods 
totally produced domestically (still prevailing in most instances, but heavily 
exposed to the danger of protectionism), to the overseas assembling of parts 
produced in Japan (the so-called screwdriver factories, well represented by 
typewriter and motorbike factories), to total overseas production of indus­
trial goods on a project basis, often considered by Japanese firms as necessa­
ry to serve markets that are differentiated in needs and tastes.
This strategy is being pursued for at least two good reasons:
— economies of scale are possible even with less than gigantic units 
of production. This makes decentralization possible and even desirable pure­
ly from the point of view of private costs. This trend is also desirable in 
order to reduce the social costs caused by the increased congestion of most 
urbanized areas and to contain social overhead expenditure for transporta­
tion and other networks;
-  large scales remain important in the marketing phase, since the 
success of a brand is often strongly correlated to market power, exemplified 
by the image attainable only through massive advertisements or to the type 
of market presence possible only for firms operating on a worldwide scale.
Mergers and acquisition of foreign firms have also become widespread 
in recent years, favoured by the appreciation of' the yen, which renders 
foreign assets relatively more attractive to Japanese firms. Japanese firms
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have in this way acquired existing firms in Europe and the United States. 
While the big acquisitions actually completed — Firestone Tire and Rubber 
acquired by Bridgestone -  or attempted -  Fairchild Industries bought by 
Fujitsu -  attract the rqost attention, this important new facet of Japanese 
foreign investment is best exemplified by the acquisition of small and me­
dium-size companies operating in sectors or industries such as electronics, 
specialty manufactures and computer software, that do not result in big 
news but that enhance the competing ability of Japan in many new fields, 
paving the way to incremental or even breakthrough innovations.
A large, efficient and relatively isolated economic system -  like that of 
the United States at the beginning of this century -  needed protection from 
within. Protection from the overwhelming power of monopolies in industry, 
trade, services that would penalize both new initiatives and the ordinary 
citizens seen as consumers. The antimonopolistic legislation that was passed 
is still in force after a century, but the situation at world level has dramatical­
ly changed and now the USA needs protection from the outside, since it has 
ceased to be by far the most important industrial country of the world as it 
used to be.
Japan, where after the defeat in the Pacific war a Fair Trade Commis­
sion was established in order to prevent the resurgence of monopolies, did 
not consider the protection of consumers as a priority and acted accordingly 
giving more attention and protection to the national producers, with the 
result that they were able to establish perhaps the most efficient economic 
system on earth, one that does not need any longer protection from the 
outside and can now embrace free trade in earnest: a change that Japan is 
now ready to adopt in order to avoid blame and protectionist actions from 
the part of its partners. On the contrary the USA may be compelled to 
adopt a more matter-of-fact attitude towards monopolies and free trade in 
order to cope with the challenge coming from Japan today and from the rest 
of Eastasia tomorrow.
Whenever institutions, rules and behaviours reciprocally contradict 
themselves or do not match the actual needs of the economic system in any 
given moment, the efficiency of the economic system decreases in terms of 
less-than-potential rates of growth, or in terms of bottlenecks or imbalances 
that the ill-performing orgware causes in the economic system. When names 
do not correspond any longer to things, and institutions to the words that 
define them, society decays, observed Confucius that used for reform the 
expression zheng ming or name rectification.
Economists used to point to terms of trade as a source of inequality 
among economic systems exporting mainly primary products or manufac­
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tures. Today many developed economies export products of the primary 
sector and almost all developing countries also export manufactured goods 
(even if they may often do so as subcontractors for companies of the devel­
oped countries). The attention must be shifted ftom terms of trade to 
exchange rates, keeping in mind that it is always possible to manage one’s 
exchange rate when the country has a surplus, enjoys credit and can afford 
to borrow. This is not possible when a country runs a deficit, unless it is for 
a short period. It is not the level of debt that matters, but how the financial 
resources are being used.
Once more the problem of development shows the importance of the 
qualitative aspects. Since it is difficult, not to say impossible, to measure 
them, economists tend to ignore them, concentrating on the quantitative 
aspects only. It is time to reconsider this approach that has led to the misuse 
and waste of resources because the qualitative aspects, those pertaining to 
orgware, had been overlooked.
The fact that in the Euro-American world a contractual type of relation­
ship prevails among companies, while in Japan relations between companies 
are often based on mutual trust, on confidence rather than on contract, has 
led us to suspect that this may change the time horizon of the company and 
its perspective to such an extent as to become a serious factor of differentia­
tion also in terms of competing ability.
The Japanese economic system did not, in the past, observe the rules of 
the game set at world level by the West, but so far all efforts to prove that 
this is continuing have failed. It is also possible -  and indeed likely — that, 
although Japan may be trying to follow these rules, under labels familiar to 
the West operates a quite distinct reality giving origin to an orgware that 
supplies the economic system with a more efficient basis for the operation 
of its companies.
Ron Dore points out that mutual trust, sincerity and goodwill are the 
basis of the relational contracting that prevails in Japan, rather than of the 
spot-contracting that prevails in the West. “There are some good reasons — 
writes Dore -  for thinking that it might be because of and not in spite of 
relational contracting that Japan has a better growth performance than the 
rest of us” (Dore, 1987, p. 174-192).
After the difficult post-war years (1946-64) Japan’s GDP ranked fifth 
after USA, USSR, West Germany and France. During the easy years of 
economic prosperity (1968-86) it ranked second and. the world was shocked 
when the average income of the Japanese became higher than that of the 
Americans: 17,000 dollars a year compared with 16,000 (The Economist, 
October 25, 1986, pp. 15-16). During the decade after the years of triumph
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(1989-98), thanks to the yen/dollar exchange rate and to the differentials in 
growth rates, Japan’s GDP might even become equal, in dollar terms, to 
that of the United States. That result will have to be attributed to the ability 
of diffusing technology and marketing technological products as factors 
responsible of a high speed economic growth. Although in both these abili­
ties, largely due to the quality of its orgware, Japan’s excellency is well 
known, there is more to it.
It is important to analyze and to understand fully the reasons for 
Japanese competitiveness, not only as an intellectual exercise, but also as a 
necessary condition for appropriate policy responses by Europe (and the 
United States) to a vital challenge coming from Japan and the other NIEs of 
Asia. The challenge is no more and no less than the transfer of the centre of 
gravity of the world industrial power from the West to Eastasia.
It is therefore extremely important that a problem of such relevance be 
discussed, debated and properly understood both in America and in Europe. 
In America, the official tendency to single out Japan as the most deviant 
trading partner, and to force it to make bilateral concessions usually with 
final disastrous effects for the United States, not only threatens the founda­
tion of the world multilateral trading system, but also limits the range of 
policy responses to the trade and other macroeconomic imbalances that exist 
between the two countries. In the EC, the general policy response to the 
Japanese challenge in manufactures, banking and insurance services will 
likely shape the overall trade and industrial policy posture of post-1992
Europe. ,
What is needed is a better understanding of both the strengths and
weaknesses of Japan’s economy, of the available policy response options 
both competitive and collaborative, and of the time horizons within which 
results can reasonably be expected. There are certainly areas where competi­
tion with Japan is inevitable. But there are for sure areas where cooperation 
is mutually profitable, either now or in the future. Japan bashing, as well as 
“if you can’t beat ’em, join ’em” types of responses -  the first strong at the 
government level, the second at the firm level -  are equally inappropriate in 
isolation. The illusion of beating back Japan by resorting to confrontation 
on a large scale is probably as dangerous as that of Japan’s invincibility, 
with the inevitable corollary of unequal cooperation. Both approaches inevi­
tably foster delusions, based on results that fall short of expectations, and 
lead to collisions whose effects may not be controllable, with devastating 
consequences on world welfare.
Rationalization of production, adoption and thorough diffusion or the 
latest technologies, together with outstanding marketing abilities, made Ja­
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pan one of the most efficient exporters of manufactured products in the 
world. As time goes by Japan is increasingly sharing this performance with 
other Eastasian economies, and the West will have to take this into consider­
ation when envisaging measures capable of dealing with the mounting com­
peting pressure from Eastasia now mainly, if not solely, represented by Ja­
pan, Korea and Taiwan.
To recognize the existence of orgware would allow Europe and the 
United States to adopt a differentiated protectionism as a substitute for free 
trade. Free-trade is an ideology based on the Darwinistic principle of the 
“survival of the fittest” that has proven to be instrumental in preserving an 
economic order favourable mainly to the dominating powers, and that has 
been unable to solve or even direct toward solution the problem of inequal­
ity among economic systems, as the growing distance in the economic condi­
tions of countries shows.
Free-trade has accentuated existing trends making richer the rich and 
poorer the poor. Only those countries that have not applied free-trade to 
their own case (like Japan, Korea, Taiwan), but that have taken advantage 
of the free-trade practiced by others, have been able -  when assisted by an 
orgware of high quality — to break that vicious circle and have succeeded in 
developing their economies. Only the very strong can afford free-trade, and 
Japan is now ready to apply it, while the rest of the world (with few 
exceptions like Germany) is no longer able to afford it.
Japanese companies succeeded in competing because their economic 
system helped them in that direction. American companies did not need any 
help to succeed, but times were different and the situation has changed. The 
United States might eventually be forced by Japan to become a more redoubt­
able competitor in the market arena. But such a path so far has beaten 
wrong tracks. The joint-ventures with Japanese companies have caused a 
substantial technology transfer. Many American firms in difficulty have 
been “saved” by Japanese companies that bought them in full or in part. The 
Japanese are creating manufacturing facilities in the United States making 
use of methods that have successfully been experimented at home. Those 
companies may be a revitalizing addition to the American industrial scene as 
some claim. But may also threaten it, since the appearance of more efficient 
companies (solely Japanese or joint ventures) may compel the least efficient 
(solely American companies) to leave and as a consequence discard capital 
and destroy jobs.
Japanese foreign direct investments are welcome, but should they not 
be reciprocated the market power of Japanese companies (and of Japan) will 
grow to control larger and larger shares of world production. A perspective
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worse than that of having Japan controlling large portions of exports, since 
exports can be checked and are more vulnerable than production made 
domestically with foreign capital.
Many American companies have already recognized the strength of the 
Japanese economy by becoming their devout customers, while the suppliers 
of Japan still in American hands decrease every day in number and import­
ance while increase those totally or partially owned by Japan.
American companies are often lured by Japan into joint-ventures that 
often lead to nothing, except for the experience gained that allows the 
partner from Japan to save time and money before replacing the less effi­
cient partner.
But there is an unbeaten track more likely to be taken perhaps by 
Europe than by America. That of co-operation in third countries. But since 
parity is a concept difficult to be understood in Eastasia — perhaps because 
it seldom exists in reality -  true cooperation is rare.
At this stage however it seems difficult to find solutions that may 
reverse the trend. Whatever action is taken it results in a strengthening of 
the Japanese side.
The quality of orgware, the dimensions of the market, the educational 
level of the labour force and the experience in using the resources with the 
appropriate methods and technologies make the Japanese system unbeat­
able, and Japan is only the tip of an iceberg called Eastasia.
This is the reality we have to recognize and face.
As a consequence we have either to create a barrier to control that 
system in order not to be dominated by it, or accept the rule of the survival 
of the fittest” even when the “fittest” is not in the West, and a Darwinistic 
approach is out of data since we created the welfare state, and social market 
economy (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) rather than “pure” capitalism is the rule 
in Europe.
If we have to seek protection from a system that combines an ad­
vanced stage of economic growth with a high quality of orgware, we have to 
accept at the same time the protection that other less fortunate economic 
systems in Africa, Asia and Latin America are seeking against us.
The world is not made of equals and we have to devise some discrimi­
nating tools to be used as handicaps that guarantee equality of development 
opportunities, to the strong (discriminated against) and to the weak (that 
can discriminate others) alike.
The cumulative experience of Europe -  where market forces have 
operated under social control, or where the market had but a marginal role 
-  might be more favourably biased toward a differentiated protectionism
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where the weak are protected and the strong are kept under control rather 
than toward a Darwinistic approach which still seems to be dominant in the 
United States.
A differentiated protectionism might be worth a try since it would 
operate in favour of those economic systems where both the low level of 
economic conditions and the poor quality of orgware indicate the relative 
disadvantage of the economic systems having these characteristics, and 
might do what so far the invisible hand has been unable to.
Data and projections seem to indicate that Europe and America will 
not match the competing power of Japan and of Eastasia as a whole. The 
reasons seem to lie not so much in unfair practices, but rather in the 
different behaviour of the various components of the economic system. 
While in Eastasia the reasons of the group seem to prevail, in the West the 
interests of individuals seem paramount.
It is a conflicting Weltanschauung that is compelling economists to 
think and eventually recognize that the rules of the game on which we have 
geared the operating of the economic systems might not be universal, and to 
admit that they have not been very efficient in making world welfare grow 
evenly.
The invisible hand has operated — to say the least — below capacity, 
and companies competing in the market arena have discovered that their 
international efficiency was influenced by something more than management 
and externalities.
Japan could base its economic growth on policies that systematically 
disregarded the rules of the game set by the West, and by so doing suc­
ceeded in becoming the most competitive economic system in the world.
Today Japan (and Eastasia as a whole tomorrow) is ready to be a 
flagbearer of free trade and may be able to practice it more fully than 
Europe or the United States. However, it might be time to recognize that 
better tools are needed and may be devised, after having experienced the 
traditional ones, if we really want to avoid that the strong become stronger 
and the weak weaker: a law of nature that human beings are trying to mend 
in order to build a less wild world.
To match the challenge of Eastasia we should have to train human 
resources in Europe like Eastasians have done in the past century. We 
should learn about them what they have been learning about us, breaking 
our Euro-centered educational system.
This may sound utopian but we should at least include in education 
curricula some elements that could break their exclusively Euro-centered 
nature. First by teaching Chinese and Japanese at University level as tools
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for reading the literature relevant to one’s own specialization, so that an 
increasing number of graduates in all disciplines might be able to approach 
the Eastasian world without intermediaries. The linguistic training should 
be supplemented and integrated by appropriate guided readings aimed at 
introducing the main cultural features of Eastasian societies.
So far we have formed a few hundred specialists every year, but this is 
not enough to match the imbalance and the knowledge gap that character­
izes today’s Euro-Asian relations. Our ignorance of Eastasia weighs heavily 
and is reflected in often ineffective or even self-defeating policy moves.
If a good number of European economists had a non-superficial know­
ledge of Eastasia even their insight about Europe’s economic systems would 
be enhanced, and might originate policies not only devised to face the 
Eastasian economic challenge effectively, but also appropriate at improving 
the world economic conditions in a long-term perspective. An appreciated 
by-product of a demanding but also highly rewarding effort.
In conclusion, the growth trends indicate that Europe -  where life 
conditions of 1925 United States were similar to those prevailing in econom­
ically developed Europe of 1960 — has now reached the United States in 
terms of real income per-capita, while it is losing ground vis-à-vis Japan. 
This fact is particularly visible if one considers the postwar trend characteriz­
ing world exports: United States share has diminished, Europe’s has re­
mained stable, while Japan’s has increased enormously, well overcoming the 
peak results of imperial Japan of the pre-war period.
Protection of the domestic market, an agricultural policy based on a 
successful land reform, industrial and trade policies geared to a favourable 
international environment that made Japan the main supplier in the Korea 
and Vietnam wars, allowed it also to take advantage of the low cost of raw 
materials and energy, to diffuse the technology produced elsewhere within 
the companies of its own economic system, to benefit from the free-trade 
atmosphere of its main partners. Japan’s institutions also operated in favour 
of economic growth to the extent that Japan was seen as a “developmental 
state”.
All this however is not sufficient to explain the economic success of 
Japan, since the various elements listed above were present also in other 
economic systems, but their combined efficiency was below that shown by 
Japan. The outstanding Japanese efficiency may stem out of an orgware 
of a higher quality ultimately responsible for the better performance of the 
Japanese economy. Although the economic standards are similar in Europe 
and in Japan, being the quality of orgware different, Europe cannot compete 
on an equal footing with Japan.
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PUÒ L’OCCIDENTE COMPETERE CON IL GIAPPONE?
Sull’esempio della performance economica giapponese, questo articolo cerca 
di dimostrare l’importanza dell’orgware — l’organizzazione strutturale consistente 
di istituzioni, regole e leggi che le definiscono, e comportamenti reali — che carat­
terizza un sistema economico e spiega come l’orgware influenzi l’efficienza di ogni 
agente economico, mentre la sua natura e qualità influenza la capacità competiti­
va delle imprese e del sistema economico in generale.
Date le differenze di orgware i sistemi economici non competono in posizio­
ne di eguaglianza e il libero mercato indiscriminato non fa che perpetuarne la di­
suguaglianza. Un rimedio potrebbe essere un protezionismo differenziato che da­
rebbe un differente handicap ad ogni sistema economico secondo il suo livello di 
sviluppo economico e la sua qualità di orgware.
RECENSIONI (BOOK-REVIEWS)
F o d e l l a  Gianni, F a t tore o rgw are  - La sfida economica dell Est-Asia. Milano, 
Garzanti, 1993, pp. 140, L. 25.000.
We are living in a period when natural resources are relatively plentiful and can easily be 
procured, and at the same time we are witness to the dematerialization of products and the 
possibility of using the technology available, wherever it has been created. But in this situation 
the economic systems which are growing most rapidly are certainly not those that possess the 
raw materials -  in general Third or Fourth World countries -  nor are they the countries in 
which the premises exist for the most advanced technologies to be studied and perfected -  
Europe and the United States -  but it can be noted that the economic systems which are 
growing most rapidly at present, such as the East Asian nations, have neither raw materials nor 
do they carry out fundamental research, but they possess particularly capable and efficient 
human resources.
But what are the reasons for these excellent economic results? What characterizes in 
particular this economic system? What is meant by the term East Asia?
Gianni Fodella has taken these premises as his starting-point in his recent work Fattore 
Orgware - La sfida economica dell'Est Asia (Orgware - The Economic Challenge of East Asia), 
and it is precisely with the intention of answering these questions that he has identified the 
concept of “orgware”.
The contemporary world can be divided into six critical areas, in which the varying rates 
of growth today characterize the economic dynamics in process in the various areas of the 
world. Starting from the slowest of these economic areas currently represented by sub-Saharan 
Africa, followed by Latin America now in a phase of decline, and then south-west Asia and 
North Africa where alongside an extensive development there is a relative stagnation, we arrive 
at North America which together with Oceania and South Africa presents a phase of decreasing 
dynamism. We then find Europe characterized today by an “intensive development and a 
certain dynamism” and finally East Asia which shows an extreme dynamism.
But why East Asia? What does this vast and variegated area of the world, that includes 
the whole of eastern Asia and a good part of south-eastern Asia, present that is particular?
Where does this current dynamism come from?
It is the heritage of a more or less direct common relationship with the traditions of the 
Chinese culture which brings together countries that are concretely different from one another 
due to their political and economic regimes: various interpretations of capitalism and commu­
nism are represented in this variegated economic system that goes from China to Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Macao, Singapore, Vietnam, Korea and Japan, and which also includes countries 
characterized by a significant presence of Chinese minorities that control important sectors of 
the economy, such as Indonesia, for example.
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It is precisely through the analysis of the particularities of this area — with its impressive 
population and the high rate of its economic development — that Fodella, comparing it with 
those of other economic areas, has succeeded in giving the true value to one of the factors of 
development that to date had not been taken into consideration: the orgware factor. But what 
is the orgware factor?
Defining the material and human resources available to an economic system as its 
hardware, and the organization and managerial capabilities of the same economic system as its 
software, the element lying between these two elements, orgware, is the element that makes 
that same system work. Orgware is “the set of institutions, rules or standards that define them, 
concrete behaviour and reciprocal relations and interactions”. If there is coherence between the 
contents of the rules and behaviour of those to whom the rules are addressed, the quality of 
the orgware is good.
We find the conditions to have an orgware of a high quality where the objectives of a 
society are shared, where there is no conflict on the world view and on the objectives between 
those who make the rules and those who must observe those rules. The quality of the orgware 
is high where there is the sense of belonging to the community of which one is a part.
For example in Japan, where the basic Confucian moral leads to seeking justice in 
concrete situations, relations are based on mutual trust, reliability and flexibility, attitudes 
which are not so obvious in the west, where contractual relations prevail and where morals are 
above all universal morals, morals that transcend individual circumstances. This results in the 
fact that in the West the infringement of social rules is considered less serious than that of 
divine rules, but on the contrary in East Asian societies social morals are not opposed to 
transcendental morals but there is one single set of morals.
There is coherence between rules and behaviour where there is mutual trust between the 
State and its subjects, where society meets the needs of the citizens: these are the basic 
conditions for an orgware of a good level, such as apparently exists at the moment in East 
Asia. *
Even if Fodella does not say so explicitly, orgware of a good level is not necessarily a 
prerogative of this particular economic system. The quality of the orgware may vary, not only 
from society to society, but within one society, from one historical period to another.
Is it possible to influence the quality of the orgware of a country, or must we restrict 
ourselves to acknowledging the level of orgware in the various societies? Is it possible to act in 
such a way as to make an economic system efficient? How can orgware be quantified? These 
are all questions that would require positive answers to be followed by suitable solutions.
In every country the level of orgware varies according to the historical period. Changing 
the orgware thus means influencing history. And it also means thinking in the long term.
In the West, the aim is always for results to be achieved in a relatively short period of 
time (Europe) or a very short period of time (America). In Japan and in general in the whole 
of East Asia the temporal horizon that underlies the plans and strategies of economic systems, 
of companies and also of families, is very wide and the objective is not only profit, but there is 
a wider, more social and more farsighted objective. The long term and ethically motivated 
behaviour overlap.
In a not too distant past, the social function of time was a value anything but unknown in 
the West too, and was at the origin of many Western habits such as: saving, which means 
immediate sacrifice in view of a future benefit, ours or that of our descendants; attention to 
problems of old age, our own and that of others; devotion to study, in the certainty that in the 
future this would produce results. Results were expected long after the actions that prepared 
them, and confidence in the results was based on a long and solid construction. This attitude
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has been replaced with us by a different way of thinking and different habits. The future of 
the elderly has been assigned to the social services; we no longer have confidence in study as 
before. Technology has accelerated manufacturing processes and the evolution of society. We 
have stopped worrying about others at least as a daily care. And thus taking advantage of the 
development of technology and social security, we have also lost the fundamental moral 
attitudes.
These are the attitudes that we still find in East Asia and which, considered from a 
different point of view, represent a competitive advantage of this economic system.
“A wide temporal horizon is a crucial factor of competitivity , states Fodella. The results 
confirm that success belongs to those economic systems which plan in the long term and are 
also ready to make temporary sacrifices in view of future results.
A lma Lauria
D orè Ronald, B isogna p ren d ere  i l  G iappone s u l serio . Sagg io  s u lla  v a rie tà  d e i  
c ap ita lism i. 1990, Bologna, Il Mulino, pp. 366, L. 44.000.
Ronald Dorè è autore di opere di grande valore come City Life in Japan (1958), indagine 
sociologica su un quartiere di Tokyo che venne salutata dai critici come la piu approfondita 
analisi della società e della cultura giapponese apparsa dopo II crisantemo e la spada della 
Benedict; e British Factory — Japanese Factory (1973), un’analisi comparata tra la fabbrica 
inglese e quella giapponese che rintraccia in maniera magistrale le origini delle differenze 
nazionali nelle relazioni industriali. Egli ci offre ora l’edizione italiana di un suo bellissimo 
libro del 1987, Taking Japan Seriously che usa il caso Giappone come uno specchio e un 
pretesto per fare considerazioni da un’angolazione particolare (A Confucian perspective) su 
alcune questioni economiche fondamentali (on leading economie issues) che ci riguardano tutti 
da vicino. Peccato che la traduzione non sia all’altezza dell’originale. Confondere Mencio con i 
Manciù può essere dovuto alle lacune dell’istruzione eurocentrica, ma alcuni importanti passi 
risultano veramente poco comprensibili per il lettore italiano che non abbia sottomano una 
copia del testo originale. Nella seconda edizione in lingua italiana pubblicata nel 1992 molte 
imperfezioni della traduzione sono state sanate. Speriamo tuttavia che il Mulino, che si appresta 
a darci in italiano anche Flexible Rigidities — Industriai Policy and Structural Adjustment in thè 
Japanese Economy 1970-80 (1986) dello stesso autore, ci fornisca una traduzione migliore.
La tesi di Dorè è chiara, ribadita con argomentazioni diverse e una ricca aneddotica nelle 
varie parti del libro: l’efficienza che permette al Giappone di eccellere in molte situazioni 
deriva « dal prendere le decisioni giuste perché ognuno ha fatto il suo dovere ... dal badare alla 
qualità del lavoro che si fa e dei servizi che si offrono ai propri clienti». Il successo 
competitivo del Giappone non è il risultato dell’efficienza nella sua accezione allocativa, ma è 
generato dal fatto che gli accordi sociali che implicano inefficienze allocative anche su vasta 
scala producono però un senso di equità che invoglia ciascun individuo a dare sul lavoro il 
meglio di se stesso. Quel senso di equità — ci ricorda Dorè non può essere un obiettivo 
raggiungibile quando ciascun operatore e incoraggiato a massimizzare il proprio tornaconto a 
breve termine con ogni mezzo e senza altro vincolo che non sia la dura realta dell operare delle 
forze di mercato. Non può esserlo in ogni caso in società dove il concetto odierno di diritto di 
cittadinanza si accompagna al diritto a essere rispettati e consultati, oltre che a godere di un 
reddito e di una sicurezza adeguati. La pratica dell’equità richiede moderazione nell’uso del 
potere di mercato e considerazione per gli interessi dei soci e dei concorrenti e per la comunità 
alla quale entrambi appartengono.
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Scartata 1 ipotesi, semplicistica ma in voga, che si possano trasferire frammenti di tecnolo­
gia sociale come i arca i, di qualità, Dorè ci dice che prender sul serio il Giappone significa 
invece chiedersi che cosa stia dietro ai circoli d i qualità e di quale tipo di impresa essi siano 
1 espressione. A che tipi di istituzioni dovremmo quindi dar vita per produrre lo stesso senso di 
equità che consente alla società giapponese di godere di un’efficienza produttiva sconosciuta in 
Europa? Questa e la domanda alla quale il libro cerca di dare una risposta, e lo fa usando 
esempt tram dall organizzazione dell’istruzione professionale (orientata verso il mercato nel caso 
dell Inghilterra e verso l ’organizzazione-impresa nel caso del Giappone) per mostrare come le 
endenze in atto indichino che la Gran Bretagna si stia già forse spostando verso il modello che 
tiene conto delle esigenze dell’organizzazione-impresa, ma non ancora abbastanza da alterare il 
modo di percepire la realtà e le aspettative della maggior parte dei datori di lavoro britannici 
Degni d. nota il capitolo che spiega in quale modo il Giappone sia stato in grado di 
dotarsi di una politica dei redditi che funziona (in parte grazie anche al caso, ma non per 
questo quell esempio cessa di essere una interessante fonte di ispirazione) e quello su autorità 
gerarchla e comunità. Ricco di aneddoti è un vero e proprio squarcio di vita vissuta che Dorè 
c. offre e che consente anche a chi non conosca il Giappone «dall’interno» di osservarlo da 
vicino usando come ulteriore strumento di esplorazione il costante paragone con la Gran 
Bretagna o il riferimento a una realtà più familiare perché radicata nella nostra cultura come 
quando osserva che il modello di serena autorità che oggi domina in Giappone è dello stesso 
tipo di quello dell Europa feudale: verso l’autorità si ha un timore revenziale ma ammirazione 
soltanto quando vi si mescola la cura intrisa di calore umano per i seguaci fedeli
Nel trattare del ruolo degli azionisti e della prospettiva di lungo periodo che tende a 
caratterizzare le imprese giapponesi, Dorè affronta il problema dell’impresa vista come una 
comunità organizzata, un modello al quale saremo probabilmente costretti a tendere anche in 
Occidente se vorremo sopravvivere. La concorrenza sui mercati infatti è « sempre più in termini 
di qualità, innovazione e reputazione: tutti prodotti dell’efficienza dinamica in un orizzonte di 
lungo periodo ». Cruciali a questo proposito sono le relazioni di tipo fiduciario, perciò di lungo 
periodo (relational contracting) contrapposte a quelle di tipo contrattuale e perciò a breve 
(spot-contracting) che si instaurano nel mercato, tema al quale Dorè dedica ampio spazio per 
sottolineare la maggiore efficienza, nel lungo periodo, della contrattazione basata su relazioni di 
tipo fiduciario (dove i confini legali sono labili, ma quelli «normali » saldi) che prevalgono in 
Giappone, rispetto ai contratti basati sulle norme (dove i confini legali sono rigidi ma nessuna 
norma morale vieta che essi siano aggirati, se ciò avviene « legalmente ») che prevalgono invece 
in Occidente. Dorè sembra riporre una certa fiducia nella possibilità di produrre un mutamento 
sostanziale nelle norme di comportamento, oltre che di carattere istituzionale e normativo 
ispirato all esempio giapponese. Chi scrive non è cosi ottimista e forse soltanto se ci rendetene 
veramente conto che non esistono alternative saremo disposti a cambiare, il che non significa 
che ci riusciremo. Poiché per farlo dovremmo mutare Yorgware che caratterizza il nostro sistema 





Un problema, spesso, lo si risolve semplicemente parlando.
Al Credito Italiano trovate sempre chi vi sa ascoltare, chi sa valutare 
e discutere le vostre esigenze per proporvi le soluzioni più vantaggiose 
per i vostri interessi e il futuro sviluppo della vostra attività.
Per la famiglia, per il commercio, l'artigianato, l'agricoltura, la piccola 
e media impresa, il Credito Italiano può fare molto.
Perché i suoi servizi sono specifici e completi.
Così ampi da assicurare le risposte più concrete 
ad ogni vostra domanda; in ogni genere di 
operazione bancaria.
Sono consigli che valgono denaro contante.
Credito Italiano:
la grande banca con oltre 700 sportelli 
in Italia, 8 filiali e 17 rappresentanti all’estero,
3000 banche corrispondenti in tutto il mondo.
STUDI IN MEMORIA DI TULLIO BAGIOTTI 












P. A. Samuelson 
B. S. Yamey
F. von Hayek A. Agnati 
D. Cantarelli 
A. Montesano
Scritti di/Papers by: A. Agnati, M. Allais, H. Arndt, G. Barbieri, H. 
Bartoli, P. Bassetti, W.J. Baumol, G. Becattini, M.J. Beckmann, L. 
Beltran, G. Borelli, W. Braeuer, F. Brambilla, M. Bronfenbrenner, F. 
Bruni, F. Caffè, D. Cantarelli, U. Caprara, C. Carli, A. Cova, C. 
Dagum, V. Del Punta, G. Demaria, B. Dmytryshyn, P. Dubey, 
R. Faucci, G.R. Feiwel, V P. Filios, V. Filosa, P.C. Fishburn, G. 
Fodella, G. Gaburro, O. Garavello, I. Gasparini, F- Gehrels, N. 
Georgescu-Roegen, A.L. Gitlow, G. Goisis, W.D. Grampp, H. 
Guitton, L.C. Harriss, K. Holbik, E. James, W. Krelle, R.E. Kuenne, 
G. Landenna, W. Leinfellner, L. Lenti, J.M. Letiche, S. Lombardini, 
G. Lunghini, M. Manfredini Gasparetto, J.A. Martellare, A. Martinelli, 
A. Mauri, F. Meacci, M.A.G. van Meerhaeghe, R. Molesti, A. 
Montesano, M. Monti, T. Negishi, H. Onoe, A. Pellanda, W.W. 
Pommerehne, P.L. Porta, A. Quadrio Curzio, R.E. Quandt, A.N. 
Rugina, O. Scarpai, C. Secchi, H.F. Sennholz, Y. Shionoya, M. 
Shubik, I. Sobel, S.C. Sufrin, M. Talamona, J. Tinbergen, J.E. 
Weiririch, S. Weintraub, J.K. Whitaker, B.S. Yamey, G. Zalin, S. 
Zamagni, O. Zinam.
1988. In 8°, pp. LX-1366 L. 120.000
EDIZIONI CEDAM - PADOVA
ASIAN
SURVEY
A Monthly Review of Contemporary Asian Affairs
Widely Used and Quoted by Academics, Government and 
Military Officials, Business Executives, and Journalists
January and February Year-end Issues 
Full summaries of the previous year's events in 24 countries
• • • •
March through December Issues 
Six articles of commentary and analysis each month on the politics, 
economics, and foreign relations of nations in East Asia, South Asia, 
and Southeast Asia.
• • • •
Special Issues
China - International Relations in the Post-Cold War World -  March 
Japan - Defining Its International Role -  June 
South Asia - Responses to the Temple/Mosque Incident in 
Ayodhya -  July
Annual Subscription Rates
Individual: US$47; Students: US$27; Institutions: US$98; Single Current and Back 
Issues: US$7; Institutions: US$9 (Orders outside the U.S., please add US$11.)
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS 
Subscriptions to:
Journals Division 
2120 Berkeley Way 
Berkeley, CA 94720 
510-642-4191; FAX 510-642-9917
INSTITUTE OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES 
Editorial Office:
Asian Survey - Room 408 
6701 San Pablo Avenue 
Oakland, CA 94608 
510-642-0978; FAX: 510-643-9930
E D I Z I O N I  C E D A M P A D O V A
Recentissima:
RAINER S. MASERA - SALVATORE ROSSI
LA BILANCIA DEI PAGAMENTI
I conti con l’estero dell’Italia, 
la lira, i problemi dell’unione monetaria europea
(Trattato di statistica economica.
Diretto da Antonino Giannone. Volume n. 10)
pp. XIV-350
ISBN 88-13-17853-0 L. 42.000
I n d ice . — Introduzione. — R iferim enti bibliografici. — Parte p rim a: Schem i contab ili e 
metodi statistici. — I: Le norme internazionali. — II: La bilancia dei pagamenti dell’Italia. 
— I li :  Le partite correnti. — IV: I movimenti di capitale e la posizione verso l’estero. — 
V : Bilancia dei pagamenti e contabilità nazionale. — Parte seconda: E lem enti d i an a lis i 
dei processi d i aggiustamento della b ilancia de i pagam enti. — VI: Il mercato dei cambi. — 
Appendice al capitolo sesto. — VII. L ’aggiornamento della bilancia dei pagamenti: le 
analisi di flusso. — V i l i :  L’aggiustamento esterno: le analisti r/oc/è/flusso. — Appendice 
al capitolo ottavo. — Parte terza: I l  sistema internazionale dei pagam enti e la  b ilancia dei 
pagam enti d e ll’I ta lia  d a l 1970 a l  1991. — IX: G li anni settanta: il decennio dell’instabili­
tà. — X: G li anni ottanta: il decennio dell’aggiustamento. — XI: Il « vincolo esterno » 
allo sviluppo dell’economia italiana. — Parte quarta : I l  progetto d i unificazione monetaria 
in Europa. — XII: Verso l ’eutanasia della bilancia dei pagamenti? — Indici.
IN VENDITA NELLE MIGLIORI LIBRERIE E PRESSO I NOSTRI AGENTI
If you need to know about China,
read The China Q uarterly
For o v e r  th irty  years, T h e C hina Q u a rter ly  has 
b e e n  essential re a d in g  f o r  e v e r y o n e  c o n c e r n e d  
w ith  m o d e r n  C hina. T o d a y  it co n t in u e s  t o  p ro v id e  
t h e  a u th o r ita tiv e  a n d  p r o v o c a t iv e  p ersp ectiv es  o n  
w h ich  C h in a -w a tch ers  h a v e  c o m e  t o  rely.
THE CHINA QUARTERLY OFFERS:
•  Carefully researched articles published according to the highest academic 
standards, after close scrutiny by specialists in the field.
•  Briefing analyses on recent developments keep readers up to date with 
current events.
•  Research notes bring specific topics of scholarly Interest to wider 
attention.
•  Occasional essays on new concepts and methods in Chinese studies.
r V
•  Surveys of the state of the field describe and assess research on China in 
various countries and academic disciplines.
•  Periodic special issues devoted to a theme provide comprehensive analysis 
of key topics.
•  The Chronicle and Documentation section offers a valuable overview of 
recent events in China and reactions thereto, both domestic and foreign.
•  Occasional translations of important Chinese documents.
•  Numerous book reviews and a listing of books received provide a reliable 
and up-to-date guide to new publications in the China field.
t
Place your order with
Grace Pursey
The China Quarterly
School of Oriental and 
African Studies 













Telephone 071 637 2388 
Fax 071 580 6836 A SPAS publication
E D I Z I O N I  C E D A M  - P A D O V A
Recentissima:
LAUSO ZAGATO
LA POLITICA DI RICERCA 
DELLE COMUNITÀ EUROPEE
(Università degli Studi di Ferrara. 
Quaderni del Centro di Documentazione e 
Studi sulle Comunità Europee. Nuova serie, n. 6)
pp. XIV-460
ISBN 88-13-18452-2 L. 48.000
I n d ic e . -  In troduz ione. -  P arte  p r im a : L a  base g iu r id ic a  d e lla  p o lit ic a  d i r ice rca  e 
sv iluppo  tecno logico  p r im a  d e l l ’a tto  unico. -  I: Ricerca e sviluppo tecnologico nella 
CEE. -  II: Ricerca e sviluppo nella politica energetica delle Comunità. -  III: 
L’applicazione degli articoli 85 e 86 del Trattato CEE a ricerca e sviluppo. -  P arte  
secon da: G li s tru m en ti g iu r id ic i d e lla  p o lit ic a  co m u n ita r ia  d i r ice rca  e sv iluppo  
tecno logico  n e g li a n n i ’8 0 . -  IV: L’attività di ricerca e sviluppo delle Comunità 
Europee sulla base dell’atto unico. — V: Cooperazione tecnologica e concorrenza 
all’avvio del mercato interno. -  C onclusion i. -  B ib lio g ra f ia  g en era le . -  Ind ic i.
IN VENDITA NELLE MIGLIORI LIBRERIE E PRESSO I NOSTRI AGENTI
E D I Z I O N I  C E D A M P A D O V A
Recentissima:
ENRICO BISOGNO - CHIARA GATTO • FABIO NERI
L’IMMIGRAZIONE STRANIERA 
IN VENETO E FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA
Aspetti demografici ed economici 
(Quaderni di economia)
pp. 352
ISBN 88-13-18185-X L. 36.000
I n d ic e . -  P resen taz ione. -  C om itato  S c ien tif ico  e A uto ri. -  In troduz ione . -  I :  
Evoluzione demografica ed economica dellTtalia. — II: La situazione del 
Veneto e del Friuli Venezia-Giulia. -  III: Aspetti qualitativi e quantitativi 
dell’immigrazione extracomunitaria. -  IV: Gli immigrati tra economia regolare 
e irregolare. -  V: Le conseguenze sociali della recente immigrazione. -  
B ib lio g ra f ia . — D ocum entazione leg is la tiv a .
IN VENDITA NELLE MIGLIORI LIBRERIE E PRESSO I NOSTRI AGENTI
Certificati di Deposito 
Mediocredito Lombardo.
Mediocredito Lombardo fa  lavorare i 
vostri soldi nelle migliori imprese italia­
ne, quelle produttive, sane insomma. 
Così aiuta l'economia italiana ed anche 
la vostra. Un investimento in Certificati di 
Deposito Mediocredito Lombardo può be­
nissimo cominciare con poco: basta un 
milione di lire. Potete scegliere fra Certifi­
cati di Deposito con durata di 18,24,36, 
48 o 60 mesi, a tassi fissi o variabili, con 
interessi semestrali, annuali o capitaliz- 
zabili. E  se volete, Mediocredito Lombardo 
provvede ad accreditarvi i rendimenti 
automaticamente sul vostro c/c. E  per la 
vostra completa tranquillità, ricordate che 
tutti i Certificati di Deposito sono sempre 
liquidabili, basta chiederlo a Mediocredi­
to Lombardo. Per sottoscriverli rivolgetevi 
alla vostra Banca, alle più importanti 
Reti di promozione finanziaria, o diretta- 
mente a Mediocredito Lombardo. A Mila­
no, in  Piazzale 
Cadorna n. 3; a Ro­
ma, in via Principes­
sa Clotilde n. 5/A.
Allora è vero che lavorano bene, 11ZTZ
I miei soldi ogni 6 mesi 
mi scrivono buone notizie.
nare al numero ver­
de 1678/26133 per fissare un appunta­
mento. Saremo fe lic i d i darvi 
tutte le informazioni che non hanno 
trovato spazio in questo annuncio.
I  NUMEROVERDel
A i sensi del provvedimento della Banca d'Italia del 24.5.1992 
emanato in attuazione della legge 154/1992. per qualsiasi 
informazione riguardante le condizioni praticate alla cliente­
lo, si rinvia ai fogli informativi analitici disponibili presso 
Mediocredito lombardo egli enti che distribuiscono iprodotti 
dell'Istituto. Istituto autorizzato dalla Banca d'Italia (con 
richiesta in data 16/10/1991) a svolgere attività di interme­
diazione mobiliare ai sensi della legge 1/1991.
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